Scherr v. Ehrlich (In re Estate of Scherr)
| Decision Date | 28 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-16-0889,2-16-0889 |
| Citation | 81 N.E.3d 131,2017 IL App (2d) 160889 |
| Parties | IN RE ESTATE OF Marjorie Friedman SCHERR, Deceased (Lisa K. Scherr, as Trustee of the George H. Scherr Trust Dated March 14, 2002, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Julie L. Ehrlich, Joel L. Friedman, and Jeremy L. Friedman, as Heirs and Legatees of the Estate of Marjorie Friedman Scherr, Deceased, Respondents-Appellees). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Leslie J. Rosen, of Leslie J. Rosen Attorney at Law, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.
John L. Quinn and John P. Richtman, of Churchill, Quinn, Richtman & Hamilton, Ltd., of Grayslake, for appellees.
¶ 2 Petitioner, Lisa K. Scherr, as Trustee of the George H. Scherr Trust Dated March 14, 2002, appeals an order of the circuit court of Lake County. That order sustained an objection made by respondents, Julie L. Ehrlich, Joel L. Friedman, and Jeremy L. Friedman, to the renunciation of the will of Marjorie Friedman Scherr by her spouse, George H. Scherr (both are deceased). For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.
¶ 4 On September 5, 2015, Marjorie died. George filed a petition for probate and letters on January 5, 2016. The petition stated that Marjorie left a will dated August 14, 1970, which George believed to be her valid last will (the will was executed while Marjorie was married to her first husband, and respondents, Marjorie's children, were the sole surviving legatees under this will). He further averred that it had not been previously admitted to probate. The individuals listed in the will as executor and successor-executor had predeceased Marjorie, so George asked that petitioner, his daughter, be named executor. She was so appointed. The will made no provision for George. Respondents filed their appearances in February 2016.
¶ 5 On April 1, 2016, George filed a renunciation of the will. It stated, "The undersigned, George Scherr, surviving spouse of the above named decedent hereby renounces the will of the decedent which was admitted to probate in this Court on January 14, 2016." George died on May 23, 2016. A copy of the renunciation was sent to respondents' counsel on May 24, 2016. On June 23, 2016, respondents filed an objection to the renunciation. In it, they asserted the following: (1) respondents were not given notice of the filing of the renunciation, and it was only after George died that their attorney was provided with a copy of the renunciation; (2) the legislative purpose behind allowing a renunciation is to provide for a surviving spouse during that person's lifetime; and (3) this court recently stated that a renunciation abates upon the death of a surviving spouse, even if it was filed before that spouse's death (see In re Estate of Mondfrans , 2014 IL App (2d) 130205, ¶ 3, 380 Ill.Dec. 751, 9 N.E.3d 1 ). Subsequently, respondents also asserted that petitioner lacked standing to assert George's renunciation, as that right was personal to him. Petitioner responded by offering an assignment to the trust, executed by George, of his interest in Marjorie's estate.
¶ 6 Following a hearing, the trial court sustained respondents' objection to the renunciation. It first addressed petitioner's standing. Respondents complained that the assignment was not verified. Petitioner testified as to George's execution of the assignment and his capacity to do so. The trial court then found that the assignment was valid and transferred to the trust the "ability to enforce" the renunciation. The court then turned to the renunciation.
¶ 7 Respondents argued that George's renunciation abated at his death. Respondents acknowledged that no Illinois case holds that a renunciation abates at death. However, they pointed to dicta in Mondfrans , id. , that did so state. Further, respondents pointed to Illinois public policy, which indicates that a renunciation's sole purpose is to provide for a surviving spouse after the death of the decedent spouse. Petitioner responded that George had complied with the "very simple requirements of the statute" and that Mondfrans was factually inapposite. According to petitioner, since George complied with the statute in its entirety, his subsequent death had no bearing on the validity of the renunciation.
