Schilling v. White

• Decision Date: 06 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-3097,94-3097
• Citation: 58 F.3d 1081
• Parties: Gordon R. SCHILLING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward L. WHITE and Robert L. Massie, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1081

58 F.3d 1081

Gordon R. SCHILLING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Edward L. WHITE and Robert L. Massie, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 94-3097.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 15, 1994.

Decided July 6, 1995.

Gordon R. Schilling (briefed), Columbus, OH, pro se.

Joshua T. Cox (briefed), Office of Atty. Gen., Columbus, OH, for defendants-appellees.

Before: MARTIN and BOGGS, Circuit Judges; and BELL, District Judge. ^*

BOGGS, Circuit Judge.

Gordon R. Schilling, proceeding pro se, appeals ¹ from the district court's dismissal without prejudice of his civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I

In March 1988, Schilling was involved in a car accident. Officers Edward L. White and Robert L. Massie of the Ohio Highway Patrol responded. Schilling claims that while Officer White was gathering information and speaking to Schilling, Massie began to search his car. Massie found what he thought were drugs, so he searched Schilling. Schilling was arrested and charged with being under the influence of drugs. On February 3, 1992, Schilling filed a Sec. 1983 suit against White and Massie, seeking monetary damages as compensation for "the violation of his constitutional rights." Schilling's complaint did not specify whether he was ultimately convicted of driving under the influence of drugs.

In an order dated February 3, 1992, the district court stated its intention to dismiss without prejudice Schilling's complaint, pursuant to Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514 (6th Cir.1985), unless "plaintiff amends the complaint to allege that he suffered no criminal conviction as a result of the alleged illegal ... search and seizure or that such conviction had been set aside...." Schilling responded by admitting that he had pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and had been unable to overturn the conviction. The district court dismissed his suit on June 11, 1992, because "under [ Hadley ], this case must be dismissed without prejudice until such time as [Schilling's] conviction is set aside."

II

A decision by a district court to dismiss without prejudice will not be disturbed except for an abuse of discretion. Craighead v. E.F. Hutton, Inc., 899 F.2d 485, 495 (6th Cir.1990). A court will find an abuse of discretion where it has a "definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors." Balani v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157, 1160 (6th Cir.1982) (citations omitted). A court also abuses its discretion where it "improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard." Gaston Drugs, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 984, 988 (6th Cir.1987), quoting Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 753 F.2d 1354, 1356 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200, 105 S.Ct. 1155, 84 L.Ed.2d 309 (1985).

III

In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), the Supreme Court first addressed the interplay between 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and habeas corpus. ² The plaintiffs in Preiser were prisoners who alleged that they were unconstitutionally deprived of good-time credits and sought reinstatement of time due. Success in these claims would have resulted in their immediate or early release. The Court in Preiser concluded that when a prisoner seeks equitable relief that challenges the fact or duration of confinement, as opposed to the conditions of confinement, habeas corpus was the sole form of relief. Because a finding of a constitutional violation in a civil suit could be given preclusive effect in a later habeas corpus proceeding, prisoners could use Sec. 1983 as an "end run" around the carefully-crafted exhaustion requirements of habeas. Thus, courts must treat such a Sec. 1983 claim as a habeas corpus petition, subject to its exhaustion requirements.

Although one of Congress's specific goals in enacting 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 was to provide a federal forum for claims arising from constitutional violations, this end was also often accomplished through habeas corpus review. Given the choice between allowing the absence of an exhaustion requirement in Sec. 1983 to "swallow the rule" of exhaustion of habeas petitions, or making a de facto exception to Sec. 1983 jurisdiction, the Court chose the latter.

In Hadley v. Werner, this Circuit extended Preiser beyond equitable relief to claims for monetary damages under Sec. 1983. The Hadley court dismissed without prejudice an inmate's suit based on ineffective assistance of counsel, where he alleged that several state and local officials had structured Michigan's system for compensating state-appointed counsel in order to attract only incompetent attorneys. 753 F.2d at 515. The court found that "a necessary portion of his claim challenges the validity of Hadley's conviction," and "direct[ed] him to pursue relief through ... habeas corpus." Id. at 516.

