Schiewe v. Farwell

• Decision Date: 01 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 18967,18967
• Citation: 867 P.2d 944,125 Idaho 70
• Parties: Violet SCHIEWE, a Personal Representative for the Estate of H. Arthur Schiewe, and Violet Schiewe, an individual acting in her own personal capacity, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William A. FARWELL and Irene Farwell, husband and wife, and Mary Curl and Marian Basterrechea, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 944

867 P.2d 944

125 Idaho 70

Violet SCHIEWE, a Personal Representative for the Estate of H. Arthur Schiewe, and Violet Schiewe, an individual acting in her own personal capacity, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. William A. FARWELL and Irene Farwell, husband and wife, and Mary Curl and Marian Basterrechea, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 18967.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

June 1, 1992.

Rehearing Granted Sept. 30, 1993.

Emil F. Pike, Jr., Twin Falls, for plaintiff-appellant.

Parsons, Smith, Stone & Fletcher, Burley, for defendants-respondents. William Parsons, argued.

SILAK, Judge.

This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment regarding the respective rights of agricultural landowners, respondents William A. and Irene Farwell, Mary Curl, and Marion Basterrechea (collectively, "Farwell"), and their tenant, Violet Schiewe, to a Conservation Reserve Program Contract ("CRP Contract"). William Farwell represents the owners of the farmland that is subject to the CRP Contract. This action arose when Farwell sought to terminate the tenancy of Violet Schiewe, who, together with her deceased husband, had leased the farmland. Schiewe argues that, in the absence of a written lease, the CRP Contract created a ten-year obligation between the owners of the farmland and herself. Farwell answered the complaint arguing that Schiewe's claim was barred by the statute of frauds and filed a counterclaim asking the court to declare that Schiewe had no right to occupy the land. In response to the counterclaim, Schiewe argued that Farwell was estopped from denying the ten-year contract and that the oral contract was enforceable because Schiewe had detrimentally relied on Farwell's representations and because Schiewe had partially performed the contract. The district court rejected Schiewe's argument and held that after the original written lease expired in 1974, Schiewe became a holdover tenant with a year-to-year oral tenancy. The district court further held that the CRP Contract was not a lease and did not give Schiewe a right to possession beyond the end of 1990. Schiewe's claim is based on her independent rights under the CRP Contract and not on her rights as a holdover tenant. We conclude that the CRP Contract created legal obligations independent of the prior lease and that the landlords breached these obligations. For this reason, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

The following facts are relevant to this action. Mary Curl and Marian Basterrechea leased their land to William and Irene Farwell. The Farwells, in turn, leased this land and other land that the Farwells owned to H. Arthur Schiewe and his wife, Violet. A five-year written lease agreement was executed in March, 1970 (the 1970 Lease Agreement). Under the terms of the 1970 Lease Agreement, the Schiewes were to pay, as a yearly rental fee, one-half of all crops grown or produced upon the leased farmland. The written lease expired on December 31, 1974. The Schiewes continued to farm the land until February, 1987, under a verbal year-to-year lease with the same terms as the original written lease.

In February, 1987, the three landowners, together with the Schiewes, entered into a ten-year CRP Contract which placed a portion of the land leased to the Schiewes, some 2,214 acres, into the United States Conservation Reserve Program. All parties were signatories of the contract. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, the Schiewes prepared the land, seeded it with grass, and sprayed it for noxious weeds. Under the terms of the contract, the land had to be taken out of production. No crops could be grown on the land.

In July, 1987, H. Arthur Schiewe died. In the late spring of 1988, the Farwells prepared a five-year written lease and presented it to Violet Schiewe. According to a letter from Schiewe's attorney, the proposed 1988 lease would have reduced her yearly payment from the government from $50,000 to $30,000. Such a reduction would be a violation of the CRP Contract. Schiewe refused to sign the five-year lease; however, she said that she would sign a lease that was consistent with the terms of the CRP Contract. Because Schiewe refused to sign the five-year lease, the Farwells threatened to evict her from the land. Schiewe filed this action for declaratory relief contending that she had a right to remain on the land for ten years under the terms of the CRP Contract. The Farwells answered and counterclaimed, asserting that Schiewe had no written lease for the land, and that a ten-year oral lease is barred by the statute of frauds.

