De Schamps v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Kokomo
Citation | 174 N.E.2d 581,241 Ind. 615 |
Decision Date | 08 May 1961 |
Docket Number | No. 29828,29828 |
Parties | Harry V. DE SCHAMPS, Appellant, v. BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF the CITY OF KOKOMO, Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Darrel L. Hodson, Kokomo, for appellant.
Ralph L. Helms, W. Dan Bretz, Shirley & Helms, Kokomo, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Howard Circuit Court enjoining and restraining the appellant and others
Appellant filed his timely motion for a new trial, alleging as grounds therefor, the following:
'1. That the finding of the Court is not sustained by sufficient evidence.
'2. That the finding of the court is contrary to law.
Appellant's motion for a new trial was denied and this appeal followed.
By agreement of the parties in the court below, it was stipulated as follows:
'1. That Plaintiff [appellee] is the regularly authorized and appointed Board of Zoning Appeals under Ordinance #2279, 1925 and amended by Ordinance #3111, 1948, as amended by the City of Kokomo, Indiana.
'2. That the defendants, Earl D. Dunkle and Gladys I. Dunkle are the record owners of the real estate in litigation.
'3. That said described real estate is by said Ordinance designated as INDUSTRIAL.
Plaintiff's exhibit B admitted in evidence in the trial court was the ordinance in question and among other things provided, as follows, section one, divided the City of Kokomo into certain districts, one being '7 I1-Industrial'; section four, special uses permitted by paragraph five thereof 'In C1 and I1 districts:
Section fifteen of such ordinance provided as follows:
'Further, the Board of Zoning Appeals or any designated enforcement officer may institute a suit for injunction in the Circuit Court of Howard County to restrain an individual from violating the provisions of this Ordinance and may also institute a suit for a mandatory injunction directing removal of any structure erected in violation of the terms of this Ordinance.'
See also: Acts 1947, ch. 174, § 90, p. 571 being § 53-791 Burns' 1951 Replacement.
The Act permitting the enactment of the ordinance here in question is Acts 1947, ch. 174, § 82, p. 571; 1951, ch. 291, § 5, p. 935, being § 53-783 Burns' 1960 Cum.Supp., and it provides for an appeal from the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals.
From the record before us it appears that appellant at some time prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance was engaged in the business of auto wrecking on all or a part of Lot #24 in Avery's Addition to the City of Kokomo, that since such date he has as a matter of right, and without molestation, continued to carry on such business on such Lot #24. It further appears from the record that Lot #20 in Avery's Addition (the real estate here in litigation) is adjacent to and abuts on Lot #24 on the east. In 1954 appellant began using at least a part of Lot #20 in connection with his auto wrecking business on Lot #24. In 1955 he applied to the City Board of Zoning Appeals for a Special Use Permit, such permit was denied and no appeal was taken from such denial, appellant stating that the appeal was not perfected on account of the illness of his then counsel.
Appellant continued to conduct such business on a part of Lot #20, and on December 6, 1957, appellee filed its 'Complaint for Injunction' seeking to enjoin appellant from the use of such real estate as an automobile wrecking yard.
The assignment of error is that the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial. Appellant assigned three causes for a new trial as previously shown herein and has elected to group causes one and two into one argument.
A. The finding of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law.
The appellant takes the position that the evidence in this case does not justify the granting of an injunction. Appellant alleges that an examination of the complaint will show that the only grounds alleged for the granting of an injunction is that no permit has been granted under the terms of the ordinance by the Board of Zoning Appeals; that there is no allegation that the defendant was conducting a business which constituted a nuisance; there was no proof that there was irreparable damage to plaintiff, and no proof to sustain the allegation that plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. The cases...
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Field v. Area Plan Commission of Grant County, Ind.
...now confronted was not precisely raised. For example, a strikingly similar situation was presented in DeSchamps v. Board of Zoning Appeals (1961) 241 Ind. 615, 174 N.E.2d 336 where the Board sought an injunction against the operation and maintenance of an auto wrecking business in a residen......
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Gross Income Tax Division Indiana Dept. of State Revenue v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., OWENS-CORNING
...trial court could have made its determination. Bassemier v. Sartore (1964), 246 Ind. 365, 205 N.E.2d 160; DeSchamps v. Board of Zoning Appeals (1961), 241 Ind. 615, 174 N.E.2d 581. Moreover, we will consider only that evidence which tends to support the findings of the trial court together ......
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Woodworth v. Inhabitants of the Town of Cumberland, SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION Docket No. AP-15-35
...physical alteration of the Town's property constitutes irreparable harm to plaintiff. Plaintiff relies particularly on De Schamps v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals. In that case, the Zoning Board of Appeals sought an injunction against a business owner who operated an automobile wrecking yard on his......
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Johnson v. Murzyn, 2336
...is a violation of the ordinance. See, e.g., Gray v. DeKalb County, 230 Ga. 95, 96, 195 S.E.2d 914 (1973); DeSchamps v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 241 Ind. 615, 620, 174 N.E.2d 581 (1961); County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis.2d 153, 163, 288 N.W.2d 129 (1980); see also 8A McQuillin, Municip......