Scheff v. Homestretch, Inc.
| Decision Date | 31 May 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-38,78-38 |
| Citation | 60 Ill.App.3d 424,377 N.E.2d 305,18 Ill.Dec. 152 |
| Parties | , 18 Ill.Dec. 152 Ronald SCHEFF and Cathy Scheff, Individually and as mother and next friend of Roni Sue Scheff and Kevin Scheff, minors (Ronald Scheff, Appellant), Plaintiffs, v. The HOMESTRETCH, INC., et al. (Quad-City Raceway, Inc., Appellee), Defendants. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Robert J. Noe, Bozeman, Neighbour, Patton & Noe, Moline, for plaintiffs.
Peter H. Lousberg and Raymond J. Conklin, Klockau, McCarthy, Lousberg, Ellison & Rinden, Rock Island, for defendants.
Plaintiff Ronald Scheff appeals from the dismissal by the Circuit Court of Rock Island County of his Dram Shop action. The trial court granted the motion of defendant Quad-City Raceway, Inc. (Quad-City) to dismiss the suit, which decision was based upon a document described as a release executed in defendant's favor by plaintiff. On appeal plaintiff contends (1) that any such exculpatory release of liability under the Dram Shop Act would be contrary to public policy and that (2) the release does not cover Quad-City's liability under the Liquor Control Act, more commonly referred to as the Dram Shop Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 43, par. 135). Plaintiff Cathy Scheff brought an action for loss of means of support but that portion of the case is not involved in the current appeal.
On August 28, 1976, defendant Quad-City Raceway, Inc. operated a stock car racetrack in Rock Island County and sold alcoholic liquors at the track. plaintiff Ronald Scheff was a participant in the stock car races on August 28, 1976. Prior to his participation in the racing events, Scheff had executed a document entitled "Voluntary Release Assumption of Risk and Indemnity Agreement." Execution of that document was a required condition before Quad-City Raceway would allow persons to enter the restricted pit area or to participate in the races themselves. The document, in pertinent part, provided that Scheff agreed to:
"Release, discharge and covenant not to sue the track operators, track owners, land owners, racing association, and each of them, their officers, agents and employees (hereinafter collectively referred to as 'releasees') from any and all claims and liability arising out of strict liability or ordinary negligence of releasees or any other participant which causes the undersigned injury, death, damages, or property damages."
Persons executing the document were granted permission to enter the restricted pit area, to participate in racing events, and they were covered under a master hospitalization insurance policy.
The allegations in the complaint, which we are considering as true for the purposes of this analysis, state that on August 28, 1976, one Brad Kelly was sold or given alcoholic beverages at the racetrack and that he became intoxicated. Kelly then drove a race car into another vehicle which was being driven by plaintiff Ronald Scheff. As a result of the collision, Scheff suffered severe and permanent injuries. The action was thereafter brought against Quad-City Raceway under the Dram Shop Act, through which Ronald Scheff sought recovery for his injuries.
Quad-City Raceway filed a motion to dismiss Ronald Scheff's dram shop action on the basis that the release executed by Scheff acted as a bar to any such suit. The trial court agreed and dismissed the dram shop action filed by Scheff.
As we have noted, there were two issues raised on appeal; first, that if the release does cover dram shop liability, it is void against public policy, and, secondly, that the language of the release must be strictly construed, and strict construction of the release requires a finding that it does not cover dram shop liability. From our analysis of the cases and the record in this cause, we conclude that the exculpatory clause, to the extent that it releases against dram shop liability, is contrary to established public policy of the Dram Shop Act. For the purposes of our discussion, we assume that the trial court was correct in finding that the exculpatory clause was intended to cover liability under the Dram Shop Act, but in view of our determination of the basic issue relating to public policy, we do not deem it necessary to discuss the other issue raised on appeal in this cause.
Normally, contractual exculpatory clauses are upheld unless enforcement of the clauses would be against public policy or unless the social relationship of the parties militates against enforcement. (Jackson v. First National Bank of Lake Forest (1953), 415 Ill. 453, 114 N.E.2d 721; Gowdy v. Richter (1st Dist. 1974), 20 Ill.App.3d 514, 525, 314 N.E.2d 549). Thus, in Morrow v Auto Championship Racing Assn., Inc. (1st Dist. 1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 682, 291 N.E.2d 30, the Appellate Court of this State upheld an exculpatory agreement between a race driver and a promoter of a stock car race which released the latter from claims due to the latter's negligence. It found that there was nothing about the relationship of the parties which would except the agreement from the general Illinois rule with respect to exculpatory clauses. The court found nothing contrary to public policy implicated in the enforcement of that exculpatory clause (8 Ill.App.3d at 686, 291 N.E.2d 30). In the instant case, however, enforcement of the exculpatory clause at issue is against the articulated public policy of the State of Illinois as found in the Liquor Control Act and cases decided thereunder.
Section 94 of the Liquor Control Act (ch. 43, par. 94) states:
"This Act shall be liberally construed, to the end that the health, safety and welfare of the People of the State of Illinois shall be protected and temperance in the consumption of alcoholic liquors shall be fostered and promoted by sound and careful control and regulation of the manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic liquors."
The Act, which imposes "no fault" liability, is penal in nature and was designed to act as a constraint upon those dispensing liquor to the public. (Wessel v. Carmi Elks Home, Inc. (1973), 54 Ill.2d 127, 295 N.E.2d 718.) Originally, the constraint referred to was direct in its impact, but with the...
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