Schiro v. Farley

Decision Date19 January 1994
Docket NumberNo. 92-7549.,92-7549.
Citation510 U.S. 222
PartiesSCHIRO <I>v.</I> FARLEY, SUPERINTENDENT, INDIANA STATE PRISON, ET AL.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

At petitioner Schiro's state court trial on three counts of murder—including, in Count I, the charge that he "knowingly" killed the victim, and, in Count II, that he killed her while committing rape—the jury returned a verdict of guilty on Count II, but left the remaining verdict sheets blank. The trial court imposed the death sentence, finding that the State had proved the statutory aggravating factor that Schiro "committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit . . . rape," and that no mitigating circumstances had been established. After twice affirming the sentence in state proceedings, the Indiana Supreme Court again affirmed on remand from the Federal District Court in habeas proceedings, rejecting Schiro's argument that the jury's failure to convict him on the Count I murder charge operated as an acquittal of intentional murder, and that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited the use of the intentional murder aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes. The Federal Court of Appeals accepted this conclusion in affirming the District Court's denial of habeas relief, ruling also that collateral estoppel was not implicated since Schiro had to show that the jury's verdict actually and necessarily determined the issue he sought to foreclose and his Count II conviction did not act as an acquittal with respect to the Count I murder charge.

Held:

1. Although this Court undoubtedly has the discretion to reach the State's argument that granting relief to Schiro would require the retroactive application of a new rule, in violation of the principle announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, the Court will not do so in the present circumstances, where the State did not raise the Teague argument either in the lower courts or in its brief in opposition to the petition for a writ of certiorari. Pp. 228-229.

2. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not require vacation of Schiro's death sentence. His argument that his sentencing proceeding amounted to a successive prosecution for intentional murder in violation of the Clause is inconsistent with the Court's prior decisions. Because a second sentencing proceeding following retrial ordinarily is constitutional, see, e. g., Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15, 17-18, an initial sentencing proceeding following trial on the issue of guilt does not violate the Clause. The Court has also upheld the use of prior convictions to enhance sentences for subsequent convictions, even though this means a defendant must, in a certain sense, relitigate in a sentencing proceeding conduct for which he was previously tried. See, e. g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 560. In short, as applied to successive prosecutions, the Clause is written in terms of potential or risk of trial and conviction, not punishment. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430, 438, 446, distinguished. Pp. 229-232.

3. Nor does the doctrine of collateral estoppel require vacation of Schiro's death sentence. The Court does not address his contention that the doctrine bars the use of the "intentional" murder aggravating circumstance, because he has not met his burden of establishing the factual predicate for the application of the doctrine, namely, that an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined in his favor. See, e. g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, 443. Specifically, because an examination of the entire record shows that the trial court's instructions on the issue of intent to kill were ambiguous, and that uncertainty exists as to whether the jury believed it could return more than one verdict, the verdict actually entered could have been grounded on an issue other than intent to kill, see id., at 444, and, accordingly, Schiro has failed to demonstrate that it amounted to an acquittal on the intentional murder count. Pp. 232-236.

963 F. 2d 962, affirmed.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 237. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 239.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

Monica Foster, by appointment of the Court, 508 U. S. 970, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was Rhonda Long-Sharp.

Arend J. Abel, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Pamela Carter, Attorney General, and Matthew R. Gutwein and Wayne E. Uhl, Deputy Attorneys General.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case we determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause requires us to vacate the sentence of death imposed on petitioner Thomas Schiro. For the reasons explained below, we hold that it does not.

I

Schiro was convicted and sentenced to death for murder. The body of Laura Luebbehusen was discovered in her home on the morning of February 5, 1981, by her roommate, Darlene Hooper, and Darlene Hooper's former husband. Darlene Hooper, who had been away, returned to find the home in disarray. Blood covered the walls and floor; Laura Luebbehusen's semiclad body was lying near the entrance. The police recovered from the scene a broken vodka bottle, a handle and metal portions of an iron, and bottles of various types of liquor.

The pathologist testified that there were a number of contusions on the body, including injuries to the head. The victim also had lacerations on one nipple and a thigh, and a tear in the vagina, all caused after death. A forensic dentist determined that the thigh injury was caused by a human bite. The cause of death was strangulation.

Laura Luebbehusen's car was later found near a halfway house where Schiro was living. Schiro told one counselor at the halfway house he wanted to discuss something "heavy." App. 53. Schiro later confessed to another counselor that he had committed the murder. After his arrest, he confessed to an inmate in the county jail that he had been drinking and taking Quaaludes the night of the killing, and that he had had intercourse with the victim both before and after killing her.