The Hadley court added comity and federalism as additional policy justifications for its rule. The court cited the federalism considerations reflected in Younger abstention ³ along with the Congressional mandate that habeas be a state prisoner's exclusive federal remedy. Id. at 516. It adopted the First Circuit's rule that a federal court must "stay its hand where disposition of the damages action would involve a rule implying that a state conviction is or would be illegal." Ibid., quoting Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1252 (1st Cir.1974). Thus, the suit could be reinstated "if and when [a prisoner] establishes, through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel." Hadley, 753 F.2d at 516.

This Circuit further expanded the scope of Hadley in Feaster v. Miksch, 846 F.2d 21, 23 (6th Cir.1988), holding that "when disposition of a federal action for damages necessarily requires the resolution of issues that will determine the outcome of pending state criminal proceedings, Younger requires that the federal action not proceed." Unlike the plaintiffs in Preiser and Hadley, Feaster was not a prisoner, so habeas relief was unavailable. Feaster sued four police officers and a municipality for alleged Fourth Amendment violations arising from the execution of a search warrant. The court recognized that entertaining the case "would necessarily determine the same questions as to the validity of the search warrant," whereas staying the action would avoid federal court rulings "implying that a state conviction is or would be illegal." Id. at 22-23 (emphasis added in Feaster ), quoting Hadley, 753 F.2d at 516 (quoting Guerro, 498 F.2d at 1252). The court therefore stayed the federal suit pending completion of ongoing state criminal proceedings. Feaster, 846 F.2d at 24.

A close reading of Feaster reveals that it was a significant departure from Hadley and Preiser. Instead of stressing the exclusivity of the habeas remedy, the Feaster court interpreted Hadley as being premised upon "the need to avoid federal interference in ongoing state judicial proceedings that implicate vital state interests, including the state's interest in maintaining its system of criminal justice." Feaster, 846 F.2d at 23. The philosophically distinct doctrines in Feaster and Hadley both graft an exhaustion requirement onto Sec. 1983 actions and, as with the rule in Hadley, " Feaster abstention" requires the exhaustion of state post-conviction relief. Even if there is no state litigation actually pending, " Feaster abstention" applies to potential litigation--hence the court's additional emphasis in the phrase from Hadley, "a ruling implying that a state conviction is or would be illegal." Feaster, 846 F.2d at 23.

More important for the resolution of this case, the court recognized in Feaster that Fourth Amendment claims must be treated differently than other constitutional violations. Because Fourth Amendment claims cannot be raised in a habeas petition, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), there is less danger that a prisoner will use Sec. 1983 to avoid the procedural requirements of habeas corpus, rendering the reasoning of Hadley inapposite. However, " Feaster abstention" is still appropriate where there remains the possibility of further state review of a conviction. Rather than dismissing Fourth Amendment claims raised under Sec. 1983 by a convicted person, a federal court should stay the action pending resolution of the state proceedings.

Accordingly, this Circuit has repeatedly cited Feaster in holding that Fourth Amendment claims are exempt from Hadley 's "dismissal without prejudice" rule. Lumpkin v. Wilkinson, No. 93-4060, 1994 WL 105889, * 1 (6th Cir. March 28, 1994) ("we conclude that the district court abused its discretion to the extent it dismissed [the] Fourth Amendment claim"); Turner v. Leis, No. 89-3877, 1990 WL 6950 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 1990) (staying Fourth Amendment portion of suit); Goddard v. Larsen, No. 89-5612, 1989 WL 144341 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 1989) (ordering a stay rather than dismissal of plaintiff's equitable claims); Sherrills v. Kerek, No. 88-4153, 1989 WL 34834, * 1 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1989) ("we find the district court correctly dismissed without prejudice all claims under Hadley ... except the fourth amendment issue"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1071, 111 S.Ct. 794, 112 L.Ed.2d 855 (1991); Powell v. Gilbert, No. 88-1067, 1988 WL 76542, * 1 (6th Cir. July 22, 1988) (" Hadley did not control the resolution of plaintiff's fourth amendment claims").

A necessary consequence of this doctrine is that when the plaintiff has exhausted state remedies and has no possibility of habeas corpus (e.g., Fourth Amendment claims), a federal court must entertain the Sec. 1983 suit. Carlson v. Zielinski, Nos. 88-1846, 88-1883, 1989 WL 16139, * 1 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 1989) ("The claim regarding the validity of the search warrant ... should have been stayed rather than dismissed...