Schaper Company v. C.A.R. Transportation Brokerage Company, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:97cv314-D-A (N.D. Miss. 12/__/1997)
| Decision Date | 01 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:97cv314-D-A. |
| Parties | THE SCHAPER COMPANY, PLAINTIFF, vs. C.A.R. TRANSPORTATION BROKERAGE COMPANY, INC., DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
The present cause is before the court upon the motion of the plaintiff to remand this matter to the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi. Finding that the motion is well taken, the court shall grant it and remand this cause.
This action arises out of a commercial dispute involving the transportation and disposition of approximately $61,000.00 worth of chicken breasts. The plaintiff instituted this cause by filing his complaint against the defendant in the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi. The defendant subsequently filed a "Notice of Removal" on September 25, 1997, and removed the action to this court. In its "Notice of Removal," the defendant asserted that this court possesses federal question jurisdiction over the cause at bar pursuant to certain provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act commonly referred to as the Carmack Amendments. See 49 U.S.C. § 14706.1 The plaintiff moved on July 29, 1997, to remand this cause to state court, and the defendant has responded to that motion. This matter is ripe for disposition by the court.
This court is required to remand any action over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction at any time before final judgment. Buchner v. F.D.I.C., 981 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 1447. An objection to the subject matter jurisdiction of this court may be raised by any party at any time in the course of these proceedings, and may even be raised by the court sua sponte. See Mall v. Atlantic Fin. Fed., 127 F.R.D. 107 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Glaziers, Glass Workers of Jacksonville v. Florida Glass and Mirror of Jacksonville, 409 F. Supp. 225, 226 (M.D. Fla. 1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1447. Nevertheless, this court has no discretionary authority to remand federal-law actions to a state court. Burks v. Amerada Hess Corp., 8 F.3d 301, 304 (5th Cir. 1993); Buchner v. F.D.I.C., 981 F.2d 816, 817 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Wilson Indus., 886 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir 1989). The court in Buchner noted that there are only three situations under statute in which a federal trial court may remand a claim to state court. Buchner, 981 F.2d at 819. Those circumstances are: (1) a trial court has discretion to remand state law claims that were removed along with one or more federal question claims; (2) it must act on a timely motion to remand based on a defect in removal procedure; and (3) it must remand a case over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction. Id. A district court exceeds its authority when it remands a case on grounds not permitted by statute. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351, 96 S.Ct. 584, 593, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976); Buchner, 981 F.2d at 820. There is a single exception to the Thermtron rule, and that exception is "a district court has discretion to remand to state court a removed case involving pendent claims upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over the case would be inappropriate." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357, 108 S.Ct. 614, 623, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988). In Carnegie-Mellon, the court determined that retaining jurisdiction was inappropriate where only pendent state law claims remained to be decided after all federal claims had been dropped. Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 354-56, 108 S.Ct. at 621-22.
When making determinations of whether remand is necessary, the defendant is the party who bears the burden of establishing that the removal to federal court is proper. Jernigan v Ashland Oil Co., 989 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1993); LeJuene v. Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 1992); B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Company, 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981). Further, the removal statutes are strictly construed, and all doubts will be resolved against a finding of proper removal. Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 951 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1992); Butler v. Polk, 592 F.2d 1293, 1296 (5th Cir. 1979). In the case at bar, the defendant contends that this court has jurisdiction over the present action based upon federal question jurisdiction. Therefore, the defendant carries the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction in this action.
In determining if removal is proper, generally the determination that must be made is whether this court would have had original jurisdiction to hear this action if the case had been filed here instead of state court. Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 391-92, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 1347, 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Jurisdiction based on diversity of the parties is not at issue in this case2, and therefore there must exist some avenue of federal question jurisdiction to maintain the action in this court. In other words, some part of the action must be one "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260, 60 L.Ed. 987, 36 S.Ct. 585 (1916) (Holmes, J.).
One powerful doctrine has emerged, however — the "well-pleaded complaint rule which as a practical matter severely limits the number of cases in which state law "creates the cause of action" that may be initiated in or removed to federal district court ...
As a consequence, the existence of a federal question will depend upon the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule. If the face of the plaintiff's complaint reveals no issue of federal law, there is no federal question jurisdiction. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d at 327 ().
[W]hether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States, in the sense of the jurisdictional statute ... must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.
Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 9, 77 L.Ed.2d at 430, 103 S.Ct. 2841 (1983) (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76, 58 L.Ed. 1218, 34 S.Ct. 724 (1914)). In this case, the plaintiff originally filed in state court and has alleged only claims arising under Mississippi common law. Plaintiff's Complaint, ¶ X (breach of contract); ¶ XIII (conversion); ¶ XV (). As such, no federal question jurisdiction arises on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Consequently, the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule in this case does not reveal any federal question which would give this court jurisdiction over this cause. As with any rule of law, however, exceptions exist to the well-pleaded complaint rule.
Pre-emption of Plaintiff's claims by 49 U.S.C. § 14706
This court need not decide whether the plaintiff's claims are in fact preempted by federal law. If such preemption exists, it is available as a defense to the plaintiff's state-law claims. Nevertheless, the mere fact that a defendant is entitled to assert a federal law defense does not likewise entitle that defendant to remove the action to federal court and is not an exception to the well pleaded complaint rule:
[I]t is now well settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is on the only question truly at issue.
Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2430, 96 L.Ed.2d 318, 327 (1987) (citing Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 12, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2847-48, 77 L.Ed.2d 420, 431 (1983)); see also Gaar v. Quirk, 86 F.3d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1996); Merkel v. Federal Express Corp., 886 F. Supp. 561, 565 (N.D. Miss. 1995). Rather, in order for preemption to serve as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule and as a basis for removal, the plaintiff's claims must be completely preempted by federal law so as to permit removal. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987); Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968); Merkel, 886 F. Supp. at 566.
"Complete Preemption" as a Basis for Removal
The defendant essentially contends that the plaintiff's claims are preempted by the Carmack Amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act. 49 U.S.C. §§ 11707, 14706. While not styling its argument as such, the defendant's contention is that the Carmack Amendments "completely preempt" the plaintiff's claims and permit removal of those claims to this court. This court has, on several occasions, addressed the propriety of removal based upon the doctrine of "complete preemption" by federal law. See, e.g., Sherron v. Private Issue, 977 F. Supp. 804, 808 (N.D. Miss. 1997) (); Wright v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 959 F. Supp. 356, 364 (N.D. Miss. 1997) (); Merkel v. Federal Express Corp., 886 F. Supp. 561, 565...
To continue reading
Request your trial