Scheidecker v. Arvig Enterprises, Inc.
| Decision Date | 09 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ. 99-1260 ADM/RLE.,No. Civ. 99-1259 ADM/RLE.,Civ. 99-1259 ADM/RLE.,Civ. 99-1260 ADM/RLE. |
| Parties | Tanya SCHEIDECKER, Plaintiff, v. ARVIG ENTERPRISES, INC., Royale Comtronics, Inc., Royale Comtronics Sales & Service, Inc., and Nancy Ettish, Defendants. Susan Von Ruden, Plaintiff, v. Arvig Enterprises, Inc., East Otter Tail Telephone Company, Nancy Ettish, and Catherine Ekern, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Stephen W. Cooper, Stacey R. Everson, The Cooper Law Firm, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for plaintiffs.
Mary E. Stumo, Angela M. Crandall, Ann M. Kraemer, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for defendants.
Because these two companion cases involve many of the same facts and legal analysis, the Court will discuss both cases in this combined Memorandum Opinion and Order.
On September 26, 2000, the undersigned United States District Judge heard Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 51] in the Von Ruden case. Defendants seek summary judgment on all of Von Ruden's remaining claims:1 (1) discriminatory disparate treatment based on her gender and pregnancy in violation of Title VII; (2) discriminatory disparate treatment based on her gender and pregnancy in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"); (3) discriminatory disparate impact based on her gender and pregnancy; (4) violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"); (5) a disability discrimination claim; and (6) a harassment claim. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
On October 18, 2000, the undersigned United States District Judge heard Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 84] in the Scheidecker case. Defendants seek summary judgment on all of Scheidecker's remaining claims:2 (1) discriminatory disparate treatment based on her gender and pregnancy in violation of Title VII; (2) discriminatory disparate treatment based on her gender and pregnancy in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"); (3) discriminatory disparate impact based on her gender and pregnancy; and (4) violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") and the Minnesota Parenting Leave Act ("MPLA"). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
This is a tale of two corporations and four pregnant employees. Arvig Enterprises, Inc. ("Arvig Enterprises") is a company that operates a telecommunications business engaged in telephone, cable television, and Internet service, as well as the sale, installation, and maintenance of telecommunications equipment. Allen Arvig is the president and CEO of Arvig Enterprises. See Arvig Dep., at 20. Don Swenson ("Swenson") is the director of operations. See Swenson Dep., at 14. Nancy Ettish ("Ettish") is the director of administrative services, which conducts human resources functions. See Ettish Dep., at 40, 61. Catherine Ekern ("Ekern") is the director of marketing. See Ekern Dep., at 37.
Royale Comtronics Sales & Services, Inc., ("RCSS") is a company that leased premises telephone equipment, provided customer wiring services, and operated retail Radio Shack Stores from 1982 until June 1998. Allen Arvig is also the president and CEO of RCSS. Dave Schornack ("Schornack") is the general manager at RCSS. See Schornack Dep., at 9. Barb Eiter ("Eiter") is a supervisor at RCSS. See Schornack Dep., at 33; Scheidecker Dep., at 48. On June 30, 1998, RCSS sold its assets to Arvig Enterprises. See Schornack Aff. ¶ 3. At that time, Arvig Enterprises transferred its RCSS assets into Royale Comtronics, Inc., ("Royale Comtronics") a newly-formed subsidiary of Arvig Enterprises. See Vyskocil Dep., at 22-23, 53, 56-58; Arvig Dep., at 37-39.
