Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc.
Decision Date | 15 July 1999 |
Parties | Dwaine SCHIFFER and White City Development, Respondents on Review, v. UNITED GROCERS, INC., an Oregon Corporation, Petitioner on Review. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
David J. Sweeney, of Brownstein, Rask, Arenz, Sweeney, Kerr & Grim, Portland, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the briefs was Paul G. Dodds.
Charles M. Zennache, of Muhlheim Palmer Zennache & Wade, Eugene, argued the cause for respondents on review. With him on the brief was R. Scott Palmer.
Before CARSON, Chief Justice, and GILLETTE, VAN HOOMISSEN, DURHAM, and KULONGOSKI, Justices.1
We are asked in this case to reconsider the rule of law in Oregon that a release of one joint and several obligor on a promissory note releases the other joint and several obligors. This court recognized the "release of one releases all" rule in the context of a joint and several obligation as a matter of common law in Crawford v. Roberts, 8 Or. 324, 325-26 (1880).2 For the reasons explained below, we now agree with the overwhelming number of jurisdictions that have abrogated, either by judicial decision or by statute, the "release of one releases all" rule in contract.3 We hold today that the release of one joint and several contract obligor does not release automatically the other joint and several obligors; instead, the release must be given effect according to the intentions of the parties to that release. The rule that we announce today is the same rule applied by this court to releases in tort. See, e.g., Cranford v. McNiece, 252 Or. 446, 452-53, 450 P.2d 529 (1969)
(, citing rule)Hicklin v. Anders, 201 Or. 128, 135-36, 253 P.2d 897 (1953). The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed. The case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
The facts of the case are uncontroverted, and we take them from the opinion of the Court of Appeals:
Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc., 143 Or.App. 276, 278-80, 922 P.2d 703 (1996) (footnote omitted).
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the theory that defendant's release of Gast from his obligation to defendant had, as a matter of law, concomitantly discharged Schiffer's and the Batzers' joint and several obligations to defendant. The circuit court, relying on Crawford, granted plaintiffs' motion. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, also relying on Crawford. Schiffer, 143 Or.App. at 278,
922 P.2d 703. We allowed review to determine the continuing validity of the rule that the release of one joint and several obligor on a promissory note releases automatically the other joint and several obligors.
The promissory note that underlies the present action could be deemed to be a negotiable instrument. Before proceeding further, therefore, we must answer the threshold question whether the common law of contract or the applicable version of Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), former ORS chapter 73,4 controls the outcome of this case. As explained below, we conclude that the common law of contract controls this case because the promissory note in question is not a negotiable instrument under the version of the UCC in effect when the note was made.
To be a negotiable instrument subject to former ORS chapter 73, a note calling for the payment of money, such as the one under consideration here, had to be payable either on demand or at a definite time. Former ORS 73.1040(1).5Former ORS 73.1080 provided the applicable definition of "on demand":
"Instruments payable on demand include those payable at sight or on presentation and those in which no time for payment is stated."
We conclude that the promissory note here is not payable on demand. The note, on its face, is not payable at sight or on presentation. The note designates the time for payment as "due and payable at such time as [defendant] under a Lease Agreement dated March 17, 1989 is granted possession of the subject property."
Former ORS 73.1090 defined "payable at a definite time":
None of the conditions in former ORS 73.1090(1)(a) to (d) applied to the promissory note. Therefore, the note is not "payable at a definite time." Moreover, under former ORS 73.1090(2), the note did not become "payable at a definite time" after the grant of possession of the property. Because the promissory note is neither payable on demand nor payable at a definite time, it is not a negotiable instrument under former ORS 73.1040(1). Because former ORS chapter 73 does not apply, the common law of contract controls the outcome of this case.
The issue before us is the continuing validity of the common-law rule that the release of one joint and several obligor on a promissory note releases automatically the other joint and several obligors. We approach that issue by first discussing the common-law origins of the "release of one releases all" rule and the theoretical bases used historically to justify that rule. We then discuss the Crawford decision, in which this court recognized the ...
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