The district court found that Schiewe and Farwell were participants in the CRP Contract and that Schiewe was an "operator" under the terms of the contract. The court ruled that the CRP Contract did not preclude Farwell from changing tenants or terminating the landlord-tenant relationship with Schiewe. The district court held that Schiewe was a holdover tenant pursuant to I.C. § 6-303(2), and that the CRP Contract itself did not create a landlord-tenant relationship. Finally, the court concluded that Schiewe's right to remain as an operator under the CRP Contract was dependent upon the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship which, in turn, depended upon the existence of either a written lease agreement or a holdover arrangement. The court further concluded that Schiewe's tenancy could be terminated, after proper notice was served, at the end of 1990, the final holdover period. The court characterized the CRP Contract as a contract which gave rise to rights and obligations separate and apart from the rights and obligations of a landlord-tenant relationship with all remedies for enforcement in the United States government. We reverse the judgment of the district court under the doctrine of quasi estoppel. The Farwells cannot reap an unconscionable advantage from the CRP Contract by denying the existence of a lease to Schiewe as long as Schiewe remains an operator under the CRP Contract.

As a preliminary issue, we address the question of jurisdiction. The Soil Bank Program, 7 U.S.C. § 1801-1838 (repealed in part), is the predecessor to the Conservation Reserve Program. Under the Soil Bank Program, cases which involved landlord-tenant questions could not be litigated in federal court because the statute creating the Soil Bank Program provided federal jurisdiction only when a litigant sought review of an administrative decision by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Committee (now the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service). 7 U.S.C.A. § 1831(d); Dickson v. Edwards, 293 F.2d 211 (5th Cir.1961) (federal court has jurisdiction to review administrative decisions such as cancellation or termination of Conservation Reserve contract but did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate rights between landlord and tenant); Caulfield v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 293 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.1961) (judicial review under Soil Bank Act is limited to question whether contract has been violated, and federal courts had no jurisdiction of tenant's action to review administrative determination that landlord had not violated Act in manner of securing acreage reserve contract). However, in Reimann v. United States, 315 F.2d 746 (9th Cir.1963), the court held that the meaning and effect of a contract under the Soil Bank Act was governed by federal law rather than state law. ¹ In this case, the interpretation of the CRP Contract comes into the case only as an ancillary question in Schiewe's claim for equitable or declaratory relief. Because our decision involves a question of state law, and because there is no statute vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the federal court, we conclude that we have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal court to interpret the CRP Contract to the extent that it impacts Schiewe's equitable claim against Farwell. See Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-508, 82 S.Ct. 519, 522-523, 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962) (state courts can exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts in cases arising under federal law where state jurisdiction is not excluded by express provision of a federal statute or by incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular case); see also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990) (state courts as well as federal courts have jurisdiction over cases involving claims under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983); Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate federal claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (1990) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear civil claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) where exclusive federal jurisdiction is neither express or implied); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over personal injury and indemnity cases under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C.S. §§ 1331, et seq.)); Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 89 S.Ct. 1902, 23 L.Ed.2d 610 (1969) (state court has authority to consider patent validity in licensor's suit for breach of royalty agreement).

The district court held that Schiewe was a holdover tenant from year to year and that the CRP Contract did not give Schiewe a right to possession beyond the year 1990 if Farwells gave proper notice of termination. The court refused to apply the doctrine of estoppel to preclude Farewell from terminating the tenancy. We conclude that the district court erred.

Idaho Code § 6-303(2), which defines an action for unlawful detainer, makes special provision for the rights of an agricultural tenant holding over after the expiration of the term of a lease:

In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, where the tenant has held over for...