Schiro also admitted the killing to his girlfriend, Mary Lee. Schiro told Mary Lee that he gained access to Laura Luebbehusen's house by telling her his car had broken down. Once in the house, he exposed himself to her. She told him that she was a lesbian, that she had been raped as a child, that she had never otherwise had intercourse before and did not want to have sex. Nonetheless, Schiro raped her numerous times. There was evidence that Schiro forced her to consume drugs and alcohol. When Laura Luebbehusen tried to escape, Schiro restrained and raped her at least once more. Then, as Laura Luebbehusen lay or slept on the bed, Schiro realized that she would have to die so that she would not turn him in. He found the vodka bottle and beat her on the head with it until it broke. He then beat her with the iron and, when she resisted, finally strangled her to death. Schiro dragged her body into another room and sexually assaulted the corpse. After the murder, he attempted to destroy evidence linking him to the crime.

II

At the time of the crime, the State of Indiana defined murder as follows:

"A person who:

"(1) knowingly or intentionally kills another human being; or

"(2) kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape or robbery; "commits murder, a felony." Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (Supp. 1978).

Schiro was charged with three counts of murder. In Count I he was charged with "knowingly" killing Laura Luebbehusen; in Count II with killing her while committing the crime of rape; and in Count III with killing her while committing criminal deviate conduct. App. 3-5. The State sought the death penalty for Counts II and III.

At trial, Schiro did not contest that he had killed Laura Luebbehusen. Indeed, in closing argument, Schiro's defense attorney stated: "Was there a killing? Sure, no doubt about it. Did Tom Schiro do it? Sure . . . . There's no question about it, I'm not going to try. .. and `bamboozle' this jury. There was a killing and he did it." App. to Brief for Respondent 24. Instead, the defense argued that Schiro either was not guilty by reason of insanity or was guilty but mentally ill, an alternative verdict permitted under Indiana law.

The jury was given 10 possible verdicts, among them the 3 murder counts described above, the lesser included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, guilty but mentally ill, not guilty by reason of insanity, and not guilty. App. 37-38. After five hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on Count II; it left the remaining verdict sheets blank.

Under Indiana law, to obtain the death penalty the State is required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of nine aggravating factors. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b) (Supp. 1978). The aggravating factor relevant here is: "[T]he defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit. .. rape" or another enumerated felony. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1). Upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an aggravating factor, the sentencer weighs the factor against any mitigating circumstances. When the initial conviction is by a jury, the "jury. .. reconvene[s] for the sentencing hearing" to "recommend to the court whether the death penalty should be imposed." §§ 35-50-2-9(d), (e). The trial judge makes "the final determination of the sentence, after considering the jury's recommendation." § 35-50-2-9(e)(2). "The court is not bound by the jury's recommendation," however. Ibid.

The primary issue...

To continue reading

Request your trial
501 cases
  • State v. Hearl, AC 39463
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • May 29, 2018
    ...that he may be found guilty even though innocent." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schiro v. Farley , 510 U.S. 222, 229–30, 114 S.Ct. 783, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994)."The proper double jeopardy inquiry when a defendant is convicted of multiple violations of the same statut......
  • United States v. Taylor
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • September 8, 2016
    ...116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) ; Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 844, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) ; Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 114 S.Ct. 783, 788, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994) ; Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 115 S.Ct. 1275, 1275, 131 L.Ed.2d 152 (1995).9 See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 ......
  • United States v. Known
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • December 15, 2015
    ...and successive prosecutions for the same offense," United States v. Basciano, 599 F.3d 184, 196 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994)). Defendant argues that Count One of the EDNY Indictment is barred by double jeopardy because it charges Defendant with racketeer......
  • United States v. Le
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • September 8, 2016
    ...116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) ; Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 844, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) ; Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 114 S.Ct. 783, 788, 127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994) ; Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 115 S.Ct. 1275, 1275, 131 L.Ed.2d 152 (1995).9 See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
6 books & journal articles
  • Institutionalizing the Culture of Control
    • United States
    • International Criminal Justice Review No. 24-4, December 2014
    • December 1, 2014
    ...249 (1988)Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990)Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992)Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991)Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994)Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)(continued)Zschirnt and Randol Table A1. (continued)Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007)Sc......
  • Aedpa's Ratchet: Invoking the Miranda Right to Counsel After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
    • United States
    • University of Whashington School of Law University of Washington Law Review No. 86-4, June 2017
    • Invalid date
    ...supra note 20, at 265-70 (listing cases restricting habeas review during Rehnquist's time on the Court). 140. See, e.g., Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232 (1994) (stating that the preclusive effect of a jury verdict is a question of federal law reviewed de 141. See Blume, supra note 20, a......
  • Protecting first federal habeas corpus petitions: closing the opening left by Gomez.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 87 No. 3, March 1997
    • March 22, 1997
    ...McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994); Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994); Burden v. Zant, 510 U.S. 132 (1994); Delo v. Blair, 509 U.S. 823 (1993); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993); Withrow v. William......
  • CHAPTER 14 DOUBLE JEOPARDY
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Procedure, Volume Two: Adjudication (CAP)
    • Invalid date
    ...See Note 172, supra and accompanying text.[213] Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384 (1971).[214] In this regard, consider Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994): S admitted he raped and killed L. He was charged in separate counts with intentional murder and felony murder (which does not require......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT