Schele v. Porter Memorial Hosp.

• Decision Date: 04 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2:00-CV-153.,2:00-CV-153.
• Citation: 198 F.Supp.2d 979
• Parties: Elizabeth M. SCHELE, Plaintiff, v. PORTER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

198 F.Supp.2d 979

Elizabeth M. SCHELE, Plaintiff, v. PORTER MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:00-CV-153.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division.

September 4, 2001.

Ivan E. Bodensteiner from Douglas & Ferngren, Daniel R. Berning from Berning

& Berning, Valparaiso, IN, for Plaintiff.

Gregory W. Moore, Christopher L. Riegler, and John P. Ryan II from Hall, Render, Killian, Heath & Lyman, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SPRINGMANN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 42], filed by Defendant Porter Memorial Hospital ("the Hospital") on February 16, 2001; and a Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 47], filed by Defendant Michael W. Copollo ("Copollo") on February 26, 2001. For the following reasons, the Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, and Copollo's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 4, 2000, the Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this Court, naming Porter Memorial Hospital and Michael W. Copollo, individually and in his official capacity, as Defendants, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.), the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and the Violence Against Women Act (42 U.S.C. § 13981), and asserting various state law claims. The Complaint premises this Court's jurisdiction over the federal claims on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1) and 13981 and over the pendant state law claims on 28 U.S.C. § 1367. On April 3, 2000, the Hospital and Copollo, in his official capacity, filed their Answer. On May 4, 2000, Copollo, in his individual capacity, filed his Answer.

On June 28, 2000, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Violence Against Women Act claim. On June 29, 2000, the Court granted the Motion, dismissing the Plaintiff's Violence Against Women Act claim.

On February 28, 2001, the parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissal of Defendant Copollo in His Official Capacity. On March 7, 2001, the Court granted the Stipulation, dismissing the Plaintiff's official capacity claim against Copollo.

On February 16, 2001, the Hospital filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Material Facts, and Index. On February 26, 2001, Copollo, proceeding pro se, filed his Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support, and Statement of Material Facts. On March 30, 2001, the Plaintiff filed her Memorandum Opposing/Response. On May 1, 2001, the Hospital filed its Reply and Response/Reply to Plaintiff's Statement of Genuine Issues of Fact. On May 9, 2001, the Hospital filed its Supplemental Notice Regarding Its Reply. On May 24, 2001, the Hospital filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment relating to the Title VII claim. On May 31, 2001, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority relating to the state law claims.

The parties have consented to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case. Thus, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ. Pro. 56(c). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate —in fact, is mandated—where there are no disputed issues of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law. In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing a court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The moving party may discharge its "initial responsibility" by simply "`showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. When the non-moving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id. at 323, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n. 3 (7th Cir.1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the moving party may, if it chooses, support its motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other materials and thereby shift to the non-moving party the burden of showing that an issue of material fact exists. Kaszuk v. Bakery & Confectionery Union & Indus. Intern. Pension Fund, 791 F.2d 548, 558 (7th Cir. 1986); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 617 (7th Cir.1982); Faulkner v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 561 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir.1977).

Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. F.R.C.P. 56(e); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir.1994). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) establishes: "the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the non-moving party must do more than raise some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts; the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 322 (7th Cir. 1992).

In viewing the facts presented on a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all legitimate inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of that party. NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 234 (7th Cir.1995); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir.1994); Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1440 (7th Cir.1992). A court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Doe, 42 F.3d at 443.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case stems from an unfortunate incident in the workplace involving the Plaintiff and Copollo that has included allegations of sexual harassment and rape and culminated in Copollo's discharge and the Plaintiff's resignation.¹

A. The Parties

The Hospital is a non-profit, county-owned hospital and operates, in addition to the hospital facility, three ambulance station houses in and around Porter County, Indiana. As part of its service to the community, the Hospital routinely runs ambulance crews at each of its ambulance station houses. A crew is comprised of a paramedic and an emergency medical technician ("EMT") who work on the same ambulance during a given shift, which typically lasts twenty-four hours. The paramedic has authority over the EMT, has primary responsibility on an emergency run, and is in charge. A paramedic may direct patient care, give directives to the EMT, direct such things as the driving and cleaning of the truck, and decide when meals are taken. A paramedic also directs activities at the station house when the crew is not on an emergency call. Essentially, a paramedic directs all of the activities of the shift and is responsible for the actions of the EMT. A paramedic is "clearly higher ranking in terms of authority than the EMT" "with respect to the ambulance call and the responsibility of the vehicle." Choate Dep. at 33.

The Hospital hired the Plaintiff as a part-time EMT in June of 1996. When the Plaintiff began her employment with the Hospital, the Hospital employed Copollo as an EMT, but soon thereafter he became a paramedic.²

As part of her orientation, the Plaintiff participated in a training program that informed her of the Hospital's policies and procedures and the whereabouts of its Policies and Procedures Manual ("the Manual"). The Plaintiff was also provided with an Associates Handbook ("the Handbook") that contained a summary of the Hospital's sexual harassment policy.

B. The Alleged Rape

On July 29, 1998, Copollo and the Plaintiff were partnered for a shift. While on duty, sexual intercourse occurred between the two in the north bedroom at Station Three. Later in their shift, the Plaintiff contacted a Hospital EMS employee who was on duty, Rachel Holland ("Holland"), and...