Schauffele v. Director General of Railroads

• Decision Date: 04 November 1921
• Docket Number: 2726.
• Citation: 276 F. 115
• Parties: SCHAUFFELE v. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

276 F. 115

SCHAUFFELE v. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS.

No. 2726.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

November 4, 1921

Robert V. Kinkead, of Jersey City, N.J., and Benjamin W. Moore, of New York City (Thomas J. O'Neill, of New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

William A. Barkalow, of New York City (Charles E. Miller and George Holmes, both of New York City, of counsel), for defendant in error.

Before WOOLLEY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and MORRIS, District Judge.

WOOLLEY Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff brought this action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (Comp. St. Secs. 8657-8665) to recover damages for the death of her husband, caused by negligence of the defendant. From a judgment entered on a directed verdict in favor of the defendant the sole question brought here for review is whether the evidence would sustain a finding that the plaintiff's decedent was at the time of his death employed in interstate commerce.

The decedent was a conductor of a drill crew engaged in shifting cars in the shop yard of the defendant at Elizabethport, New Jersey. He was caught between two cars and killed.

All cars in the movement-- two unloaded and one loaded-- were owned by carriers in distant states, had come into New Jersey transporting coal in interstate commerce and were destined eventually to be returned to the states of their origin. All had arrived at their destinations many days before the movement. At the time of the accident they were being shifted for different purposes; the two unloaded cars to a place for repair and the loaded car to a chute for unloading. In the absence of evidence as to the character of commerce, if any in which the cars were engaged at the time of the accident the plaintiff in error advances the proposition that being foreign cars, certain in the course of events to be returned to distant states, the jury should have been permitted to draw the inference that they were at the time being moved in interstate commerce, or, were engaged in a movement so closely related to interstate commerce as to be practically a part of it. While, admittedly, the cars were foreign cars there is no evidence that they, or any one of them, were homeward bound. On the contrary, the evidence is that their movement was purely local and for purposes not connected with interstate commerce. The interstate movement of the two empty cars ended when they reached their...