Plaintiff Susan Von Ruden ("Von Ruden") was an employee with Arvig Enterprises from 1987 until July 6, 1998. See Von Ruden Dep., at 129-31. Until 1993, Von Ruden worked as a customer service representative. See id. From 1993 until the time she was dismissed, Von Ruden worked as a marketing and public relations assistant. See id., at 138; Swenson Dep., at 57-60. In September 1997, Arvig Enterprises hired Ekern as marketing director. See Swenson Dep., at 88. Thereafter, Von Ruden reported to Ekern and assisted with marketing projects. See Von Ruden Dep., at 140-42; Ekern Dep., at 103. As director of operations, Swenson supervised Ekern. See Ekern Dep., at 88. Von Ruden announced her pregnancy January 2, 1998. See Ettish Dep., at 133; Von Ruden Dep., at 237. Swenson had warned Von Ruden that more children may affect her ability to receive promotions. See Von Ruden Dep., at 180-83. Ekern told Von Ruden that once a woman has two children, it was her experience that such a woman would not return to work. See id., at 427-28. Meanwhile, Ekern was dissatisfied with Von Ruden's performance, such as her timeliness in completing projects. See Ekern Dep., at 93, 103, 117. Von Ruden's failure to alert the media until the day of a grant signing event on June 16, 1998, resulted in Ekern's disappointment that only one reporter attended the event. See id., at 324. Allen Arvig also was displeased with Von Ruden's handling of the media event. See Arvig Dep., at 85. On July 6, 1998, a few days before the birth of her child, Ettish and Ekern met with Von Ruden and informed her that she was being discharged. See Von Ruden Dep., at 394-96.
Tonia Evans was a marketing and public relations representative at Arvig Enterprises. See Evans Aff. ¶ 1. Evans was a capable employee who received positive performance reviews. See Evans Aff. ¶ 4; Swenson Dep., at 262. Evans also was pregnant in July 1998 and Arvig Enterprises management was aware of her pregnancy. See Evans Aff. ¶ 6; Ettish Dep., at 95-97. Tonia Evans was terminated on the same day as Von Ruden. See Evans Aff. ¶ 3; Ettish Dep., at 235.
Plaintiff Tanya Scheidecker ("Scheidecker") was hired by RCSS as an inventory clerk on May 27, 1997. See Scheidecker Dep., at 48. After struggling to meet RCSS's performance expectations in her inventory clerk position, Scheidecker transferred to the receptionist position. See Scheidecker Dep., at 48; Eiter Aff. ¶ 8-9. Scheidecker performed well as the receptionist. See Schornack Dep., at 56. She received a positive performance review. See (Schdkr) Pl.Ex. H. In November or December of 1997, Scheidecker told RCSS that she was pregnant with a due date of May 20, 1998. See Scheidecker Dep., at 58, 62-63, 70. On April 14, 1998, Scheidecker gave birth to her baby prematurely and began her maternity leave. See id., at 70. On April 28, 1998, RCSS placed a service order for the installation of a Centrex answering system.3 See Ettish Aff., Ex. C. On May 7, 1998, Ettish and Eiter summoned Scheidecker to a public restaurant to notify her that her position at RCSS was terminated because of the installation of the Centrex system on June 1, 1998. See Scheidecker Dep., at 74-77; Eiter Dep., at 85-86. Schornack has testified that Scheidecker's termination was related to budget issues and an effort to reduce costs and improve efficiency. See Schornack Dep., at 65. Due to delays, the installation of the Centrex system was not completed until October 1998. See Ettish Dep., at 322-23.
Daisy Johnson was a support staff employee at RCSS, who "did a little bit of everything." Schornack Dep., at 63. Johnson, Scheidecker's co-worker, also was terminated in May 1998. Johnson was told that her position was not necessary due to the installation of Centrex. See Johnson Aff. ¶ 6; Ettish Dep., at 257. Daisy Johnson gave birth to her baby on May 28, 1998.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." A genuine issue of material fact does not exist "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Once the movant meets its Rule 56(c) burden, the non-movant "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When weighing the evidence offered by the parties on a motion for summary judgment, this Court must review the evidence and all inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. The nonmovant, however, "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348.
Von Ruden and Scheidecker have produced evidence that Arvig Enterprises and RCSS may have constituted a single entity, or operated as joint employers, for Title VII purposes. Title VII is given a liberal construction in order to carry out its purposes. See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir.1970). Such liberal construction is also given to the definition of "employer" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). See Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir.1977). A "single employer"...
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