Schiller v. Orange Hall Corp.
| Decision Date | 26 March 1957 |
| Citation | 144 Conn. 327,130 A.2d 798 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Edna SCHILLER (Roland W. Schiller, Administrator, Substituted Plaintiff) et al. v. ORANGE HALL CORPORATION. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
George D. Stoughton, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).
Paul B. Groobert, Manchester, with whom were Ronald Jacobs, Manchester, and, on the brief, George C. Lessner and John S. G. Rottner, Manchester, for appellees (plaintiffs).
Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.
This negligence action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff Edna Schiller and for expenses incurred by her husband by reason of her injury. Mrs. Schiller died while the action was pending and the administrator of her estate intervened as a party plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. The defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and that, as an alternative, the verdict be set aside. The court denied the motion, and the defendant has appealed from the judgment rendered on the verdict.
The jury could reasonably have found these facts: On May 2, 1953, and prior thereto, the defendant was the owner of a building, known as the Orange Hall, in the town of Manchester. There were stores in the front part of the ground floor of the building and an apartment in the rear part which was occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Neville, the custodians of the building. A lodge hall and adjacent anterooms were on the second floor. About two weeks prior to May 2, the defendant caused the floors of the lodge hall and the anteroom leading to it to be waxed, thereby rendering them very slippery. Although complaints were made to the defendant, nothing was done to remedy the dangerous condition of the floors. For a long time prior to May 2, there was an uncovered radiator valve in the anteroom leading to the hall. Notwithstanding the fact the defendant knew of it, nothing was done to correct it. During the afternoon of May 2, Mrs. Neville was preparing the hall for use that evening. She did not wear her shoes because she was afraid of falling on the slippery floors. Mrs. Schiller, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, came to the second floor, called Mrs. Neville and engaged her in conversation in the anteroom. Mrs. Neville then left the plaintiff in the anteroom, without warning her of the slippery floor or the uncovered radiator valve. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff slipped on the floor in the anteroom and fell against the uncovered radiator valve and sustained serious injuries.
The claim of the defendant that the court erred in denying its motion is based upon is assertion that it failed in no duty to the plaintiff, that the condition of the floor was not a proximate cause of her fall, and that her conduct constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law. An owner of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a natural or artificial condition thereon if he knows of the condition and realizes that it involves an unreasonable risk to them and, having reason to believe that they will not discover the condition or realize the risk, permits them to enter or remain in or upon the premises without exercising reasonable care to make the condition reasonably safe or to warn them of the condition and the risk involved therein. Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 474, 78 A.2d 693, 25 A.L.R.2d 592; Restatement, 2 Torts § 342. Whether the defendant's failure to warn the plaintiff constituted negligence and, if it did, whether such failure was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries were questions of fact. Likewise, whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was a question of fact. Dickau v. Rafala, 141 Conn. 121, 125, 104 A.2d 214. The evidence submitted to the jury was such as to permit them, acting reasonably and logically, to resolve all of these issues in the plaintiffs' favor.
The defendant contends that the court erred in admitting evidence related to falls by other persons. After the testimony in question had been admitted, the defendant requested...
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State v. Grimes
...materially injurious to the defendant so as to constitute a cause for reversal. General Statutes § 52-265; Schiller v. Orange Hall corporation, 144 Conn. 327, 331, 130 A.2d 798. The claimed error in the charge relates to the portion in which the court discussed the evidence concerning an in......
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Waldron v. Raccio
...in view of the court's cautionary instructions. State v. Bausman, 162 Conn. 308, 314, 294 A.2d 312; Schiller v. Orange Hall Corporation, 144 Conn. 327, 330-331, 130 A.2d 798. In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the plaintiff's testimony. In a death action......
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State v. Barber
...State v. Bausman, 162 Conn. 308, 314, 294 A.2d 312, 315; State v. Smith, 156 Conn. 378, 383, 242 A.2d 763; Schiller v. Orange Hall Corporation, 144 Conn. 327, 330-31, 130 A.2d 798. Further, it is possible that, as a matter of trial tactics, trial counsel left this area alone after objection......
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Derby v. Connecticut Light & Power Co.
...v. Pugliese, 149 Conn. 299, 301, 179 A.2d 603; Hennessey v. Hennessey, 145 Conn. 211, 213, 140 A.2d 473; Schiller v. Orange Hall Corporation, 144 Conn. 327, 329, 130 A.2d 798; Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 474-475, 78 A.2d 693. That section states that: '(a) possessor of land is subjec......