Schelberger v. Eastern Sav. Bank

• Decision Date: 15 December 1983
• Citation: Schelberger v. Eastern Sav. Bank, 470 N.Y.S.2d 548, 60 N.Y.2d 506, 458 N.E.2d 1225 (N.Y. 1983)
• Parties: , 458 N.E.2d 1225 Gail SCHELBERGER, Respondent, v. EASTERN SAVINGS BANK, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 548

470 N.Y.S.2d 548

60 N.Y.2d 506, 458 N.E.2d 1225

Gail SCHELBERGER, Respondent, v.EASTERN SAVINGS BANK, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 15, 1983.

[60 N.Y.2d 507] William E. Kelly, Manuel H. Quintana and Gianni Donati, New York City, for appellant.

[60 N.Y.2d 508] Bernard Meyerson, William J. Fitzgerald and Edward P. Dean, New York City, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JONES, Judge.

In this action to recover the proceeds of a life insurance policy the jury was properly instructed with respect to the presumption against suicide and the evidence warranted submission of the issue to the jury.The contention of the insurer that the time has come to change the law with respect to the operation of such presumption is rejected.

The insurance policy on the life of Edward Schelberger on which the present action is predicated was issued by defendant bank as insurer on May 1, 1978.Respondent, wife of the insured, was designated primary beneficiary.The policy contained the standard provision, authorized under section 155 (subd. 2, par. [d] ) of the Insurance Law, that, "[i]f the Insured dies as a result of suicide within two years after the date of issue of this policy, the liability of the Savings Bank shall be limited to an amount equal to the premiums paid."The insured died on December 25, 1979, well within the two-year period.The insurer tendered the amount equal to the premiums paid, but denied respondent's claim to proceeds in the face amount of the policy on the ground that the insured's death was a suicide.

At trial before a jury, the court denied the insurer's motion for a directed verdict, and the jury returned a verdict for the named beneficiary.On appeal, the Appellate Division, two Justices dissenting, affirmed.We agree with the majority at the Appellate Division.

Appellant insurer argues before us that the instruction given by the trial court with respect to the presumption against suicide was not in accord with the pertinent law in the State of New York.In the first alternative, the insurer argues that if the instruction is found to have been in accord with current law, the time has come when such law should be changed.In a second alternative, the insurer contends that it was entitled to a directed verdict in its favor even under the law as stated in the instruction that was given.Finally, reversal of the order of the Appellate Division is sought on the basis of asserted errors in the course of the trial.

With respect to the presumption against suicide, the trial court charged the jury as follows:

"Now, there is a presumption against suicide since self-destruction is contrary to the general conduct of mankind.In making your determination, whether the defendant has sustained its burden of proving that plaintiff's husband committed suicide, you should consider that presumption and of course, all of the evidence in this case.If your finding is that the circumstances are consistent with either a finding of accidental death or a finding of suicide, then your finding must be that the death was accidental and your verdict will be for the plaintiff.

"You may make a finding of suicide only if you are satisfied from the evidence, and taking into consideration the presumption against suicide, that no conclusion other than suicide may reasonably be drawn."

In so charging, the trial court tracked the language of the charge set forth in charge 4:57 of New York Pattern Jury Instructions.This charge accurately stated the present law of New York (Begley v. Prudential Ins. Co., 1 N.Y.2d 530, 154 N.Y.S.2d 866, 136 N.E.2d 839).The pertinent authorities are identified and discussed in the opinion of Justice Bentley Kassal writing for the majority at the Appellate Division(93 A.D.2d 188, 461 N.Y.S.2d 785), and no useful purpose would be served by our paraphrase of that opinion.

We perceive no sufficient reason to accept appellant insurer's alternative invitation to modify the law of our State with respect to the presumption against suicide.The presumption springs from strong policy considerations as well as embodying natural probability (seeWellisch v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 293 N.Y. 178, 184-185, 56 N.E.2d 540).The evidence submitted by the insurer as to current statistical data with respect to the incidence of suicide as a major cause of death does not warrant a shift in our law, nor does the fact that neither suicide nor attempted suicide is proscribed by our criminal law.It is relevant, too, that the subject of presumptions and their operational significance is now before our Legisl...