Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison

• Decision Date: 29 July 2003
• Citation: 826 A.2d 1102,264 Conn. 829
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SCHAGHTICOKE TRIBAL NATION v. RONALD HARRISON.

264 Conn. 829

826 A.2d 1102

SCHAGHTICOKE TRIBAL NATION v. RONALD HARRISON.

(SC 16874), (SC 16875).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 11, 2003.

Officially released July 29, 2003.

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js. Charles D. Ray, with whom were Eric Watt Wiechmann and, on the brief, Vanessa D. Roberts, for the appellant-appellee in Docket No. S.C. 16874, appellee in Docket No. SC 16875 (plaintiff).

Michael J. Burns, for the appellee-appellant in Docket No. 16874 (defendant) and for the appellant in Docket No. 16875 (proposed intervenor).

Opinion

SULLIVAN, C. J.

In these two consolidated appeals, the plaintiff, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, appeals from the trial court's decision granting the motion of the defendant, Ronald Harrison, to dismiss the plaintiff's trespass action, and the defendant cross appeals and the proposed intervenor, the Schaghticoke Indian Tribe, appeals, both from the trial court's decision denying the proposed intervenor's motion to intervene. We reverse both the trial court's granting of the motion to dismiss and its denial of the motion to intervene.

The Schaghticoke are a state-recognized tribe of Indians who possess a state-recognized reservation in Kent.¹ The tribe currently is divided into two factions. The plaintiff, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, and the proposed intervenor, Schaghticoke Indian Tribe, of which the defendant is a member, each claim to be the tribe recognized by the state. On June 13, 2001, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for trespass. The basis of the complaint was an allegation that the defendant, a resident of the Schaghticoke Indian reservation (reservation), without the plaintiff's permission and contrary to its orders, had removed and was continuing to remove timber from the reservation and had caused additional incidental damage in the process. On July 17, 2001, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action, and the proposed intervenor filed both a motion to intervene and a motion to dismiss. On November 27, 2001, the trial court denied the motion to intervene and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff did not have standing because it did not have authority to bring suit on behalf of the tribe. The plaintiff and the proposed intervenor appealed from these decisions against each of them respectively, and the defendant filed a cross appeal challenging the denial of intervention. We transferred the appeals to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. We reverse both decisions of the trial court.

I

We first consider the plaintiff's appeal challenging the trial court's granting of the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff maintains that the facts alleged in its complaint were sufficient to demonstrate standing and that those facts should have been construed most favorably to the plaintiff. In the alternative, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motion to dismiss. We agree with the plaintiff's alternative argument.

"`If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.'" Ramos v. Vernon, 254 Conn. 799, 808, 761 A.2d 705 (2000). "[T]he standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to demonstrate two facts. First, the complaining party must be a proper party to request adjudication of the issues.... Second, the person or persons who prosecute the claim on behalf of the complaining party must have authority to represent the party." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, 231 Conn. 563, 571, 651 A.2d 1246 (1995). "To demonstrate authority to sue ... it is not enough for a party merely to show a `colorable claim' to such authority. Rather, the party whose authority is challenged has the burden of convincing the court that the authority exists." Id., 572. "When issues of fact are necessary to the determination of a court's jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, 220 Conn. 689, 695-96, 600 A.2d 1019 (1991).

In the present case, the defendant challenged the plaintiff's authority to bring an action on behalf of the Schaghticoke tribe,² asserting that the proposed intervenor, and not the plaintiff, is the tribe recognized by the state. In the face of this challenge, the plaintiff had the burden of convincing the court of its authority to maintain this action, and, therefore, contrary to its claims, was not entitled to have its allegations regarding this authority construed in its favor. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, supra, 231 Conn. 572. The plaintiff was, however, entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which it could attempt to establish its authority before the court found that it lacked that authority. Because the trial court in this case did not hold an evidentiary hearing prior to determining that the plaintiff was not authorized to bring an action on behalf of the tribe, the court's granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss was improper.

The defendant asserts several alternate grounds for affirmance of the court's dismissal of the plaintiff's action. The defendant maintains that, in the present case, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hold such an evidentiary hearing or to determine whether the plaintiff is in fact the Schaghticoke tribe referred to in General Statutes § 47-63, because the resolution of the question of "tribal status" must be determined in administrative proceedings before the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (bureau)³ before the trial court may permit this case to proceed. We disagree.

The defendant claims that "[a] determination of the tribal status of [the plaintiff] and [the proposed intervenor] is required prior to proceeding" in the present case. Noting the plaintiff's petition for federal recognition pending with the bureau, the defendant claims that "the determination of tribal status is a prerequisite to determining the merits of the plaintiff's complaint, and tribal status is also at the heart of the federal proceedings. The plaintiff's claims are contingent upon the resolution of that very issue, and are not ripe." The defendant makes no other assertion regarding the status of the plaintiff's petition for federal recognition and, therefore, takes the position that the mere fact that such a petition is pending, standing alone, deprives the trial court of jurisdiction.

The defendant cites only one case in support of his claim that the present case is not ripe. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1994). That case, however, does not support his position. In Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, supra, 54, a tribe of Indians sought relief under the federal Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of July 22, 1790 (Nonintercourse Act), 25 U.S.C. § 177, which provides in relevant part: "No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution...." The plaintiff in that case also had an application for recognition pending with the bureau. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, supra, 55. One of the defendants moved to dismiss the action, claiming that "the [D]istrict [C]ourt lacked jurisdiction because [the] plaintiff had alleged insufficient facts to support an element of its claim, namely that [the] plaintiff is a `tribe' within the meaning of the Nonintercourse Act." Id. The District Court dismissed the action without prejudice. Id., 54. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the District Court was required to defer to the bureau's determination of whether the plaintiff in that case would be granted federal recognition before determining if that plaintiff was a "tribe" under federal law, and remanded the case with direction to stay the action pending that determination by the bureau. Id., 60.

The plaintiff in the present case has not brought suit under any law requiring that it be a federally recognized tribe, however, but instead has brought a state common-law trespass action to protect the interests of the Schaghticoke tribe in the reservation assigned to it under § 47-63. Therefore, if the plaintiff can establish that it is authorized to bring this action on behalf of the Schaghticoke tribe, the plaintiff has standing whether its petition for federal recognition is granted, denied or stayed indefinitely. Consequently, a decision by the bureau regarding the plaintiff's pending petition for federal recognition is not a prerequisite to determining the plaintiff's standing to sue in the present case.

The defendant further asserts that "[t]he question of ripeness in the present case also involves an understanding of the interrelated doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction as well as concerns over federal preemption." Those doctrines, however, did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hold an evidentiary hearing in the present case to determine if this action has been properly authorized by the Schaghticoke tribe. The plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendant from removing trees from, or making other alterations to, land on the reservation. The granting by the bureau of the plaintiff's petition for federal recognition would not provide the remedy sought by the plaintiff in this action, and, as previously explained, federal recognition is not a prerequisite for the granting of that remedy. Consequently, the alleged failure by the plaintiff...