Schell v. Evans
| Decision Date | 16 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-6267,12-6267 |
| Parties | DEREK RYAN SCHELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EDWARD L. EVANS, Interim Director, Oklahoma Department of Corrections; SHARON MCCOY; STEVE YOUNG; CHIEF LOGAN; MARVIN VAUGHN; LINDA EIKE, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit) |
(W.D. Okla.)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT**Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Derek Ryan Schell, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se,1 appeals from the district court's dismissal of his claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections ("ODOC") and numerous other ODOC employees (collectively, "Defendants"). In connection with his appeal, Mr. Schell has filed a self-styled "motion in limine," which we address in this order and judgment. Mr. Schell also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Mr. Schell's § 1983 complaint, deny his motion in limine, and deny him IFP status.
On April 26, 2010, Mr. Schell entered a no-contest plea to pointing a firearm at a person, in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1289.16. He was sentenced to a term of ten years' imprisonment in the ODOC. Despite his request to the contrary, he was assigned to the John Lilley Correctional Center ("JLCC") in March 2011. Mr. Schell contends that Defendants deliberately sent him there "in hopes that a gladiator fight would arise" between him and a JLCC inmate with whom he evidently did not get along—and that in July 2011, to conceal this "wrongful transfer," Defendants moved him to the Frederick Community Work Center ("FCWC"). R. at 8-9 (Compl., filed Aug. 10, 2012).
Mr. Schell also maintains that one of the Defendants blocked his access to the FCWC's law library, thereby preventing him from making timely post-conviction filings and "causing [his] case to be dismissed." Id. at 6. According to Mr. Schell, he committed an infraction in order to effect a transfer to a higher-security facility—the William S. Key Correctional Center ("WSKCC")—where he thought he would be able to access a law library and file for state post-conviction relief. Mr. Schell alleges that his request was denied and that he subsequently petitioned for federal habeas relief in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. But, according to Mr. Schell, Defendants again sabotaged his case by withholding his petition from the mail.
On August 10, 2012, Mr. Schell filed a § 1983 lawsuit in the Western District of Oklahoma, alleging violations of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.2 He requested dismissal of his criminal case, an order directing the ODOC not to commit any "recourse or retaliation" against him, and a transfer to a facility "close to home." Id. at 11. The district court—adopting the preliminary-screening recommendation of the magistrate judge (over Mr. Schell's objection)—dismissed the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A. After Mr. Schell filed his notice of appeal on October 18, 2012, the district court denied his two motions for leave to proceed IFP.
We first address Mr. Schell's argument that the district court erred in dismissing his § 1983 complaint. We then turn to his self-styled "motion in limine," wherein he requests a transfer to a different facility, and then to his request to proceed IFP.
Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is a legal question we review de novo. See Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009). As we must when assessing any dismissal for failure to state an actionable claim, we "accept as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, and view those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 455 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to make his claims facially plausible. See Kerber v. Qwest Grp. Life Ins. Plan, 647 F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2011). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Context is particularly critical to this determination with respect toprisoner litigation. See Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1185 (10th Cir. 2010) (). Indeed, prisoners' constitutional rights "must be exercised with due regard for the 'inordinately difficult undertaking' that is modern prison administration." Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987)).
Mr. Schell asserted three claims for relief against Defendants in his § 1983 complaint: (1) "[i]ndifference toward the plaintiff," in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights (Count I); (2) denial of access to a law library, in violation of his Fifth Amendment due-process rights (Count II); and (3) frustration of his efforts to defend and maintain his habeas action in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, purportedly in violation of his general constitutional rights (Count III). R. at 8-10.
Mindful of the Supreme Court's directive in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), we hold a pro se plaintiff's pleadings "to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have understood the Haines rule to mean "that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiffcould prevail, it should do so." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). In addition, we afford pro se litigants reasonable opportunities to cure any defects in their pleadings. See id. at 1110 n.3; Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1990). At the same time, "the court should not assume the role of advocate, and should dismiss claims which are supported only by vague and conclusory allegations." Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, 318 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110 . The onus does not fall upon the court to supply additional facts or legal theories to benefit pro se plaintiffs. See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009); Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997).
A plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim must "allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Bruner v. Baker, 506 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, the plaintiff names several individuals as defendants, "the complaint [must] make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her." Robbins v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008). The complaint must also demonstrate personalinvolvement on the part of each individual. See Grimsley v. MacKay, 93 F.3d 676, 680 (10th Cir. 1996). Additionally, the plaintiff must allege a causal connection—viz., that the defendants "set in motion a series of events that caused the constitutional violation." Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 779 (10th Cir. 2013).
Even a generous reading of Mr. Schell's complaint indicates that Count I, wherein he alleges violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, fails to state a viable § 1983 claim. To be sure, there is no bright-line test "by which courts determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual" for Eighth Amendment purposes. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). Nonetheless, Count I does not describe a "deprivation[] denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," thereby offending the Eighth Amendment. Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The essence of Mr. Schell's position is that Defendants were "indifferent" to his housing preferences—not that they acted with "deliberate indifference," as the Supreme Court has defined that term. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (emphasis added). Indeed, his specific allegations merely show that he wanted to be separated from another inmate; yet, Mr. Schell concedes that Defendants placed the other inmate in protective custody the entire time both menresided at the JLCC. This admission suggests that Defendants were actually responsive to Mr. Schell's needs, and it plainly defeats his Eighth Amendment claim. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998) ().
Moreover, to the extent that Count I asserts a violation of Mr. Schell's Fourteenth Amendment rights, it is equally infirm. As a matter of law, Mr. Schell has no protected liberty interest in being incarcerated in a facility of his choosing, see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976); Gee, 627 F.3d at 1193, or in any other discretionary housing classifications by prison officials, see Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2007). Indeed, he has no liberty interest in his conditions of confinement, unless he alleges facts showing that the conditions "impose[] atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents...
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