Schimandle v. DeKalb Cnty. Sheriff's Office

• Decision Date: 07 October 2022
• Docket Number: 21-cv-50477
• Parties: Justin Schimandle, Plaintiff, v. DeKalb County Sheriff's Office, Detective Josh Duehning, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Justin Schimandle, Plaintiff, v. DeKalb County Sheriff's Office, Detective Josh Duehning, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

No. 21-cv-50477

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Western Division

October 7, 2022

Courtroom 5200

Courtroom 5300

Ekl Williams & Provenzale LLC

Terry A. Ekl #0727105 Attorneys for Defendants

Honorable Iain D. Johnson

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Margaret J. Schneider Magistrate Judge

NOW COME Defendants, Detective Josh Duehning and the DeKalb County Sheriff's Office, by and through their attorneys, Ekl, Williams & Provenzale, LLC, and for their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) state as follows:

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted for the offense of battery on a minor, a student at the school where Plaintiff was employed as the Dean. Accordingly, Plaintiff has sued Detective Josh Duehning and the DeKalb County Sheriff's Office for a §1983 claim of false arrest and an Illinois state law claim of malicious prosecution. Plaintiff brings these claims despite the fact that the incident that led to Plaintiff's arrest was captured on video, an arrest warrant was issued for Plaintiff's arrest based on a judicial finding of probable cause, Detective Duehning did not arrest Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was only detained temporarily at the DeKalb County Sheriff's Office while being processed on the arrest warrant. Plaintiff does not allege that Detective Duehning fabricated any evidence against him, concealed exculpatory evidence, or engaged in any misconduct to either obtain an arrest warrant for his arrest or to commence criminal charges against him. To the contrary, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint centers around the theory that despite the video evidence, Detective Duehning should have accepted Plaintiff's claim that he was acting in self-defense when he grabbed a student, carried the student through a door, and brought the student down to the ground, and therefore, should not have filed charges against Plaintiff for battery.

Defendants initially filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See Dkt. 26. One of the arguments presented in that Motion was that Plaintiff could not state a cause of action for false arrest because he was only detained pursuant to an arrest warrant and therefore, he did not have a Fourth Amendment claim. Defendants relied upon the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bianchi v. McQueen, 818 F.3d 309 (7^th Cir. 2015) in support of this argument. See Dkt. 26, pp. 6-7. In denying the Motion to Dismiss, the Court held that Bianchi was no longer good law in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S.Ct. 911 (2017) (“Manuel I”). See Dkt. 38. In denying the Motion, the Court ordered Defendants to answer the First Amended Complaint but also invited Defendants to file a Rule 12(c) motion, if grounds for such a motion existed. Id., pp. 4-5.

While it is Defendants' position that the narrowly tailored holding of Bianchi still survives after Manuel I, there are also several other grounds for entering judgment in favor of Defendants. Initially, Plaintiff's own allegations establish that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for battery. Moreover, at the very least, there was arguable probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest and therefore, Detective Duehning is entitled to qualified immunity. Lastly, both causes of action are factually insufficient given that Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any damages during his extremely brief detention, which is required for a false arrest claim, and Plaintiff does not allege that Detective Duehning acted with any type of malice required for a malicious prosecution claim.

ARGUMENT

I. Applicable Pleading Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) permits a party to move for judgment after the parties have filed a complaint and an answer, and the pleadings are closed. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Gil v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 339 (7^th Cir. 2017). A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to demonstrate a plausible entitlement to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 (2007). This “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 555. Courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual assertion.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). According to Iqbal, once the pleader's conclusions are disregarded, a court should determine if the “well-pleaded factual allegations....plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 679.

II. Plaintiff's Allegations^[1]

Plaintiff was the Dean of Students at Kishwaukee Education Consortium (“KEC”) in Malta, Illinois. Dkt. 25, ¶7. On September 26, 2019, Plaintiff was informed that one of the students at KEC, C.G., was using a vaping device in violation of school rules. Id., ¶¶8-9. Subsequently, an “incident” occurred during which C.G. acted aggressively towards Plaintiff and Plaintiff restrained C.G. Id., ¶10. The Associate Principal of KEC called the DeKalb County Sheriff's Office to report the incident and Detective Duehning was assigned to the case. Id., ¶11.

