Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Social Security Admin.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-5463,98-5463
• Citation: 181 F.3d 429
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 1999) LISA SCHAUDECK, APPELLANT v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 429

181 F.3d 429 (3rd Cir. 1999)

LISA SCHAUDECK, APPELLANT v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

No. 98-5463

U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

ARGUED March 9, 1999

Filed June 25, 1999

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY (D.C. No. 97-cv-02718) District Judge: The Honorable Jerome B. Simandle

Glenn B. Carey, Esq. (Argued) Agnes S. Wladyka, Esq. Abromson & Carey 10 Park Place Newark, NJ 07102 Attorneys for Appellant

Peter G. O'Malley, Esq. (Argued) Office of United States Attorney 970 Broad Street Room 700 Newark, NJ 07102 Attorney for Appellee

Before: Mansmann, Scirica, and Nygaard, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Nygaard, Circuit Judge.

An Administrative Law Judge held that Lisa Schaudeck did not prove that she was disabled for a continuous twelve-month period by Hodgkin's Disease, and the District Court affirmed this decision. See Schaudeck v. Apfel, No. Civ.A.97-2718 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 1998). Schaudeck argues that the ALJ improperly determined that her impairment did not meet the criteria of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, of the regulations and failed to properly consider the effects of her chemotherapy treatments and her substantive testimony. We will reverse and remand the cause for a rehearing.

I.

Schaudeck was first diagnosed with Hodgkin's Disease in 1990. She was treated and the disease went into remission. Her symptoms recurred in 1993, and in early 1994, she began a year-long course of chemotherapy. She alleges that, on February 7, 1994, she became disabled by the disease and treatment and thereafter met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act until June 30, 1998. Although she worked as a hairdresser from 1981 until 1992 and as a waitress for three to five months in 1993, Schaudeck has not worked since.

At her hearing before the ALJ, Schaudeck testified to significant problems resulting from her chemotherapy treatments. She testified that, among other things, they caused fatigue, sickness and nausea. App. at 162. She also testified to residual effects that continued after the chemotherapy, such as having very little energy, tiring easily, and having to take regular naps. App. at 150, 153, 155, 164. In addition, she stated that she had frequent stomach, leg and chest cramps and that the bottom of one leg was numb. App. at 151-52.

The ALJ found that Schaudeck had been disabled from February 7, 1994, until approximately August 31, 1994, but that she was not disabled thereafter. In reaching this Conclusion, the ALJ relied on a consulting doctor's report indicating that Schaudeck's Hodgkin's Disease was "responding to" the chemotherapy treatments. The ALJ thus denied her claim, holding that she had not shown a period of disability continuing for more than twelve months. The Appeals Council denied her request for review, and the District Court affirmed the ALJ's decision.

Schaudeck alleges that the ALJ erred by: (1) holding that her impairment did not meet or equal a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (2) failing to properly evaluate the medical evidence and her subjective complaints of pain; and (3) failing to consider her non-exertional impairments. We have plenary review of all legal issues, see Krysztoforski v. Chater, 55 F.3d 857, 858 (3d Cir. 1995), and review the ALJ's findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Overall, the substantial evidence standard is deferential and includes deference to inferences drawn from the facts if they, in turn, are supported by substantial evidence. See Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986). To determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, we must review the record as a whole. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.

II.

A social security insurance benefits claimant must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The Commissioner evaluates each case according to a five-step process until a finding of "disabled" or "not disabled" is made. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The sequence is essentially as follows: (1) if the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful employment, she will be found not disabled; (2) if the claimant does not suffer from a "severe impairment," she will be found not disabled; (3) if a severe impairment meets or equals a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 and has lasted or is expected to last continually for at least twelve months, then the claimant will be found disabled; (4) if the severe impairment does not meet prong (3), the Commissioner considers the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") to determine whether she can perform work she has done in the past despite the severe impairment - if she can, she will be found not disabled; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform her past work, the Commissioner will consider the claimant's RFC, age, education, and past work experience to determine whether she can perform other work which exists in the national economy. See id. § 404.1520(b)-(f).

Schaudeck was not engaged in substantial gainful employment. At the second step, the ALJ determined that Schaudeck had established the existence of a "severe impairment" related to the Hodgkin's Disease and its "residual effects." At the third step, however, the ALJ found that the impairment did not meet or equal in severity any of those listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Regulation 404. At step four, the ALJ considered Schaudeck's RFC and found that she could perform her past work of hairdressing and waitressing. ALJ's Decision at 3-4; app. at 127-28. Thus the ALJ did not reach step five.

A. The listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1

Schaudeck alleges that the ALJ erred when he found that her Hodgkin's Disease did not meet or equal in severity any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of Part 404 of the regulations. The list includes "Hodgkin's Disease . . . not controlled by prescribed therapy." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 13.06A (emphasis added).¹ The ALJ apparently relied on the report of Dr. Wilchfort, a nontreating physician, who wrote that Schaudeck seemed to be "responding to" her treatment. From this statement, the ALJ found that the Hodgkin's Disease was "controlled by" the chemotherapy.² The issue is whether the ALJ erred by concluding that the term "responding to" was equivalent to "controlled by."

We conclude that the terms are not synonymous and that Schaudeck's disease was not "controlled by" her chemotherapy simply because it was "responding to" the treatment. We hold that "control," as used here, means that the treatment has been so successful that the disease can be considered effectively neutralized. Webster's Dictionary supports our holding. It defines "to control" as: "to exercise restraining or directing influence over . . . to have power over . . . to reduce the incidence or severity of especially to innocuous levels." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 285 (1988) (emphasis added).

In addition, the context in which the phrase "controlled by" appears in the Appendix is further reinforcement for our Conclusion that the phrase should signify something more than that a treatment is merely affecting the disease. Indeed, section 13.06C of the CFR Appendix, which lists the various impairments, also lists "[e]pidermoid carcinoma in a lymph node in the neck not responding to prescribed therapy," 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,§ 13.06C (emphasis added), thus distinguishing between diseases that are "responding to" treatment and those "controlled by" it. Each term clearly means something different. Thus, simply because Schaudeck's cancer was responding to the chemotherapy does not mean that the disease was controlled by the treatment.

Because the ALJ considered only evidence indicating that Schaudeck's disease was "responding to" treatment, we will remand the cause to give the ALJ an opportunity, using this definition, to reassess whether Schaudeck's Hodgkin's Disease meets or equals in severity the listed impairment of "Hodgkin's Disease . . . not controlled by prescribed therapy." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,§ 13.06A.

B. Evaluating the medical evidence

On remand, should the ALJ again find that Schaudeck's Hodgkin's Disease did not meet or equal a listed impairment, the ALJ will need to reassess his determination that Schaudeck was capable of doing her past relevant work despite her severe impairment and make more explicit the reasoning behind his Conclusion.

An ALJ must give great weight to a claimant's subjective testimony of the inability to perform even light or sedentary work when this testimony is supported by competent medical evidence. See Dobrowolsky v. Califiano, 606 F.2d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1979). Although the ALJ can reject such claims if he does not find them credible, see Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), when assessing a claimant's credibility:

"[i]n instances in which the adjudicator has observed the individual, the adjudicator is not free to accept or reject that individual's complaints solely on the basis of such personal observations. Rather, in all cases in which pain or other symptoms are alleged, the determination or decision rationale must contain a thorough Discussion and analysis of the objective medical and the other evidence, including the individual's complaints of pain or other symptoms and the adjudicator's personal observations. The rationale must include a resolution of any inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole and set forth a logical explanation of the individual's ability to work."...