Scheiding v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 09 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. S073196.,S073196.
• Citation: 22 Cal.4th 471,993 P.2d 996,93 Cal.Rptr.2d 342
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Robert SCHEIDING et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent. [And four other cases.]

93 Cal.Rptr.2d 342

22 Cal.4th 471

993 P.2d 996

Robert SCHEIDING et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent.

[And four other cases.]¹

No. S073196.

Supreme Court of California.

March 9, 2000.

Rehearing Denied April 12, 2000.

Brayton, Harley, Curtis, Novato, Brayton, Purcell, Curtis & Geagan, Alan R. Brayton, Novato, Claudia J. Martin, San Mateo, James L. Oberman, Philip A. Harley, Oakland; Wolf & Ellis, Wolff, Ellis & Clausen, Gregory R. Ellis, San Francisco, Joan Wolff and Gerald Clausen, San Francisco, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Kazan, McClain, Edises, Simon & Abrams and James L. Oberman, Oakland, for Asbestos Victims of America as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Allison Beck; Geffner & Bush, Robert Kropp, Jr., Burbank; John Roven & Associates and John Roven, for International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Sturgeon, Keller, Phillips, Gee & O'Leary, Brock Phillips, San Francisco; Brasher Law Firm and William A. Brasher for the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Grace, Genson, Cosgrove & Schirm, Philip R. Cosgrove, Thomas H. Hutchinson, Los Angeles, Kimberly A. Smith, Carl E. Lovell, David K. Schultz, Los Angeles; McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, David M. Heilbron, San Francisco, Leslie G. Landau and Robert A. Brundage, San Francisco, for Defendant and Respondent.

Hugh F. Young, Jr.; Mayer, Brown & Platt, Kenneth S. Geller and Donald M. Falk, Washington, Dist. of Columbia, for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

BROWN, J.

Almost 75 years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act (BIA or Act), now codified at 49 United States Code section 20701 et seq., "extends to the design, the construction, and the material of every part of the locomotive and tender and of all appurtenances." (Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line (1926) 272 U.S. 605, 611, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432 (Napier).) Since Congress intended the Act to occupy this field, "requirements by the states are precluded, however commendable or however different their purpose. [Citations.]" (272 U.S. at p. 613, 47 S.Ct. 207.)

We conclude Napier continues to articulate the preemptive scope of the BIA and thus forecloses state law causes of action against locomotive manufacturers for defective design of their product. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal in favor of defendant.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are former railroad employees, their spouses, and their survivors, who brought suit against defendant General Motors Corporation (defendant) for asbestos-related injuries.² Until 1984, defendant, through its electro-motive division, manufactured diesel locomotives containing asbestos materials. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment on the grounds the BIA preempted plaintiffs' strict product liability and other state common law claims.

Relying on Napier, supra, 272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432, the Court of Appeal affirmed. It expressly disagreed with the contrary decision in Viad Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 330, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 136 (Viad), in which the Court of Appeal held that the federal preemption analysis in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) 518 U.S. 470, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (Medtronic) and Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. (1984) 464 U.S. 238, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (Silkwood) had undermined the viability of Napier. We granted review to resolve this conflict in the law.

II. DISCUSSION

"It has long been settled that Congress intended federal law to occupy the field of locomotive equipment and safety, particularly as it relates to injuries suffered by railroad workers in the course of their employment." (Law v. General Motors Corp. (9th Cir.1997) 114 F.3d 908, 910 (Law).)

Napier, supra, 272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432, is the genesis of this settled law. Napier involved a Georgia statute that prescribed an automatic door to the locomotive firebox and a Wisconsin statute that required a locomotive cab curtain. Invoking the BIA, interstate carriers brought suit to enjoin enforcement of these laws, which prohibited use within each state of locomotives not equipped with the specified devices. The question presented was "whether the Boiler Inspection Act has occupied the field of regulating locomotive equipment used on a highway of interstate commerce, so as to preclude state legislation." (272 U.S. at p. 607, 47 S.Ct. 207.)

