Scheidt v. Floor Covering Assocs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-cv-5999 |
| Parties | MICHELLE SCHEIDT, Plaintiff, v. FLOOR COVERING ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment [44]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment [44] is granted in part and denied in part. The case is set for further status on October 15, 2018 at 9:00 a.m.
Defendant Floor Covering Associates, Inc. ("Defendant" or "FCA") specializes in floor covering services and installation for floor products such as hardwood flooring or tiles. [45 (Def.'s Stmt. of Facts), at ¶ 1.] FCA was incorporated in 1976 and is based in Shorewood, Illinois. [Id.] FCA hired Plaintiff Michelle Scheidt ("Plaintiff" or "Scheidt") as an administrator in February 2013. [Id. at ¶ 2.] Plaintiff's responsibilities included managing FCA's website, maintaining FCA's social media platforms, answering telephone calls, developing floor sample programs, transporting floor samples within FCA's premises, and assisting with FCA's online store. [Id.] Brittaney Geskey is a manager at FCA, and she held that position during all times relevant to this lawsuit. [44-1 (Geskey Aff.), at ¶ 2.] Plaintiff testified that prior to becoming pregnant, she was friendly with Ms. Geskey. [45-2 (Scheidt Dep.), at 52:6-9.]
Plaintiff claims, however, that she was treated differently by Defendant—via Ms. Geskey—after becoming pregnant. Plaintiff became pregnant sometime in 2013, and she informed Plaintiff of her pregnancy sometime in November of that year.1 After Plaintiff notified Ms. Geskey of her pregnancy, Ms. Geskey was no longer friendly towards Plaintiff. [Id.] Furthermore, sometime after Plaintiff notified Ms. Geskey of her pregnancy, Ms. Geskey moved Plaintiff to an office in which a vent from the bathroom released exhaust and fumes. [Id. at 51:20-23, 92:6-23.] Although Defendant contends that "any issues with the bathroom vent being near the office were resolved by 'prop[ing] open the warehouse door to get some [ ] fresh air'" [55 (Resp. to Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts), at ¶ 4], Defendant has not identified any evidence indicating that Plaintiff was satisfied with that solution.
Furthermore, before becoming pregnant, Plaintiff was allowed to stay late or work on weekends to make up time she missed for medical appointments occurring during Defendant's usual business hours. [52 (Pl.'s Stmt. of Add'l Facts), at ¶ 9.] After January of 2014, however, Plaintiff's medical appointments during the day would count as her lunch break. [55 (Resp. to Pl.'s Stmt. of Add'l Facts), at ¶ 10.] If Plaintiff's appointment took longer than the hour allowed for lunch, the missed time would cut against Plaintiff's working time. Id. Plaintiff was no longer allowed to stay late or work on weekends to make up time. Id. When Plaintiff had doctors' appointments over her lunch break, Plaintiff would either skip eating or would eat something "easy and quick" (like chips) in her car. [45-2 (Scheidt Dep.), at 57:21-58:2, 61:4-20.] Plaintiff did notask her supervisor if she could eat at her desk on days she had doctors' appointments, but Plaintiff once was told to put her food away when she was eating at her desk. Id. at 58:7-17. Plaintiff contends that other employees were allowed to stay late or work on weekends to make up time they missed for personal appointments [52 (Pl.'s Stmt. of Add'l Facts), at ¶ 14], but—as Defendant notes—Plaintiff does not have any admissible evidence supporting that contention. The deposition testimony Plaintiff cites to support that contention is based on speculation and/or hearsay.2 [45-2 (Scheidt Dep.), at 62:11-21.]
During the course of her pregnancy, Plaintiff developed allergies to the carpet materials at Defendant's business. [Id. at 49:15-19; 87:7-11.] Plaintiff's allergy—which got more pronounced in her second trimester—caused extreme swelling and an itchy, burning rash that "would get really bad[.]" [Id. at 87:7-24.] Although Plaintiff initially did not mention breathing problems when she was asked to describe the symptoms of her allergy, when asked whether she developed any breathing issues, Plaintiff testified "[a] little bit." [Id. at 88:1-6.] Plaintiff's symptoms would dissipate within an hour of leaving work. [53 (Resp. to Def.'s Stmt. of Facts), at ¶ 9.] Plaintiff testified that her doctor did not prescribe any medication for her symptoms because she didn't have the allergy symptoms anywhere but her place of employment. [45-2 (Scheidt Dep.), at 89:3-9.] Plaintiff also testified that her doctor told her the only medication safe for her to take was Benadryl, but the Benadryl did not really help the symptoms because Plaintiff could only take low-dosages.3 Id.
