Scheffler v. Lee
| Decision Date | 04 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-373-CRS |
| Parties | TROY K. SCHEFFLER PLAINTIFF v. ALEX LEE, ET AL. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on motion for attorney's fees and costs by Plaintiff Troy Scheffler ("Plaintiff"). DN 197. Defendant Alex Lee ("Defendant") filed a response. DN 198. Plaintiff filed a reply. DN 199. This matter is now ripe for judicial review. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff filed this civil rights action against Defendant, a member of the Louisville Metro Police Department, on May 15, 2014 for violations of his constitutional rights stemming from Plaintiff's arrest on May 18, 2013. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on claims of arrest without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. DN 182. The jury awarded Plaintiff $2,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. Id. Plaintiff now seeks attorney's fees in the amount of $149,920.00 and an award of costs in the amount of $6,024.26.
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, permits the court, in its discretion, to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a Section 1983 action. Young v. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections, 2015 WL 4756514, at *1-2 (E.D. Ky. May 19, 2015) (citing Pouillon v. Little, 326 F.3d 713, 716 (6th Cir. 2003). "[A] court must first determine whether the petitioning plaintiff was the prevailing party." Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 531 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)). This requirement is satisfied if "the plaintiff has succeeded on any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit...." DiLaura v. Township of Ann Arbor, 471 F.3d 666, 670 (6th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
If the Court determines that the petitioning plaintiff is the prevailing party, it must then determine whether the fee request is reasonable. Wayne, 36 F.3d at 531. To be reasonable, a fee must be "adequately compensatory to attract competent counsel" but avoid "producing a windfall for lawyers." Gonter v. Hunt Valve Company, Inc., 510 F.3d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 2007). Courts begin with the "lodestar formula," which calls for multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. In "rare" or "exceptional" cases, courts may adjust the lodestar up or down by considering twelve factors adopted by the Supreme Court in Hensley, 461 U.S. at 471: (1) the time and labor required by a given case; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented; (3) the skill needed to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff was the prevailing party in this matter. DN 198 at 1. Accordingly, the Court will proceed to the lodestar formula. Plaintiff seeks compensation for$400 per hour multiplied by 374.8 hours equaling $149.920.00 in attorney compensation. DN 197-2 at 7. In support of this fee request, Plaintiff submitted a declaration from his lead counsel, Peter J. Nickitas, affying that his hourly rate for this kind of police misconduct litigation in Minneapolis is $400 per hour. 197-2 at 5. Nickitas provided a declaration from attorney Jordan S. Kushner, a licensed attorney in Minnesota, stating $400 per hour is "a very modest fee for an attorney in the Twin Cities, Minnesota market who has about 29 years of experience and has prevailed at trial in a federal civil rights case." DN 197-15 at 5.
The Court finds that a reasonable rate for Mr. Nickitas in this case is $350 per hour. The Court bases its "reasonable hourly rate" component of the lodestar formula on the "prevailing market rate in the relevant community." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). District courts are generally free to look to any market they believe is appropriate to fairly compensate attorneys in individual cases. See Louisville Black Police Officers Org. v. City of Louisville, 700 F.2d 268, 278 (6th Cir. 1983) (). But "[g]enerally, when determining a reasonable hourly rate, the relevant community is the forum in which the district court sits." Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008); see Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 743 F. Supp. 2d 619, 645 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (); see also Holley Performance Prods. v. Smith-CNC China Networking Co., No. 1:06CV-165-M, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66506, at *8 (W.D. Ky. Sep. 6, 2007) ().
Here, the relevant community is the Western District of Kentucky—the district where the action was brought, the location of the jury trial, and the location of the events giving rise to the tort. While the Court credits Plaintiff's statement that he "telephoned over 20 attorneys in the Louisville, Kentucky area," the Court does not find that Plaintiff therefore "exhaust[ed] all options" of finding local counsel. DN 197-3 at 1. The Louisville Bar Association has more than 3,100 active members, many more than 20 of whom are capable of prosecuting a straightforward civil rights case like the one presented here. See https://www.loubar.org/directory/. Furthermore, there are certainly scores of other licensed attorneys practicing in the more than 700 miles between Louisville, Kentucky and St. Paul, Minnesota (the location of Mr. Nickitas' practice). On these facts, the Court does not find that broadening the "relevant community" is justified. Kushner's statement that "the U.S. District Court in Minnesota would award at least $450 per hour in a civil rights case to an attorney with Mr. Nickitas' level of experience and expertise," DN 197-15 at 5, has no bearing on the reasonable rate in this case because, by Kushner's own admission, he is "not familiar with the legal market in Kentucky," id.
Defendant provides affidavits from eleven Louisville attorneys who, in the context of performing comparable legal work, state their hourly rates range between $325 and $375 per hour. DN 198-1 at 1-11. Plaintiff does not dispute these rates but instead points out that several of the affidavits describe their rates as "at least" that high. DN 199 at 2. Defendant also argues $400 is reasonable for his attorney because the rate Id. at 4. The Court finds that these factors do not justify an upward deviation from the reasonable rate for comparable representation in the relevant legal market. Accordingly, $350 is a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Nickitas' compensation for work he performed in this case.
The other factor in the lodestar equation is the number of hours labored. Plaintiff requests compensation at his full hourly rate for 374.8 hours, for which he provides a 14-page breakdown of how many hours he claims to have spent on litigation-related activities. DN 197-5 at 1-14. After carefully reviewing the record, the Court finds the amount of hours claimed by Plaintiff's counsel are, in part, unreasonable. Specifically, the Court finds that Plaintiff may not recover attorney's fees for the total hours billed for clerical tasks, long-distance travel, or the excessive time Nickitas spent preparing his summation. After reducing the hours billed for the foregoing tasks, the Court also finds that a further reduction is warranted to account for the limited degree of success obtained by Plaintiff at trial.
The Court will reduce the number of compensable hours spent by Mr. Nickitas on clerical tasks. Plaintiff's counsel billed at his full attorney rate for tasks that, while reasonably necessary, were administrative in character and could have been performed by a non-attorney. Such tasks should not be billed at $400 or even $350 per hour. As noted by the Supreme Court:
It is appropriate to distinguish between legal work, in the strict sense, and investigation, clerical work, compilation of facts and statistics and other work which can often be accomplished by non-lawyers but which a lawyer may do because he has no other help available. Such non-legal work may command a lesser rate. Its dollar value is not enhanced just because a lawyer does it.
Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 288 n.10 (quoting Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717). Hours spent on purely clerical tasks must be either reduced or excluded in their entirety. See Allison v. City of Lansing, No. 5:03-cv-156, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52592, 2007 WL 2114726, *1 (W.D. Mich. July 19, 2007) (). Therefore, while still compensable, the Court will reduce the number of hours billed for each of these tasks to reflect the value of the non-legal services provided.
The Court finds that the billable hours for the following clerical tasks should be reduced: 1.5 attorney...
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