Schifando v. City of Los Angeles
Decision Date | 01 December 2003 |
Docket Number | No. S106660,S106660 |
Citation | 79 P.3d 569,6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457,31 Cal.4th 1074 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | Steve SCHIFANDO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. |
Law Offices of Robert M. Ball, Robert M. Ball, Beverly Hills, and Loyst P. Fletcher for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Office of David J. Duchrow, David J. Duchrow, Los Angeles, and Robert E. Racine, Pasadena, for California Employment Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Charlotte E. Fishman, San Francisco, for Equal Rights Advocates as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Brad Seligman, Berkeley, for The Impact Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rothner, Segall & Greenstone and Glenn Rothner, Pasadena, for California Faculty Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Joannie Chang, San Francisco, for Asian Law Caucus as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Madalyn Frazzini, San Jose, for California School Employees Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Beverly Tucker, Burlingame, for California Teachers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Linda Kilb, Berkeley, for Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Pat Shiu for Legal Aid Society/Employment Law Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Vicky L. Barker, Manhattan Beach, for California Women's Law Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
James K. Hahn and Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorneys, Leslie E. Brown and Zna Portlock Houston, Assistant City Attorneys, Marie McTeague and Judith D. Thompson, Deputy City Attorneys, for Defendant and Respondent.
Best Best & Krieger, Arlene Prater and Alison D. Alpert, San Diego, for Sixty One California Cities as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Jones Day, Elwood Lui, Scott D. Bertzyk and John A. Vogt, Los Angeles, for County of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Reed Smith Crosby Heafy, Paul D. Fogel, Raymond A. Cardozo, San Francisco; James E. Holst, John F. Lundberg, Eric K. Behrens and Jeffrey A. Blair, Oakland, for The Regents of the University of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
We granted review to determine whether a city employee must exhaust both the administrative remedy that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov.Code,1 § 12900 et seq.) (FEHA) provides and the internal remedy that a city charter requires before filing an FEHA disability discrimination claim in superior court. We conclude the employee need not exhaust both administrative remedies, and that receiving a Department of Fair Employment and Housing (the Department) "right to sue" letter is a sufficient prerequisite to filing an FEHA claim in superior court.
Plaintiff Steve Schifando filed a complaint against the City of Los Angeles (City) in Los Angeles County Superior Court, alleging employment discrimination based on physical disability under the FEHA. The complaint alleges the following: Schifando worked for defendant City's Parks and Recreation Department as a storekeeper. He suffered from severe hypertension that made him dizzy and lightheaded in stressful situations. He informed two supervisors of his condition.
Schifando met with the two supervisors in August 1998 to discuss his objections to recent changes in his job responsibilities. They argued with him and tried to get him to "blow his top" due to his medical condition. During the meeting, he began to sweat profusely, his face turned red, his chest felt constricted, and he had difficulty breathing. Finally, he exclaimed, "I can't take it anymore; I quit!" The supervisors asked him to "put it in writing" and provided a piece of paper on which Schifando wrote "I quit." The supervisors then left and returned with a blank "notice of vacancy and/or request for certification form." They did not complete the form or explain it to Schifando, but asked him to sign it. He complied because he sought to avoid what he considered further dangerous confrontation. Schifando reconciled with one of the supervisors, but the other supervisor processed the signed "certification," which Schifando learned was actually a resignation form. The complaint implies that the City terminated Schifando's employment in August 1998 because he signed the resignation form. Although Schifando alleged that he had received a "right to sue" letter from the Department, and the record shows he did receive it, his complaint failed to observe that he received the notice in June 1999, within one year of his resignation.
The City demurred to the complaint on the grounds that Schifando did not sufficiently allege that he was disabled or that he was able to perform the essential functions of his job, either with or without reasonable accommodations. The City also argued that the complaint failed to allege that Schifando had filed his administrative complaint with the Department by August 1999, as required by law. The trial court sustained the demurrer on the second ground and dismissed the action without leave to amend. Schifando filed a timely appeal. For the first time on appeal, the City alleged that Schifando had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Charter of the City of Los Angeles (City Charter). The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and denied leave to amend on the new issue, holding that Schifando was required to exhaust both the FEHA and the City Charter remedies before filing his lawsuit in superior court. We granted review.
When reviewing a judgment dismissing a complaint after the granting of a demurrer without leave to amend, courts must assume the truth of the complaint's properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58.) Courts must also consider judicially noticed matters. (Ibid.) In addition, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and read it in context. (Ibid.) If the trial court has sustained the demurer, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to state a cause of action. If the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, as here, we must decide whether there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect with an amendment. (Ibid.) If we find that an amendment could cure the defect, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, no abuse of discretion has occurred. (Ibid.) The plaintiff has the burden of proving that an amendment would cure the defect. (Ibid.)
The California Fair Employment Practices Act was enacted in 1959 (former Lab. Code, § 1410 et seq., repealed by Stats.1980, ch. 992, § 11, p. 3166) and recodified in 1980 in conjunction with the Rumford Fair Housing Act ( ) to form the FEHA. (Stats.1980, ch. 992, § 4, p. 3140.) The FEHA establishes as a civil right a person's freedom from employment discrimination based on disability. (Gov.Code, § 12921.) Discrimination because of disability is against public policy (Gov.Code, § 12920) and is an unlawful employment practice. (Gov.Code, § 12940.) The legislative scheme created two administrative bodies: the Department (Gov.Code, § 12901), which investigates, conciliates, and seeks redress of claimed discrimination (Gov.Code, § 12930), and the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (Commission) (Gov.Code, § 12903), which performs adjudicatory and rulemaking functions (Gov.Code, § 12935).
Employees who believe they have suffered discrimination under FEHA may file complaints with the Department within a one-year period. (§ 12960.) The Department must then investigate their claims (§ 12963). It has 150 days to issue either an accusation for hearing before the Commission (§§ 12965, subd. (a), 12969) or a "right to sue letter." Employees who receive a "right to sue" letter from the Department may then proceed on their statutory causes of action in superior court. They have one year from the date the letter is issued to do so. (§ 12965, subd. (b).) If the Department decides to issue an accusation with the Commission, it prosecutes the employee's complaint. If the Commission finds in favor of the employer, the employee may subsequently file suit in superior court. In this event, the Commission's findings are not binding on the court, which reviews the evidence de novo. (See State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 422, 433, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354 (State Personnel Bd.); see also Kerrigan v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 43, 51, 154 Cal.Rptr. 29.)
The Legislature intended the FEHA's administrative system "to occupy the field of regulation of discrimination in employment and housing encompassed by the provisions of [the act], exclusive of all other laws banning discrimination in employment and housing by any city, city and county, county, or other political subdivision of the state...." (§ 12993, subd. (c).) In other words, although the FEHA does not limit the application of other state statutes (e.g., Civ.Code, § 51.7), or constitutional provisions involving discrimination, it expressly preempts local governmental laws, regulations, and procedures that would affect the rights included in its provisions. It provides a one-year grace period for pending local enforcement proceedings. (Gov.Code, § 12960; see Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 77-79, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373 (Rojo).)
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