In addition to her pregnancy-related allergies, Plaintiff was placed on a ten-pound lifting restriction while she was pregnant. [52 (Pl.'s Stmt. of Add'l Facts), at ¶ 15.] Plaintiff testified that she provided Ms. Geskey with a doctor's note for her ten-pound lifting restriction. Id. Defendant disputes this contention, arguing that Plaintiff did not allege that she provided Defendant with the note and that Defendant does not have any record of the note. [55 (Resp. to Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts), at ¶ 15.] Defendant also notes that Plaintiff did not produce the note. Id. However, Plaintiff testified that Ms. Geskey "tossed [the note] out" when Plaintiff gave it to her. [45-2 (Scheidt Dep.), at 69:2-8.] Thus, although Defendant disputes that Plaintiff provided Ms. Geskey with a doctor's note indicating that she had a ten-pound lifting restriction, for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
The ten-pound lifting restriction created a problem for Plaintiff, because her usual duties included moving carpet and hardwood flooring samples that sometimes weighed more than ten pounds. [55 (Resp. to Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts), at ¶ 17.] When Plaintiff initially asked Ms. Geskey for assistance moving samples, Ms. Geskey informed Plaintiff that someone would move the samples. [45-2, at 75:17-24.] When the samples were not moved a week or so later, Plaintiff again told Ms. Geskey the boxes still were not moved and that they were too heavy for Plaintiff to move. [Id. at 76:1-10.] Ms. Geskey told Plaintiff, "it's your job." [Id. at 76:4-19.] Plaintiff then found other employees to help move the boxes. [Id. at 76:23-77:6.] Plaintiff never moved the boxes herself, but she did testify that she had to start "badgering people to help" lift boxes for her. [Id. at 78:5-23.]
On April 29, 2014 Plaintiff requested leave and submitted Defendant's request for leave form to Defendant. [45 (Def.'s Stmt. of Facts), at ¶¶ 5-6.] On the request for leave form, Plaintiff specified that she was requesting leave "[b]ecause of the birth of an employee's child and to care for the employee's newborn child" and "[b]ecause of the employee's serious health condition which makes the employee unable to work." [Id. at ¶ 7.] On the request for leave form, Plaintiff requested to use five paid vacation days in addition to her FMLA leave. [45-1 (Request for Leave Form), at 3-4.] She requested leave beginning May 1, 2014 and ending September 22, 2014. Id. Plaintiff noted that she was not giving Defendant 30-day advance notice, but explained that her failure to provide Defendant with 30-day advance notice was due to the fact that she just found out that day (i.e., April 29, 2014) that her doctor was recommending that she take leave. Id. at 4.
The request for leave form that Plaintiff signed includes Defendant's FMLA policy, which states: "A family leave of absence cannot exceed 12 weeks in any 12-month period." [45 (Def.'s Stmt. of Facts), at ¶ 11.] Plaintiff signed the request for leave form, which stated the following: [Id. at ¶ 12.] No one at FCA orally told Plaintiff that she could return to work on September 22, 2014. [Id. at ¶ 13]. However, a human resources manager approved Plaintiff's request for leave form, which indicated that Plaintiff would return to work on September 22, 2014. [45-1 (Request for Leave Form), at 5-6.]
When Plaintiff requested leave on April 30, 2014, she did not have any other note from a doctor specifying when she could return to work. [45 (Def.'s Stmt. of Facts), at ¶ 22.] Plaintiff later submitted a medical certification from doctor certifying that Plaintiff had a "serious health condition" that was pregnancy related. [52-2, at 1.] Plaintiff's doctor noted that the condition wasPlaintiff's allergic reaction to carpet material and that the probable duration of Plaintiff's incapacity was from April 30, 2014 to six-weeks post-partum. [Id.] Defendant does not dispute the fact that Plaintiff's doctor advised her to avoid certain areas due to her allergy symptoms. [55 (Resp. to Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts), at ¶ 27.]
Plaintiff gave birth to her daughter in July 2014. After the birth of her daughter, Plaintiff required a blood transfusion, although it is unclear why Plaintiff required a blood transfusion.4 [55 (Resp. to Pl.'s Stmt. of Facts), at ¶ 30.] While Plaintiff was on leave, she had at least some communications with Defendant. For example, in an email to Plaintiff dated July 25, 2014, Loraine Green (a payroll and benefits administrator for Defendant) stated: [52-3, at 1.]
Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment through a telephone...
To continue reading
Request your trial