There is a surveillance video of the incident that occurred between Plaintiff and C.G. Id., ¶12. While Plaintiff did not attach a copy of the video to his Complaint, he alleges that the video establishes that C.G was the aggressor during the incident between Plaintiff and C.G. and that Plaintiff acted reasonably in defending himself when he restrained C.G. Id., ¶13. There was also a cell phone video of the incident between Plaintiff and C.G. showing Plaintiff “leading C.G. through the doorway of KEC's gym to its foyer.” Id., ¶14. Again, Plaintiff fails to attach a copy of this video but claims that this video shows that Plaintiff used his forearm and elbow, not C.G.'s body, to open the door to the foyer when he led C.G. through the door. Id., ¶14.

On October 15, 2019, Detective Duehning interviewed Plaintiff about the incident with C.G. Id., ¶16. During that interview, Plaintiff admitted that he “bear hugged” C.G., held C.G. in a “bear hug” as he walked him through a set of doors, and that C.G. and Plaintiff fell to the ground. Id., ¶16(m), (n), (o). Detective Duehning noted in his report that Plaintiff's description of what occurred was consistent with the surveillance video. Id., ¶17. Plaintiff informed Detective Duehning that he placed C.G. in a bear hug out of fear for his safety and in response to C.G. trying to reach into his pockets. Id., ¶16(k)-(m). According to Plaintiff, his use of force against C.G. was authorized by statute and was a reasonable and necessary use of force to maintain Plaintiff's safety. Id., ¶29.

During his investigation, Detective Duehning also interviewed other employees at KEC. Id., ¶¶18-27. Four of those employees observed Plaintiff holding onto C.G. on the ground. Id., ¶¶18-25. One of the employees stated that he saw Plaintiff carry C.G. out of the commons area in a “bear hug” and that they ended up on the floor. Id., ¶26. Detective Duehning noted in his reports that the witnesses' statements were consistent with the surveillance video. Id., ¶19, 21, 23, 25, 27. The Complaint neglects to mention C.G's description of the incident between himself and Plaintiff.

Detective Duehning submitted affidavits in support of an arrest warrant. Id., ¶31. Those affidavits alleged that: Plaintiff caused bodily harm to C.G. and made physical contact of an insulting and provoking nature to C.G while carrying C.G. and falling on top of C.G. with his body weight (Counts I and II); and that Plaintiff caused bodily harm to C.G. and made physical contact of an insulting and provoking nature with C.G. while carrying C.G. and using C.G.'s body to open a door, striking C.G's head and side into the door(Count III and IV). Id., ¶¶32-39. Plaintiff alleges that Detective Duehning had no probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had committed a criminal offense. Id., ¶30. Plaintiff also alleges that the affidavits in support of an arrest warrant were “false” because Detective Duehning should have known that Plaintiff had the authority to restrain and remove C.G. and that Plaintiff did not “knowingly” fall onto C.G. Id., ¶¶33, 35, 37, 39.

A DeKalb County judge made a finding of probable cause on the battery charges and issued an arrest warrant for Plaintiff. Id., ¶40; See also, Arrest Warrant, attached hereto as Exhibit A^[2]. As a result, Plaintiff turned himself into the DeKalb County Sheriff's Office where he was handcuffed and detained. Id., ¶41. On July 13, 2021, after a bench trial commenced, Plaintiff was found not guilty of the battery charges on a motion for directed finding. Id., ¶39.

Plaintiff claims that he was terminated from his employment and suffered lost wages, lost opportunities, reputational harm and severe emotional distress as a result of his arrest and charges. Id., ¶45. Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any injuries during his brief detention at the DeKalb County Sheriff's Office.

III. Plaintiff Fails to State a Cause of Action Against Detective Duehning for False Arrest.

A. Plaintiff's Processing At the Sheriff's Office Pursuant to an Arrest Warrant Does Not Support a Cause of Action For False Arrest.

Plaintiff acknowledges that an arrest warrant was issued for his arrest and then he was permitted to turn himself into the Sheriff's Office, rather than being arrested. See Dkt 25, ¶40-41. ...