Schiavulli v. School Committee of Town of North Providence

• Decision Date: 02 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74-11-A,74-11-A
• Citation: 114 R.I. 443,334 A.2d 416
• Parties: Alfredine SCHIAVULLI v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF the TOWN OF NORTH PROVIDENCE. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 416

334 A.2d 416

114 R.I. 443

Alfredine SCHIAVULLI v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF the TOWN OF NORTH PROVIDENCE.

No. 74-11-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 2, 1975.

[114 R.I. 451] Natale L. Urso, Westerly, for plaintiff.

Richard J. Israel, Atty. Gen., Dorothy A. Carr, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

The plaintiff has taught in the elementary schools of North Providence for a period of 13 years. She is before us on her notice of appeal from a Superior Court judgment affirming a decision of the Board of Regents for Education which in turn had sustained the decision of the commissioner of education who had approved the denial by the municipality's school committee of the plaintiff's request for assignment for the second half of the 1970-71 school year.

Before proceeding to the merits of the controversy, we shall first comment on a procedural matter. In Jacob v. Burke, 110 R.I. 661, 296 A.2d 456 (1972), after referring to the abolition in 1969 of the 'State Department of Education' and the establishment of a 'Board of Regents for Education' and the investure in the board of powers, rights and privileges formerly possessed by the Department of Education, we set forth the procedural route to be taken by a tenured teacher who is challenging a dismissal or by a nontenured teacher who questions the school committee's failure to renew his or her employment contract. The dissatisfied pedagogue first requests a hearing from the school committee, from there, we said, he or she goes in the following sequence: to the commissioner of education, to the Board of Regents, and lastly, to the Superior Court. The plaintiff has followed this procedural path. In blazing the trail in Jacob, we failed to lay out the course for the unhappy litigant who wishes to go from the Superior Court to the Supreme Court. We shall now establish this final guidepost.

In designating the Superior Court as the tribunal having original appellate jurisdiction in matters of dismissals or nonrenewals of teachers' employment contracts, the General Assembly has failed to provide a vehicle for review of the actions taken in the Superior Court. We recently noted a similar omission in cases involving appeals from administrative determinations made in matters relating to police discipline and zoning. Simmons v. Town Council, 112 R.I. 522, 312 A.2d 725 (1973); Bassi v. Zoning Board of Review, 107 R.I. 702, 271 A.2d 210 (1970). We shall do here what we did in Simmons. Lacking the statutory jurisdiction, we will exercise the revisory and appellate jurisdiction that we have over all inferior tribunals and issue a prerogative writ. Rhode Island Const. amend. XII. In the circumstances of this case we shall fashion our own writ. Hester v. Timothy, 108 R.I. 376, 275 A.2d 637 (1971).

Consequently, we will treat plaintiff's notice of appeal as the equivalent of a writ of certiorari issued by this court for the sole purpose of reviewing the Superior Court's affirmance of the actions taken by the Board of Regents. Hereafter, in matters of this kind, review in this court will be had by way of a petition for a common-law certiorari.

The plaintiff, after graduation from college in June 1957, was provisionally certified as an elementary school teacher by the State Department of Education. This certificate was issued pursuant to departmental regulations that were authorized by G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 16-1-4(b). The regulations provided for the issuance of a provisional certificate which was good for 3 years. Thereafter, the department would issue a professional certificate which was valid for a period of 5 years. The professional certificate could only be issued after the applicant had had 3 years' 'successful teaching experience in the elementary grades in Rhode Island.' Either certificate generally permitted its holders to teach at any level from kindergarten through grade eight. ¹ Section 16-11-1 prohibits the hiring of noncertified teachers in any school supported wholly or in part by public money. In the event such individuals are employed, the Board of Regents is authorized to deduct from the state aid due a municipality the amount of the salary paid to the noncertified personnel.

Upon being certified plaintiff went to work in North Providence. When her provisional certificate expired in 1960, she was given a professional certificate. At this point plaintiff acquired status as a tenured teacher who could be dismissed only for 'good and just cause' after a hearing held by the school committee. Sections 16-13-3 and 16-13-4. She continued to teach in the North Providence school system.

In 1965, plaintiff applied for and was granted a second professional certificate which would expire at the end of the 1969-70 school year. Sometime during the summer recess of 1970, two events occurred. On August 28, the superintendent of schools notified plaintiff of her teaching assignment for the coming school year. The plaintiff applied to the certification section of the Board of Regents for a third 5-year certificate and was told that it could not be issued because had failed to present proof that she had successfully completed the 6 semester hours of study called for by the pertinent regulations.

At this point, plaintiff conferred with the superintendent of schools and told him that in the light of the information given her by the state, she would have to seek a leave of absence for the first helf of the coming school year so that she could earn the necessary credits. The superintendent advised her that there was no necessity that she contact the school committee since he would do it for her. He told plaintiff to put her request in writing and send it to him.

The plaintiff did as she was told. The written request was sent. The superintendent presented the request to the committee and plaintiff went off to college where she successfully completed the requisite courses. In January 1971, she reported back to the superintendent and asked for an assignment. None was forthcoming. The plaintiff first sought the assistance of her union. Acting under its collective bargaining agreement, the union filed a grievance. Attached to one of the briefs is the superintendent's reply to the grievance. His response is dated May 12, 1971, and reads, 'This matter is before the school committee, hence it is beyond the scope of the Superintendent.' This entry tells us that the school committee took no action whatever on the leave request. It would appear that in parliamentary parlance the request was tabled.

Confronted with inaction on the municipal level, plaintiff has followed the lengthy procedural route delineated in Jacob. She has been to the commissioner of education, the Board of Regents, and the Superior Court. The regents characterized the committee's failure to act on plaintiff's leave request as 'discourteous' or 'callous.' However, while not condoning the committee's nonfeasance, the board was unable to classify the refusal to assign as 'unlawful.' The trial justice, in affirming the regents' decision, observed that the appeal turned on one basic fact: '* * * plaintiff left her job without permission and she cannot now complain if the School Committee refuses to rehire her and give her a teaching assignment.' He therefore held §...