Schena v. Smiley

• Decision Date: 25 April 1980
• Citation: 413 A.2d 662,488 Pa. 632
• Parties: William SCHENA and Raymond Serafini, Appellants, v. Lester SMILEY, Jr. and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 66, A, B, C, AFL-CIO, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

413 A.2d 662

488 Pa. 632

William SCHENA and Raymond Serafini, Appellants, v. Lester SMILEY, Jr. and International Union of Operating

Engineers, Local No. 66, A, B, C, AFL-CIO, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 25, 1980

Argued March 10, 1980.

William Caprio, III, Cogan Station, for appellants.

Stanford A. Segal, Gatz, Cohen, Segal & Koerner, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before EAGEN C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FLAHERTY Justice.

The issue on this appeal is whether a state court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action in trespass seeking pecuniary damages for the willful or negligent misconduct of appellee union and its agent for their failure to pursue appellants' claims with the National Labor Relations Board, or whether its jurisdiction is preempted by virtue of federal labor relations law.

Appellants' complaints allege negligence on the part of appellees in not including their names in an action before the NLRB ^[1] and that by the time appellants realized they had not been included in the action, the statute of limitations for filing their own action against Treasure Lake, Inc. had run.^[2]

In order to prevail against appellees, appellants would have to prove that, in discharging them, Treasure Lake had committed an unfair labor practice, and that, in an unfair labor practice action against Treasure Lake before the NLRB, the appellants would have been awarded damages.The trial court dismissed appellees' preliminary objections raising the question of jurisdiction, reasoning that since this was not an action to cure an unfair labor practice, the court did have jurisdiction over the issue in an action in trespass.The Superior Court reversed, and we affirm the ruling of the Superior Court.

In so doing we note agreement with the Superior Court that in deciding whether the jurisdiction of the trial court is preempted, we must examine the action in the context of the federal scheme.

The common law recognized no right of employees to form labor organizations, to deal collectively through such organizations regarding terms and conditions of employment or to engage in concerted activities for other mutual aid or protection.In the early decades of the nineteenth century, concerted employee activities in support of demands for higher wages and better working conditions were met with criminal prosecution as common law conspiracies.In the latter part of the century and in the early years of the twentieth century, unionization was combatted by civil injunctions.Concerted activities in support of unionization strikes, picketing and boycotts were treated as conspiracies which restrained trade and inflicted irreparable damages on the affected employer.Courts tended to outlaw as tortious concerted employee activity which relied on methods such as striking and picketing which were thought to be inherently intimidating and foreboding of violence, or which set economic goals, such as an improved wage scale or closed shop, which were thought to be anti-social or unfairly restrictive of the freedom of others.Gorman, Labor Law 1-2, (1976).

Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ^[3] to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other and to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce.Congress entrusted administration of the labor policy for the nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience.

Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties.It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order.Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes towards labor controversies. . . .A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law. . . .Garner v. Teamsters C. & H. Local Union,346 U.S. 485, 490, 491, 74 S.Ct. 161, 165-66, 98 L.Ed. 228(1953).

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,359 U.S. 236, 242-3, 79 S.Ct. 773, 778, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, 781(1959), sets forth the rule which we are bound to follow in reviewing the question of federal preemption:

When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.

359 U.S. at 245, 79 S.Ct. at 780.

Here, without question, had an unfair labor practice action proceeded before the NLRB, it would have been under §§ 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.

The states, however, have not been deprived of all power where the activity in question is merely a peripheral concern of the Act, or where the action involves an interest so deeply rooted in the local community that the Court will not infer an intent on the part of Congress to preempt even though the tort action arose in the context of an unfair labor practice.Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters,436 U.S. 180, 98 S.Ct. 1745, 56 L.Ed.2d 209(1978);Farmer v. Carpenters,430 U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338(1977);Linn v. Plant Guard Workers,383 U.S. 53, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582(1966).From a review of these cases it seems clear that in deciding whether the jurisdiction of the lower court is preempted, we must inquire whether the state has a strong interest in redressing the alleged injury and, if it does, whether the state court can adjudicate the action without deciding the merits of the underlying labor controversy.

Linn involved an action for libel, which occurred in the midst of an organizational campaign.In upholding state court jurisdiction over the tort action the Supreme Court stressed the fact that the decision with respect to the merits of the libel action would not involve a decision of the merits of the unfair labor practice claim.

"While the Board might find that an employer or union violated § 8 by deliberately making false statements or that the issuance of malicious statements during an organizing campaign had such a profound effect on the election as to require that it be set aside, it looks only to the coercive or misleading nature of the statements rather than their defamatory quality.The injury that the statement might cause to an individual's reputation whether he be an employee or union official has no relevance to the Board's function. . . .

Furthermore damages for personal injuries may be assessed without regard to the merits of the labor controversy * * *."

Judicial condemnation of the alleged attack on Linn's character would reflect no judgment upon the objectives of the union.It would not interfere with the Board's jurisdiction over the merits of the labor controversy.383 U.S. at 63-64, 86 S.Ct. at 663-64.

Similarly in Farmerthe Court held that a state court was not preempted from exercising jurisdiction over a cause of action brought by a union member against the union for intentional infliction of emotional distress.The action could be adjudicated without regard to the merits of the underlying labor controversy.

The state court need not consider, much less resolve, whether a union discriminated or threatened to discriminate against an employee in terms of employment opportunities.To the contrary, the tort action can be resolved without reference to any accommodation of the special interests of unions and members in the hiring hall context.430 U.S. at 303-05, 97 S.Ct. at 1066.

In Sears, the Court upheld the power of the state court to entertain an action by an employer to enforce state trespass laws against picketing which was arguably, but not definitely, prohibited or protected by federal law.

(I)n the state action, Sears only challenged the location of the picketing, whether the picketing had an objective proscribed by federal law was irrelevant to the state claim.Accordingly, permitting the state court to adjudicate Sears' trespass claim would create no realistic risk of interference with the Labor Board's primary jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices.

The reasons why pre-emption of state jurisdiction is normally appropriate when union activity is arguably prohibited by federal law plainly do not apply to this situation; they therefore are insufficient to preclude a State from exercising jurisdiction limited to the trespassory aspects of that activity.436 U.S. at 198, 98 S.Ct. at 1758.

Since appellants' damage claim is based upon their ability to prove and the lower court's ability to determine that when Treasure Lake, Inc. discharged appellants it committed an "unfair labor practice" that would have been decided in appellants' favor by the NLRB, it is apparent that under Linn, Farmer and Sears the lower court's jurisdiction has been preempted.To...