The Supreme Court noted that as originally enacted in 1911, the BIA applied only to the boiler. (Napier, supra, 272 U.S. at p. 608, 47 S.Ct. 207.) In 1915, however, it was extended "to `include the entire locomotive and tender and all parts and appurtenances thereof.'" (Ibid.) At the same time, Congress conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission (Commission) the responsibility and authority for promulgating rules and regulation to implement the Act (see 272 U.S. at pp. 608-609, 47 S.Ct. 207), authority now exercised by the Secretary of Transportation. Although the Commission had the power to designate requirements for locomotives, "it ha[d] made no order requiring either a particular type of fire box door or a cab curtain. Nor ha[d] Congress legislated specifically in respect to either device." (Id. at p. 609, 47 S.Ct. 207.)

The court acknowledged that "[e]ach device was prescribed by the state primarily to promote the health and comfort of engineers and firemen" and was therefore "a proper exercise of its police power...." (Napier, supra, 272 U.S. at p. 610,47 S.Ct. 207.) Nevertheless, the requirements came within the scope of authority delegated to the Commission, i.e., regulation of "the equipment of locomotives." (Id. at p. 612, 47 S.Ct. 207.) "The fact that the Commission has not seen fit to exercise its authority to the full extent conferred [by regulating fire box doors or cab curtains], has no bearing upon the construction of the act delegating the power." Since Congress "intended to occupy the field" of locomotive equipment (id. at p. 613, 47 S.Ct. 207), the standard set by the Commission must displace all state requirements notwithstanding a lack of conflict between that standard and state law. (Ibid.; cf. Southern Ry. Co. v. Lunsford (1936) 297 U.S. 398, 402, 56 S.Ct. 504, 80 L.Ed. 740 [no liability under the BIA for failure to perform if locomotive part is not "definitely prescribed by lawful order" of the Commission].)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently explained the practical rationale for this determination: "This broad preemptive sweep is necessary to maintain uniformity of railroad operating standards across state lines. Locomotives are designed to travel long distances, with most railroad routes wending through interstate commerce. The virtue of uniform national regulation `is self-evident: locomotive companies need only concern themselves with one set of equipment regulations and need not be prepared to remove or add equipment as they travel from state to state.' [Citations.]" (Law, supra, 114 F.3d at p. 910.) Moreover, "[a]part from compensating victims of accidents for their injuries, the purpose of tort liability is to induce defendants to conform their conduct to a standard of care established by the state. [Citation.] A railroad equipment manufacturer found to have negligently designed a braking system, for example, is expected to modify that system to reduce the risk of injury. If the manufacturer fails to mend its ways, its negligence may be adjudged willful in the next case, prompting a substantial punitive damages award. If each state were to adopt different liability-triggering standards, manufacturers would have to sell locomotives and cars whose equipment could be changed as they crossed state lines, or adhere to the standard set by the most stringent state. Either way, Congress's goal of uniform, federal railroad regulation would be undermined. [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 910-911; cf. Carrillo v. ACF Industries, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1158, 1168-1169, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 832, 980 P.2d 386 (Carrillo) [finding same rationale applies under the federal Safety Appliance Acts (49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq.) ].)

We agree with the Court of Appeal that the foregoing principles govern the viability of plaintiffs' state law causes of action, which are based upon their claim defendant manufactured a defective product by utilizing asbestos in the design of its locomotives. As the court explained: "There is no doubt that the Secretary of Transportation has authority to regulate the design of the locomotive and could order the elimination of asbestos in locomotive components.³ Imposing tort liability on railroad locomotive manufacturers clearly would affect `"the design, the construction, and the material" of locomotives.' ([Law, supra, 114 F.3d at p. 911, quoting Napier, supra, 272 U.S. at p. 611,47 S.Ct. 207.]) This effect on interstate commerce would be both `direct and substantial.' (English v. General Electric Co. [ (1990) ] 496 U.S. [72,] 85 [110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65] [(English)].) As Law explains, the imposition of tort liability on railroad equipment manufacturers would force them to conform to design and construction standards imposed by the states. `This would transfer the regulatory locus from the Secretary of Transportation to the state courts—a result the BIA was clearly intended to foreclose. [Citation.]' (Law, supra, at pp. 911-912, fn. omitted.)"

This conclusion follows numerous state and lower federal court decisions that have found the BIA preempts state tort damage actions.⁴ We find this consensus further indication that Napier, supra, 272 U.S. 605, 47 S.Ct. 207, 71 L.Ed. 432, remains the controlling and dispositive authority on the...