Scheckel v. Iowa

• Decision Date: 27 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. C16-2100-LRR,C16-2100-LRR
• Parties: ELMER SCHECKEL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF IOWA, IOWA SUPREME COURT, BUCHANAN COUNTY COURT, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

ELMER SCHECKEL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF IOWA, IOWA SUPREME COURT,BUCHANAN COUNTY COURT, Defendants.

No. C16-2100-LRR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA EASTERN DIVISION

October 27, 2016

ORDER

This matter is before the court pursuant to the defendants' motion to dismiss (docket no. 7). The defendants filed such motion on September 29, 2016. The plaintiff filed a resistance (docket no. 8) on October 13, 2016. The defendants filed a reply (docket no. 10) on October 24, 2016.

I. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal on the basis of "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept all of the plaintiff's factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696 (2009). With respect to the facts, "'[t]he court may consider the pleadings themselves, materials embraced by the pleadings, exhibits attached to the pleadings, and matters of public record.'" Illig v. Union Elec. Co., 652 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 2010)); accord Mulvenon v. Greenwood, 643 F.3d 653, 656-57 (8th Cir. 2011); Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999).

"To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); accord B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 569 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 2009). A claim satisfies the plausibility standard "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 556); see also Parkhurst v. Tabor, 569 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[A] complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .'" (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555)); Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2007) (examining federal pleading standards).

Although a plaintiff need not provide "detailed" facts in support of his or her allegations, the "short and plain statement" requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (citing Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) ("Specific facts are not necessary [under Rule 8(a)(2)]."). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555). And, "[w]here the allegations show on the face of the complaint [that] there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate." Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997)).

"A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)] which is limited to a facial attack on the pleadings is subject to the same standard as a motion brought under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)]." Mattes v. ABCPlastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990)); see also Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing standard of review). The court, however, must address the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction before addressing a defendant's other arguments. See Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating the district court must consider jurisdictional motions first, because a court must find jurisdiction before considering the merits of a claim); United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1155-56 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating the court should address Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) challenge before Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion).

A pro se party's pleadings are to be liberally construed and are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)); accord United States v. Sellner, 773 F.3d 927, 932 (8th Cir. 2014). Liberal construction requires that, "if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . ., then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework." Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). "Although pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, 'they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.'" Stringer v. St. James R-1 Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stone, 364 F.3d at 914). Additionally, the court is not permitted to act as counsel to either party. See Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984) ("A pro se litigant should receive meaningful notice of what is expected of him, but the court is not permitted to act as counsel for either party."). Therefore, the court is not permitted to construct claims on behalf of a pro se party, even though it has a duty to liberally construe his or her pleadings. Cf. id.; Farnsworth v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 513, 518 (Fed. Cl. 2012) (noting that a pro se plaintiff is entitled to liberal constructionof his or her pleadings; however, there is no duty on the part of the court to create a claim which the pro se party has not asserted in his or her pleading). Likewise, the court will not rewrite deficient pleadings to save them. See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) ("Th[e] court, however, will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf." (quoting Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997))); Dawkins v. Glover, 308 Fed. App'x 394, 395 (11th Cir. 2009) ("However, [the court] will not act as de facto counsel for pro se parties or rewrite a deficient pleading." (formatting omitted)).

II. ANALYSIS

Having reviewed the record, the court concludes that it is appropriate to dismiss the claims against the defendants for the reasons stated in their briefs. The defendants adequately set forth the law and apply such law to the facts that are set forth in the plaintiff's complaint. Namely, the defendants correctly conclude that: (1) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and/or the plaintiff's claims are precluded, (2) the court is unable to interfere in ongoing state court matters, (3) the defendants are immune from suit and (4) the plaintiff failed to state a valid federal claim in his complaint.

In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), the Supreme Court clarified that only it has the authority to entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify a state court judgment. Id. at 416; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (granting only the United States Supreme Court the power to review final judgments rendered by high courts of a state). In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review final state court judgments in judicial proceedings. Id. at 482-86. The Supreme Court concluded that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review issues that are "inextricably intertwined" with the issues previously decided in a state court proceeding. Id. at 486. The twoprinciples have merged to become the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which stands for the proposition that federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review final state judgments or to review claims that are inextricably intertwined with state court decisions. See Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 964 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining limited scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Lemonds v. St. Louis Cty., 222 F.3d 488, 493 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining when a federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment).

Here, the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the judgments that entered against him the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County. The judicial actions attacked in this case were taken in adversary proceedings and within the scope of the color of authority granted to the defendants. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's allegations of error are "inextricably intertwined" with the issues that were resolved in the state court proceedings. Stated differently, the court lacks the authority to review and reject the state court judgments. It is not possible for the court to grant the requested relief without disrupting the judicial process of the Iowa courts; the plaintiff's recourse, if any, is through the Iowa appellate procedure and, ultimately, a review by the United States Supreme Court. Because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.

Alternatively,

[t]he federal courts have traditionally adhered to the related doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were

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