Schaszberger v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps.
| Decision Date | 20 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-1922 |
| Citation | 540 F.Supp.3d 481 |
| Parties | David SCHASZBERGER, et al., Plaintiffs v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 13, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Aaron B. Solem, c/o National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Springfield, VA, Brian K. Kelsey, Reilly Stephens, Liberty Justice Center, Chicago, IL, Charles O. Beckley, II, Beckley & Madden, Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Richard Griffin, Pro Hac Vice, Bredhoff & Kaiser, PLLC, Washington, DC, Amy L. Rosenberger, Willig, Williams & Davidson, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.
Presently before the court is the motion to dismiss the first amended complaint ("FAC"), (Doc. 16), of plaintiffs David Schaszberger, Bradford Schmittle, Kyle Clouse, Colby Conner, Jeanette Hulse, Gary Landiak, and Andrew Malene filed by defendant American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Union, Council 13 ("AFSCME"), (Doc. 18). Defendant AFSCME's motion seeks dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims against it for retrospective monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and it seeks dismissal of plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment under Rule 12(b)(1). Specifically, AFSCME contends that plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims against it, in this putative class action, for retrospective monetary relief under § 1983 should be dismissed since it relied in good faith on the formerly valid Pennsylvania law and longstanding United States Supreme Court precedent that allowed it to collect fair-share fees from public-sector employees who were not members of the union. AFSCME contends that plaintiffs’ request for declarative judgment should be dismissed for lack of standing and mootness.
Once again, see Wenzig v. SEIU Local 668, 426 F. Supp. 3d 88 (M.D. Pa. 2019), aff'd , Diamond v. Pennsylvania State Education Ass'n, 972 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2020), petition for cert. pending. This court concurs with the now well-settled caselaw that has dismissed claims identical to those raised by plaintiffs in their FAC, including the Third Circuit and five other Circuit Courts as well as numerous other district courts. For the reasons that follow, AFSCME's motion to dismiss will be GRANTED and, all of plaintiffs’ claims against AFSCME will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE .
The plaintiffs are non-members of AFSCME seeking to recover fair-share fees paid to the union when such fees were authorized by Pennsylvania state law, 71 P.S. § 575, and had been held constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). Plaintiffs bring this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and seek compensatory and declaratory relief against the Union in connection with its collection of fair-share fees from them prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Janus.1
Pennsylvania permits certain of its own employees to organize and bargain collectively with the Commonwealth, through a representative organization of their choosing, over the terms and conditions of their employment. 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101, et. seq. AFSCME is a labor organization certified as the exclusive representative of certain classifications of state employees and for several bargaining units in the state. Plaintiffs were employed by the state in jobs that were within a classification covered by AFSCME and their bargaining units were represented by AFSCME. Since the FAC states the particular employment of each plaintiff as well as the state agency for which they worked, they are not repeated herein. (Doc. 16 at 2-3). AFSCME had a legal duty to represent equally the interests of all employees in the bargaining units, in collective bargaining and grievance administration, whether they were dues-paying members of the union or not. Plaintiffs were not members of AFSCME, but they allege that the union was legally allowed to collect fair share fees from them under Pennsylvania's Public Employee Fair Share Fee Law, 71 P.S. § 575, since it represented them in collective bargaining.2
Under state law, AFSCME negotiated with the state a Master Agreement ("MA") for the collection of fair-share fees from nonmembers state employees, including plaintiffs.
In particular, Article 4, Section 2 of the MA, which was effective from July 1, 2016 through June 30, 2019, provided:
The Employer further agrees to deduct a fair share fee biweekly from all employees in the bargaining unit who are not members of the Union. Authorization from non-members to deduct fair share fees shall not be required. The amounts to be deducted shall be certified to the Employer by the Union and, the aggregate deductions of all employees shall be remitted together with an itemized statement to the Union by the last day of the succeeding month, after such deductions are made.
Thus, under the MA, prior to June 27, 2018, all Commonwealth employees in the collective bargaining units who were represented by AFSCME and who were not union members, such as plaintiffs, were forced to pay "fair-share fees" to AFSCME as a condition of their public employment. Plaintiffs state that at no time was any one of them a member of AFSCME. Plaintiffs further allege that before June 27, 2018, government employers covered by the MA, such as they were, involuntarily had fair-share fees deducted from their paychecks despite the fact that they "never affirmatively authorized these fees to be taken from their [wages]." Rather, they allege that "their employer automatically garnished [their] wages directly from [their] paychecks and transmitted them to AFSCME." Plaintiffs further allege that before June 27, 2018, government employers covered by the CBA "deducted fair share fees from Plaintiffs’ and other nonmembers’ wages without their consent and, ..., transferred those funds to AFSCME, which collected those funds." (Doc. 16 at paras. 16-18).
As such, plaintiffs aver that "AFSCME should have known that its seizure of fair share fees from non-consenting employees likely violated the First Amendment." ).
Plaintiffs also seek to bring this case as a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) for themselves and for all others similarly situated. They define the proposed class as "all current and former Commonwealth employees from whom AFSCME collected fair share fees pursuant to its collective bargaining agreement with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania." ).
Plaintiffs raise claims in their FAC under the First Amendment. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that "AFSCME [acting under color of state law in concert with Pennsylvania] violated [their] and class members’ First Amendment rights to free speech and association, as secured against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by requiring the payment of fair share fees as a condition of employment and by collecting such fees." (Id. at 7).
As relief, plaintiffs request declaratory judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), "declaring that AFSCME violated Plaintiffs’ and class members’ constitutional rights by compelling them to pay fair share fees as a condition of their employment and by collecting fair-share fees from them without consent." Additionally, plaintiffs seek monetary damages "in the full amount of fair share fees and assessments seized from their wages", as well as costs and attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (Id. at 8).
Plaintiffs are proceeding on their FAC filed on December 18, 2020. (Doc. 16). On January 19, 2021, AFSCME filed its motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ FAC, (Doc. 18), and filed its brief in support, (Doc. 24), on February 2, 2021. On February 16, 2021, plaintiffs filed their brief in opposition. (Doc. 26). AFSCME filed its reply brief on March 2, 2021. (Doc. 28).
The court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) because plaintiffs aver violations of their rights under the U.S. Constitution. Venue is appropriate in this court since AFSCME is located in this district and the alleged constitutional violations occurred in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Plaintiffs instituted this case after the Supreme Court decided Janus.3 Plaintiffs are state employees who, before Janus, were required to pay fair-share fees to AFSCME for collective bargaining representation. Specifically, the MA contained a fair-share fee provision which required plaintiffs to pay fair share fees to AFSCME. However, after the Janus decision, AFSCME stopped receiving fair-share fees from non-members, including plaintiffs. In this action, plaintiffs seek AFSCME to repay themselves, as well as a putative class of all non-union state employees, all the fair-share fees that the union received prior to Janus.
As a backdrop, prior to Janus, unions representing government employees could use "agency shop" clauses in collective bargaining agreements "which required every employee represented by a union, even those who declined to become union members for political or religious reasons, to pay union dues." Diamond, 399 F.Supp.3d at 370-71. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977), the Supreme Court "held that the charges were constitutional to the extent they were used to finance the union's collective-bargaining, contract-administration, and grievance activities." Id. at 370. "[T]he Court [in Abood ] also concluded that the agency-shop clause and fees were unconstitutional insofar as the clause compelled non-member teachers to pay fees to the union that supported the union's political activities." Id.
In accordance with Abood, Pennsylvania enacted its own agency-shop statute for public employees in 1988, 71 Pa. Stat. § 575. According to Section 575, if...
To continue reading
Request your trial