¶ 8 The trial court began its ruling by acknowledging that there was "no case in Illinois that [had] exactly these facts." The trial court noted the Illinois public policy that a renunciation is for the benefit of the surviving spouse and that the interests of any heirs of that spouse are irrelevant. The trial court rejected petitioner's position that filing is sufficient to complete the renunciation. It explained that it hears "objections to renunciations all the time," based on issues like premarital agreements or divorce decrees. It then reasoned, "So renunciation still has to be approved by the court." The trial court acknowledged that its position "raises the issue [of] how long does one have to survive for a renunciation to take effect." However, it emphasized that this was not at issue here. Rather, in this case, the renunciation had not come before the trial court and "was not approved yet." Further, George died "shortly after the renunciation" and it would not benefit him. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that allowing the renunciation would violate public policy and it sustained the objection. This appeal followed.
¶ 10 On appeal, petitioner argues that the trial court erred in sustaining respondents' objection. She primarily relies on the plain language of section 2-8 of the Probate Act of 1975 (Act) ( 755 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2016) ). Respondents raise three arguments in opposition. First, they contend that the policy underlying the statute indicates that the right to renounce abates on the death of the renouncing spouse. Second, they contend that any action that is a creation of statute abates on the death of the party advancing the cause of action, absent a statutory provision providing otherwise. Third, they contend that petitioner lacks standing.
¶ 12 Initially, we note that we are confronted with the task of ascertaining the meaning of a statute. The construction and application of a statute are matters we review de novo . Evanston Insurance Co. v. Riseborough , 2014 IL 114271, ¶ 13, 378 Ill.Dec. 778, 5 N.E.3d 158. Thus, our foremost guide to resolving this appeal is the language of the statute itself. In re Objections to Tax Levies of Freeport School District No. 145 , 372 Ill. App. 3d 562, 579, 310 Ill.Dec. 37, 865 N.E.2d 361 (2007). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we must apply it without resorting to external aids of construction. Moore v. Green , 219 Ill. 2d 470, 479, 302 Ill.Dec. 451, 848 N.E.2d 1015 (2006). We may not depart from the plain language of a statute and read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the legislature's clearly expressed intent. Barnett v. Zion Park District , 171 Ill. 2d 378, 389, 216 Ill.Dec. 550, 665 N.E.2d 808 (1996).
¶ 13 Here, the statute in question reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(Emphases added.) 755 ILCS 5/2-8(b) (West 2016).
Thus, in the first sentence, the statute plainly states that the filing of a document renouncing the will is the operative act in effectuating the renunciation. Nowhere does it state that anything else, such as judicial approval, is required. In the final sentence, the statute again states that the filing of the document effectuates the renunciation.
¶ 14 The meaning of "file" is not obscure. The United States Supreme Court has explained it thusly: "An application is ‘filed,’ as that term is commonly understood, when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record." Artuz v. Bennett , 531 U.S. 4, 8, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 (L.Ed.2d 213 2000) ; see also Black's Law Dictionary 642 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "file" as "[t]o deliver a legal document to the court clerk or record custodian for placement into the official record"). Webster's Third New International Dictionary 849 (2002) defines "file" as, inter alia , "to place (as a paper or instrument) on file among the legal or official records of an office" and "to return (a law case) to the office of the clerk of a court without action on the merits ." (Emphasis added.) None of these definitions imply in any way that judicial action is necessary before a document is deemed to be "filed." Accordingly, the plain language of section 2-8 of the Act specifies that a renunciation is accomplished by the filing of an appropriate document.
¶ 15 As the meaning of section 2-8 is clear, we have no occasion to resort to external aids of construction. Moore , 219 Ill. 2d at 479, 302 Ill.Dec. 451, 848 N.E.2d 1015. These include matters of public policy, which may be considered only to resolve an ambiguity in a statute. People ex rel. Madigan v. Bertrand , 2012 IL App (1st) 111419, ¶ 36, 365 Ill.Dec. 426, 978 N.E.2d 681 ; Golladay v. Allied American Insurance Co. , 271 Ill. App. 3d 465, 469, 207 Ill.Dec. 701, 648 N.E.2d 157 (1995) (citing Chapman...
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