Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz

• Decision Date: 28 May 1976
• Docket Number: No. 47619,47619
• Citation: 349 N.E.2d 61,63 Ill.2d 499
• Parties: SCHILLER PARK COLONIAL INN, INC., et al., Appellees, v. Michael BERZ et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 61

349 N.E.2d 61

63 Ill.2d 499

SCHILLER PARK COLONIAL INN, INC., et al., Appellees, v.Michael BERZ et al., Appellants.

No. 47619.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 28, 1976.

Rehearing Denied June 28, 1976.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago (Robert G. Epsteen, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for appellants.

Halfpenny, Hahn & Roche, Chicago (James F. Flanagan, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

CREBS, Justice:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Cook County holding unconstitutional section 12a of article VI of 'An Act relating to alcoholic liquors'(hereinafter referred to as the Liquor Control Act)(Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 43, par. 132).

The plaintiffs are liquor licensees who each received a 'Citation and Notice of Hearing' from the Illinois Liquor Control Commission.The citations informed the plaintiffs that they were charged with having made certain political cmpaign contributions in violation of article VI, section 12a, of the Liquor Control Act(hereinafter referred to as section 12a).The citations ordered the plaintiffs to appear before the Commission to show cause why their State retail liquor licenses should not be suspended or revoked.

On February 19, 1974, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the individuals constituting the Liquor Control Commission.The complaint requested a declaratory judgment that section 12a of the Liquor Control Act is unconstitutional and an injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding with the charges against the plaintiffs.On February 21, 1974, the court issued a preliminary injunction against the defendants, enjoining them from proceeding against the plaintiffs.The defendants filed an answer to the complaint in which they admitted that the plaintiffs had been sent citations charging them with violations of the law.The answer denied, however, that section 12a of the Liquor Control Act was unconstitutional.The defendants subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs responded by filing a similar motion.The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding in any manner with reference to the citations served upon the plaintiffs.The court found that section 12a of the Liquor Control Act violated the first and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution of the United States and article I, sections 1,2and4, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.Defendants appealed under Rule 302(a).

Section 12a of the Liquor Control Act provides:

'It is unlawful for any licensee, where more than 5% Of the licensee's gross income is derived from the sale of alcoholic liquor, or any officer, associate, representative, agent or employee of such licensee to become liable for, pay or make any contribution directly or indirectly toward the campaign fund or espenses of any political party, or candidate for public office, or for nomination of any candidate for any public office.Any such licensee who violates, or permits or suffers any officer, associate, representative, agent or employee to violate, any of the provisions of this Section shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, and the issuing authority shall revoke the license of such licensee.Any other person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.'

The first issue to consider is whether the above statute is violative of the free speech and associational rights provisions of the United States or Illinois constitutions.(U.S.Const. amend. I;Ill.Const.1970, art. I, sec. 4.)Defendants contend that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is not relevant to this case because the giving of political contributions does not constitute a form of speech.Even if we were to accept this argument, the fact remains that 'the primary First Amendment problem raised by * * * contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association.'(Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24, 96 S.Ct. 612, 637, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, 691.)In Buckley, the United States Supreme Court considered a challenge to the Federal Election Campaign Act(Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub.L.No. 92--225,86 Stat. 3, as amended, Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub.L.No. 93--443, 83 Stat. 1263).In part, the Act placed monetary limitations upon individual contributions to political candidates and upon campaign spending by candidates for various Federal offices.The constitutionality of the Act was challenged on the grounds that the contribution and expenditure provisions violated first and fourteenth amendment guarantees of free speech and associational freedom.In determining the validity of the Act's limitations upon campaign contributions, the Supreme Court focused primarily upon the conflict between the plaintiffs' associational rights and the government's interests, mainly that of preventing the corruptive and coercive influence of financial contributions upon candidated for public office.The court upheld the contribution limitations, concluding that '(e)ven a "significant interference' with protected rights of political association' may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.'424 U.S. 1, 25, 96 S.Ct. 612, 638, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, 691.

The appellants argue that any of three interests of the State are sufficient to sustain the validity of section 12a.It is first alleged that the State has a compelling interest in regulating alcoholic beverages and in protecting its citizens from the dangers associated with alcohol.It is further alleged that the State has an interest in preventing liquor licensees from gaining influence over legislators or other political figures.Finally, it is argued that the State has an interest in protecting liquor licensees from being pressured into making political contributions.

The nature of the liquor industry is a prime consideration in judging the validity of section 12a of the Liquor Control Act.In Daley v. Berzanskis, 47 Ill.2d 395, 398, 269 N.E.2d 716, Cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999, 91 S.Ct. 2173, 29 L.Ed.2d 166, we noted that the business of selling intoxicating liquor is 'attended with danger to the community' and is 'closely related to certain evils in society.'We held in Daley that the business of selling liquor is subject to any regulation which has any substantial relation to the public health, comfort, safety or welfare.

In determining whether the above State interests are sufficient to justify section 12a of the Liquor Control Act, we must consider the degree to which the appellees' constitutional rights are infringed.We believe that section 12a imposes little direct restraint on the ability of liquor licensees to engage in political communication or association.In Buckely v. Valeo, the Supreme Court stated that:

'By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication.A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.'(424 U.S. 1, 20--21, 96 S.Ct. 612, 635, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, 688--89.)

Section 12a does not prohibit liquor licensees from engaging in any type of 'pure speech.'For example, those individuals, of course, may express their political opinions to anyone who will listen.They may announce their support for candidates or political parties.They also can express their political opinions by exercising their voting rights.Additionally, nothing in section 12a prohibits liquor licensees from joining political parties or groups or from volunteering services to those parties or groups.

The appellees argue that, even if section 12a does further substantial State interests, the provision is invalid because the restrictions on the constitutional rights of liquor licensees are greater than necessary.The appellees contend that the statute is overly broad for several reasons.They first allege that section 12a is unreasonable in that it proscribes political contributions in all amounts and not merely large contributions.Secondly, the appellees argue that there is no justification for prohibiting contributions to political parties as well as to individual candidates.Lastly, it is alleged that section 12a is overbroad because it forbids political contributions toward the campaign fund or expenses of any candidate for public office, rather than merely those candidates whose duties, if the candidate is elected, could have some relation to the regulation of liquor.We do not find these arguments persuasive.We agree that it is large compaign contributions which are most likely to create a danger that liquor licensees or other individuals in the liquor business may obtain a degree of influence over public officials.The General Assembly may reasonably have believed, however, that its efforts to further the relevant State interests would have been much less effective if only contributions above a certain amount were prohibited.It is possible that a liquor licensee could circumvent a law proscribing only large contributions by financing a large number of small contributions ostensibly given by his friends and associates.Also, if many liquor licensees acted in concert and each made a small contribution to a particular candidate, it is conceivable that they could, as a group, accomplish what section 12a of the Liquor Control Act was intended to prevent.We therefore hold that section 12a is not rendered unconstitutional by the fact that it prohibits small political contributions as well...