Scheerer v. Rose State College, CIV-90-101-B.

• Decision Date: 05 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. CIV-90-101-B.,CIV-90-101-B.
• Parties: W.M. SCHEERER, Plaintiff, v. ROSE STATE COLLEGE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

774 F. Supp. 620

W.M. SCHEERER, Plaintiff, v. ROSE STATE COLLEGE, Defendant.

No. CIV-90-101-B.

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

April 5, 1991.

Donald W. Davis, Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiff.

Sherry Blankenship, Ted N. Pool, Pool, Thompson, Coldiron, Blankenship & Vincent, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendant.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BOHANON, District Judge.

Before the court is the motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by the Defendant, Rose State College, on March 8, 1991. Plaintiff's response was filed on March 25, 1991. The issues have been fully briefed and are ripe for determination. After careful review of the motion, supporting brief and attached exhibits as well as Plaintiff's response and attached exhibits, the court finds that Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted as to each of Plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff, Wynelle Scheerer's, complaint results from Defendant's failure to hire Plaintiff as Director of Nursing, a decision which Plaintiff claims was based on discriminatory hiring practices. This court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. Plaintiff brings her action under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, as amended, as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, and 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 and 1684. Defendant's motion for summary judgment addresses each of these claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard for granting summary judgment is expressed in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule provides that judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When a motion for summary judgment is made, the party opposing the motion may not rest on the pleadings or on mere allegations or denials, but "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 56(e). The adverse party must present sufficient evidence that his claim has merit. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). On a summary judgment motion, the court is required to pierce the pleadings and evaluate the actual proof to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 (Advisory Committee Notes).

I. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 and 1684 Claims

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff has wholly failed to address Defendant's argument with respect to her claims brought pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 and 1684. Therefore, the court deems Plaintiff to have waived or abandoned those claims. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted as to those claims arising under 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 and 1684.

II. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 Claims

Second, a review of the record in this case reveals that Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 are clearly brought outside the applicable statute of limitations with respect to these particular civil rights statutes. Federal civil rights statutes do not specify a statute of limitations for section 1981 and section 1982 actions. Therefore, courts have been uniformly clear in stating that a federal court should adopt the most analogous state statute of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). The characterization of an action for purposes of selecting the appropriate state statute is ultimately a question of federal law. International Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agr. Impl. Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966). In the Garcia case, the Supreme Court ruled that section 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions for purposes of selecting the most appropriate state statute of limitations. The Supreme Court has further found that the Garcia rationale is equally applicable to claims brought under 1981 since all section 1981 claims are in essence actions for injury to personal rights. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987). See also E.E.O.C. v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir.1984). Likewise, actions brought pursuant to section 1982 are best characterized as personal injury actions. See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 660-61, 107 S.Ct. at 2620-21 (sections 1981, 1982 and 1983 are all "part of a federal law barring racial discrimination, which ... is a fundamental injury to the individual rights of a person."). Under these holdings, the most analogous Oklahoma statute is the two-year limitations period for injury to the rights of another. See Okla.Stat. tit. 12, § 95.

Further, Oklahoma law is clear with respect to the accrual of causes of action for claims for injury to the rights of another. Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues, and the test for determining when the cause of action accrues is to ascertain the time when the plaintiff could first maintain her action. Knudson v. Weeks, 394 F.Supp. 963 (W.D.Okla.1975).

In the present case, the court finds that Plaintiff's claim accrued when she was informed that the employment decision had been made and she was not hired. As will be discussed in greater detail infra., Plaintiff had knowledge that she was not hired for the position in May or June, 1985.¹ The record reflects that Plaintiff's complaint was filed on January 17, 1990, well outside the two-year limitations period.

Moreover, the law is equally clear that filing an administrative claim under Title VII does not toll the statute of limitations on an action brought pursuant to sections 1981 and 1982 concerning equal rights under the law. Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 556 F.2d 346 (5th Cir.1977). The court concludes, therefore, that Plaintiff's claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 are time-barred. Consequently, those claims should be dismissed.

III. Title VII Claim

Next, the court addresses Plaintiff's Title VII claim for race discrimination and the effect of the statutory limitations period on her claim. For purposes of analyzing these issues, the court finds the following facts are uncontroverted by the evidence.

On January 5, 1985, Plaintiff responded to an advertisement soliciting resumes for the position of Director of Nursing at Rose State College. She reapplied for the position on May 2, 1985. Plaintiff was notified by letter dated June 24, 1985, and mailed to Plaintiff's address that she was not hired for the position.²

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on March 26, 1986. The EEOC referred Plaintiff's charge to the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission on April 11, 1986. The state agency indicated that it did not intend to initially process the charge and deferred to the EEOC on April 23, 1986.

The EEOC issued a dismissal and notice of right to sue on June 6, 1989. The EEOC determined that Plaintiff's claim was untimely filed, and therefore, the Commission had no authority to investigate her claim. By letter dated June 9, 1989, Plaintiff informed Donald Burris, Oklahoma City Area Director of the EEOC, that she "rejected" the dismissal of her charge. On August 24, 1989, the District Director of the EEOC notified Plaintiff that her charge was to be reopened for the "limited purpose of acquiring more information on the timeliness of the charge." Defendant's Ex. 7 attached to its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment. However, by letter dated September 18, 1989, Donald Burris addressed the merits of Plaintiff's charge rather than the timeliness issue for which the charge had been reopened. His determination was that there had been no racially discriminatory motive in rejecting Plaintiff for the Director's position. On September 24, 1989, Mr. Burris sent a letter entitled "DETERMINATION" to Plaintiff informing her that her charge had no merit. It further informed her that she could request a review of his determination if she did so before October 13, 1989. The significant language provides:

This determination does not conclude the processing of this charge. If the Charging Party wishes to have this determination reviewed, she must submit a signed letter to the Determinations Review Program which clearly sets forth the reasons for requesting the review and which lists the Charge Number and Respondent's name. Charging Party must also attach a copy of this Determination to her letter.

These documents must be PERSONALLY DELIVERED OR MAILED (POSTMARKED) ON OR BEFORE OCTOBER 13, 1989 to the Determinations Review Program.... IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT SOME PROOF OF MAILING, SUCH AS A CERTIFIED MAIL RECEIPT, BE SECURED.

If the Charging Party submits a request by the date shown above, the Commission will review the determination. Upon completion of the review, the Charging Party and Respondent will be issued a final determination which will contain the results of the review and what further action, if any, the Commission may take. The final determination will also give notice, as appropriate, of the Charging Party's right to sue.

If the Charging Party does not request a determination by October 13, 1989, this determination will become final the following day, the processing of this charge will be complete, and the charge will be dismissed. (This letter will be the only notice of dismissal and the only notice of the Charging Party's right to sue sent by the Commission." FOLLOWING DISMISSAL, THE CHARGING PARTY MAY ONLY PURSUE THIS MATTER FURTHER BY FILING SUIT AGAINST THE RESPONDENT(S) NAMED IN THE CHARGE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT WITHIN 90 DAYS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF DISMISSAL. Therefore, in the event a request for review is not made, if a suit is not filed by January 12, 1990, the Charging Party's right to sue will be lost.

Defendan...