Schiller v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 14 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:10-cv-161-J-34TEM |
| Parties | ANTHONY LEON SCHILLER, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Anthony Leon Schiller initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #1) with exhibits (P. Ex.) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on February 23, 2010. Petitioner challenges a 2004 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for two counts of burglary. Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Respondents' Response (Response) (Doc. #28) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On March 9, 2010, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and Notice to Petitioner (Doc. #6), admonishing Petitioner regarding his obligations and giving Petitioner a time frame in which to submit a reply. Petitioner submitted a brief in reply onMarch 7, 2012. See Petitioner's Reply (Doc. #36). This case is ripe for review.
On March 4, 2004, the State of Florida charged Anthony Leon Schiller with burglary of a dwelling (three counts) and burglary of a conveyance (two counts). Resp. Ex. 5 at 33-34, Amended Information. While the pretrial proceedings were ongoing, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Resp. Ex. 1. The appellate court denied the petition on June 22, 2004. Schiller v. State, 876 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Resp. Ex. 2. After jury selection, Schiller proceeded to a trial. Resp. Exs. 8-14, Transcript of the Jury Trial (Tr.). At the conclusion of the trial, a jury found Schiller guilty of burglary of a dwelling (counts one and three) and not guilty of burglary to a conveyance (count two). Tr. at 845-46; Resp. Ex. 5 at 156-58, Verdicts. On November 19, 2004, the trial court sentenced Schiller, as a habitual felony offender, to a term of incarceration of fifteen years on each count, to run concurrently. Resp. Ex. 5 at 165-71, Judgment.
After trial, Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 29, 2004. Resp. Ex. 3. On December 6, 2004, the appellate court denied the petition. Schiller v. State, 888 So.2d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Resp. Ex. 4.
On appeal, Petitioner, through counsel, filed an Initial Brief, arguing that the trial court erred when it: permitted Petitioner to represent himself without making the inquiries required by Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d) (ground one); failed to properly instruct the jury on the offense of burglary of a dwelling (ground three); commented on Petitioner's failure to testify (ground four); denied Petitioner's motion to suppress without affording him an evidentiary hearing (ground six); and imposed habitual offender sentences when Petitioner's predicate offenses did not meet the sequential sentencing requirement, as interpreted in Richardson v. State, 884 So.2d 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (ground seven). Resp. Ex. 19. Schiller also argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Petitioner's motion for continuance to secure the presence of defense witnesses (ground two), and that Petitioner was denied his right to due process of law and trial by a neutral and detached magistrate when the trial court repeatedly rebuked Petitioner in the presence of the jury (ground five). Id. The State filed an Answer Brief, see Resp. Ex. 20, and Petitioner filed a Reply Brief, see Resp. Ex. 21. On June 16, 2006, the appellate court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence per curiam without issuing a written opinion. Schiller v. State, 935 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Resp. Ex. 22. The court denied Petitioner's motion for rehearing on August 10, 2006. Resp.Exs. 23; 24. The mandate issued on August 28, 2006.1 Petitioner did not seek review in the United States Supreme Court.
On or about February 5, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that appellate counsel was ineffective on direct appeal. Resp. Ex. 25. The appellate court denied the petition on the merits on April 2, 2007. Schiller v. State, 960 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The court denied Petitioner's motion for rehearing on June 5, 2007. Resp. Ex. 26.
Later in February 2007, Petitioner also filed a pro se motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (Rule 3.850 motion). Resp. Ex. 27 at 1-80. In his request for post conviction relief, Petitioner asserted that counsel was ineffective for the following reasons: counsel, Matthew Shirk, never objected to the State Attorney's perjured Information (ground one); Shirk never conveyed any plea offer or discussed viable options with Petitioner (ground two); counsel, Katy Aguilar, never conveyed any plea offer or discussed viable options with Petitioner (ground three); counsel Aguilar and McGuiness were "combative, delinquent and [contradictory]" (ground four); Shirk and Aguilar refused to aid Petitioner in preparing motions (ground five); they refused to disclose discovery and "logical information" (ground six); counsel, David Taylor, failed to object to theState's prejudicial comments in closing argument (ground nine); Taylor's representation fell below that of any counsel (ground ten); Taylor failed to move for a mistrial (ground twelve); Taylor failed to object (ground thirteen); Taylor failed to ensure that Petitioner received the proper jail credits (ground fourteen); Aguilar, Shirk and Taylor failed to object to the State's use of the wrong sentencing guidelines (ground fifteen); counsel failed to move to suppress photographs that were neither signed nor dated (ground sixteen); Taylor failed to obtain a presentence investigation report (ground seventeen); Taylor was ineffective for hiring Investigator Kevin Mitchell (ground eighteen); counsel failed to conduct a proper investigation (ground nineteen); Aguilar failed to object to the initial threats of habitualization (ground twenty); Aguilar failed to move for discharge on speedy trial grounds (ground twenty-three); Taylor failed to object to the erroneous jury instruction that left out an essential element of the crime (ground twenty-five); Aguilar failed to address the insanity defense or explore addiction or mental issues (ground twenty-eight); and Aguilar failed to inform the court of a conflict she had relating to a State informant (ground twenty-nine).
Schiller also asserted that the trial court, state attorneys, and Aguilar erred by allowing Petitioner to represent himself (ground seven); the trial court should have granted Schiller a continuance (ground eight); the State and the trial court werebiased against the defense (ground eleven); the prosecutor failed to disclose favorable evidence (ground twenty-one);2 the State Attorney's Office committed fraud in that the prosecution discouraged the production of facts and evidence (ground twenty-four); the Information was a sham (ground twenty-six); the State Attorney's Office caused an unconstitutional delay in the case and deprived Schiller of a speedy and fair trial (ground twenty-seven); the trial court failed to inquire into Petitioner's competence and ability to represent himself (ground thirty); the State Attorney's Office, the Public Defender's Office, and the law firm of Selinger & Fletcher denied Petitioner a meaningful and competent review of the records before, during, and after the trial (ground thirty-one); the State excluded favorable testimony for the defense and withheld favorable evidence (ground thirty-two); and the trial court was biased and possibly racist and vindictive at the sentencing (ground thirty-three).
The court denied Petitioner's Rule 3.850 motion on October 28, 2008. Id. at 106-46. On January 8, 2008, the court denied Schiller's motion for rehearing. Id. at 147-52, 153-54. Petitioner appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion. On July 27, 2009, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision per curiam. Schiller v. State, 13 So.3d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009);Resp. Ex. 28. The mandate issued on August 24, 2009. Resp. Ex. 28.
The Petition is timely filed within the one-year period of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
"In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Id. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034 (2004), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.
The Court will analyze Petitioner's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is described as follows:
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