Scharff v. Klein

• Decision Date: 06 December 1887
• Citation: Scharff v. Klein, 29 Mo.App. 549 (Mo. App. 1887)
• Parties: L. SCHARFF et al., Respondents, v. LARRY KLEIN, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

29 Mo.App. 549

L. SCHARFF et al., Respondents, v. LARRY KLEIN, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of Missouri, St. Louis.

December 6, 1887

APPEAL from the St. Louis Circuit Court, HON. GEORGE W. LUBKE Judge.

Affirmed.

G. M STEWART, for the appellant: In order to avoid the effect of section 2514, of the Revised Statutes of 1879, there must be not only a delivery and receipt of the goods, but there must always be an acceptance by the vendee. Benjamin on Sales (4 Am. Ed.) sec. 139 and note 1; Kirby v. Johnson, 22 Mo. 354; Lovelace v. Stewart, 23 Mo. 384; Harvey v. Butchers' Ass'n, 39 Mo. 211; Delventhal v. Jones, 53 Mo. 460; Benjamin on Sales (4 Am. Ed.) sec. 161, and note 12; Allard v. Geasert, 61 N.Y. 1, 5; Rogers v. Phillips, 40 N.Y. 519, 530.

A. C. STEWART, for the respondents: Entire performance of a contract by one of the parties to it takes the contract out of the operation of the statute of frauds. Hoyle v. Bush, 14 Mo.App. 408; Winters v. Cherry, 78 Mo. 344. Delivery need not be made at the time of sale, but is good if made subsequently. Rickey v. Ten Broeck, 63 Mo. 563; Allen v. Richard, 83 Mo. 59. It is not always even necessary to deliver, to satisfy the statute of frauds. Erwin v. Arthur, 61 Mo. 386; Glass v. Gelvin, 80 Mo. 297; Dowell v. Taylor, 2 Mo.App. 329; Groffe v. Belche, 62 Mo. 400; Bobb v. Bobb, 7 Mo.App. 501; S. C., 76 Mo. 419; State to use v. Knapp, Stout & Co., 13 Mo.App. 467; York v. Railroad, 15 Mo.App. 598. The requirement of actual delivery applies only to executory contracts for future delivery of property not in esse. Nance v. Metcalfe, 19 Mo.App. 183.

OPINION

ROMBAUER J.

This action was begun before a justice of the peace on the following statement:

" St. Louis, February 6, 1887.

Munzesheimer & Klein,

Bought of L. & A. Scharff, Dr.

To one jewelry case $40 00

To carpenter work, painting, packing and shipping 15 00

$55 00"

There was judgment for plaintiffs upon retrial of the cause in the circuit court for the amount claimed.

There was no controversy touching the fact of purchase of the case by defendant of plaintiffs, nor was there any controversy touching the fact that the charge for carpenter's work, etc., was reasonable, and that payment for the same was made by plaintiffs upon defendant's request. The entire controversy between the parties turned upon the point whether there was a delivery of the article within the time agreed upon. On this point defendant's testimony was to the effect that, by the terms of the contract, the article was to be delivered before January, 1886, and was not in fact tendered until February 7, 1886. While plaintiffs' testimony was to the effect that, by the terms of the contract, they were authorized to retain the article until January 15, 1886, and then have it repaired and shipped to defendant, which they did.

There was no written memorandum of the sale. The contract in all its details was testified to by witnesses for plaintiffs as well as for the defendant, all of which testimony was unobjected to. There was also some correspondence between the parties in evidence, but not of a sufficiently definite character to constitute a memorandum under the statute of frauds.

The defendant appealing now complains that the evidence adduced fails to show a valid contract under section 2514, of the Revised Statutes, being that section of the statute of frauds which refers to contracts of sale of goods, wares, and merchandise for the price of thirty dollars and upwards.

This point is not properly saved by anything in the record. The statute of frauds is an affirmative defence. It was held at one time that where an action originates in a court of record it must be pleaded to be available at the trial. Rabsuhl v. Lack, 35 Mo. 316; Gordon v. Madden, 82 Mo. 193; Donalson v. Newman, 9 Mo.App. 235, 242. The case of Allen v. Richard, 83 Mo. 55, 60, is opposed to Gordon v. Madden, supra, Commissioner Martin stating the proposition thus: " It is often laid down that the statute must be pleaded by the party claiming its benefits. But when the contract is denied the burden is upon the plaintiff to establish it by legal evidence. The defendant, therefore, may raise his defence at the time the proof is submitted by proper objection to its admission."

No case, however, can be found which goes to the extent that the defence of the statute may not be waived, and it is evident that in order to make the defence available it must be asserted in some manner which calls the attention of the trial court to the fact that it is relied on as a defence.

The present action originated before a justice of the peace and the defendant was not bound to raise the defence of the statute by written plea in any event, but he was unquestionably bound to call the attention of the trial court distinctly to the fact, in some manner, that he relied upon the statute as a defence, before he can be heard in this court to say that the trial court ignored this special defence. This he has failed to do. No objection was interposed by him to theoral evidence introduced to establish the contract. Witnesses produced by himself testify to the details of it. The point is not raised distinctly by any of his instructions even. Nor is it called to the attention of the court by his motion for new trial, except by inference.

Under the circumstances we would not be at liberty to disturb the judgment, even if it was clear that the evidence fails to show such delivery and acceptance of the article in question as to take the case out of the statute, a question which we deem it unnecessary to decide.

All the judges concurring, the judgment is affirmed.

ROMBAUER, J., on March 1, 1888, delivered the opinion of the court, upon a motion for rehearing.

Two points are made upon this motion and are supported in an able argument filed by counsel for appellant. The first is, that the defence of the statute of frauds was properly raised by a demurrer to the plaintiffs' evidence, interposed by the defendant at the close of the plaintiffs' case, and by instructions asked at the close of all the testimony. The second is, that it appears by a written opinion filed by the trial judge, and produced for the first time in support of this motion, that he considered the defence as properly raised, and passed...