Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville

Decision Date30 April 1997
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 97-0021-C.
PartiesDaniel SCHLEIFER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

Deborah Chasen Wyatt, Wyatt & Carter, Charlottesville, VA, Mary Catherine Bauer, ACLU of Virginia Foundation, Richmond, VA, for plaintiffs.

W. Clyde Gouldman, III, Deputy City Attorney, Charlottesville, VA, Lisa Robertson Kelley, City Attorney's Office, Charlottesville, VA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MICHAEL, District Judge.

This case involves an attack on a recently enacted curfew law by Defendant City of Charlottesville, Virginia; the court has been asked to issue preliminary injunctive relief against the curfew law pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. P. 65(a). After holding a hearing on the matter and considering the parties' oral arguments, memoranda, and evidentiary exhibits, the court concludes that it must presently decline to enjoin the law's operation.

In dealing with any preliminary injunction request, the court is acutely aware of the potential for mischief in acting on such a request. The guiding principles are perhaps best expressed by a case from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals where Judge Wilkinson stated: "[G]ranting a preliminary injunction requires that a district court, acting on an incomplete record, order a party to act, or refrain from acting, in a certain way. `[T]he danger of a mistake' in this setting `is substantial.'" Hughes Network Systems v. InterDigital Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 691, 693 (4th Cir.1994) (quoting American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir.1986)). It is particularly difficult to reach reasoned conclusions on what must necessarily be an incomplete and sometimes unbalanced record.

"Where serious issues are before the court, it is a sound idea to maintain the status quo ante litem ...." Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722, 727 (4th Cir.1986) (citing Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 194-95). When the injunction that would alter the status quo is mandatory (as opposed to prohibitory), the district court should "sparingly exercise[]" its authority. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir.1980).

It is important to note with clarity that the observations and conclusions stated herein are based on an incomplete record and cannot represent any final decision on any one of the claims. The court will expatiate on the law involved in these various issues, but does so with the clear recognition that a full evidentiary basis may change entirely the view of the court as to any one of these issues. It is to be hoped that some or all of the observations in this opinion will give guidance to counsel in developing that full evidentiary record. Again, the court cautions that the observations concerning plaintiffs' claims are made on the basis of that incomplete record about which Judge Wilkinson warned.

I. THE CURFEW LAW

Plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), are juveniles and their parents1 who request preliminary injunctive relief from Section 17-7 of Chapter 17 of the Charlottesville City Code, which enacts the curfew law (effective March 1, 1997). The purpose of the law is to

(I) promote the general welfare and protect the general public through the reduction of juvenile violence and crime within the City; (ii) promote the safety and wellbeing of the City's youngest citizens, ... whose inexperience renders them particularly vulnerable to becoming participants in unlawful activities, particularly unlawful drug activities, and to being victimized by older perpetrators of crime; and (iii) foster and strengthen parental responsibility for children.

See Introduction to § 17-7.

The law, applicable to children under the age of seventeen, sets a curfew of 12:01 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. on Mondays through Fridays and 1:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. During these hours, children are not permitted "to remain in or upon any Public Place within the City, to remain in any motor vehicle operating or parked therein or thereon, or to remain in or upon the premises of any Establishment within the City ..." Id. § 17-7(b). Parents are prohibited from aiding violations of the law. Id. § 17-7(c). Eight exceptions are provided. Minors are not bound by the curfew when: (1) they are accompanied by parents; (2) they are out because of an emergency; (3) they are engaged in employment activity, leaving from such activity, or going to such activity; (4) they are directly outside of their residences where their parents reside; (5) they are attending activities supervised by an adult and sponsored by a school, religious organization, civic organization, public agency, or a similar organization; (6) they are on an errand on behalf of their parents and have an appropriate authorizing note; (7) they are engaging in interstate travel; or (8) they are exercising rights under the First Amendment, such as free exercise of religion, speech, or assembly. Id. § 17-7(b)(1)-(8). A minor who violates the curfew law but who has never before received a warning will receive only a warning from an enforcing police officer. Id. § 17-7(g)(1)(A)(1). However, a minor who has previously received a warning will be charged with violating the curfew law and will be issued a summons to appear in court for the violation. Id. § 17-7(g)(1)(A)(2). The law directs the arresting officer to release the child into the custody of a parent as soon as is practicable or to place the child into a temporary care facility, so that a parent can retrieve the child. Id. § 17-7(g)(1)(B).

II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CURFEW LAW

Plaintiffs argue that the curfew law infringes upon various rights guaranteed them under the United States Constitution, such as freedom of movement and freedom from undue government interference in child-rearing, both of which derive from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;2 rights guaranteed under the First Amendment;3 the Fourth Amendment;4 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Further, plaintiffs contend the curfew law is void for vagueness because its defenses (or exceptions) give insufficient guidance to plaintiffs and enforcement officials as to which activities are exempt from the curfew law.

The following are activities of which the juvenile plaintiffs claim they will be deprived during curfew hours: (1) going to City Council meetings; (2) attending concerts and movies (such as Star Wars and The English Patient); (3) socializing with friends at coffee houses and dance parties ("raves"); (4) participating in band or theater activities; (5) eating; and (6) swimming and ice skating. Although plaintiffs speculate that other activities, such as late-night church and Alcoholics Anonymous meetings are threatened by the curfew law, none of the plaintiffs claim to be late-night church goers or recovering alcoholics.

III. STANDARD GOVERNING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

The following articulation of the law on preliminary injunctions is taken, virtually verbatim, from this court's opinion in Betts v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 939 F.Supp. 461, 465 (W.D.Va. 1996). Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is governed by the test articulated in Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Manufacturing Co., 550 F.2d 189, 196 (4th Cir. 1977), pursuant to which the court must take into account four factors, the weight given to each to be determined by the strength of the other factors. First, the court must make a finding that plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury if the court declines to grant injunctive relief. After this determination has been made, the court must assess the likelihood of harm to defendant if the court issues an injunction against it and then balance this harm against the injury plaintiffs will suffer if they are denied injunctive relief. Subsequently, the court must establish that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits, or if the balance in the previous step clearly favors plaintiffs, the court need only satisfy itself that plaintiffs have raised substantial and serious questions on the merits. Finally, public interest must be considered in the analysis. Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating Co., 22 F.3d 546, 551 (4th Cir.1994) (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812-13 (4th Cir.1991)).

A. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS

Because the merits of plaintiffs' case will, in large part, determine where the remaining Blackwelder factors lie, the court will first address the likelihood that plaintiffs will succeed on their claims.

Most of the challenges to curfew laws have taken place at the state level. However, two recent important decisions discussing the constitutionality of curfew laws come from federal courts-one from the district court in the District of Columbia, Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F.Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1996), and the other from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir.1993). These cases are luxurious precedent, for both analyze curfew laws almost identical to the curfew law under attack before this court. Hutchins struck down the curfew law, based upon a conclusion that the law infringed the constitutional rights of minors and their parents; the latter were found to have been unconstitutionally deprived of their right to rear children without undue governmental interference, and the former were found to have been unconstitutionally constrained in their right of free movement. The Fifth Circuit in Qutb, in contrast determined that the curfew law should be upheld; the Fifth Circuit concluded that any infringement on the rights of parents was minimal and that the constraint on the free movement rights of minors was justifiable. The court finds both cases helpful,...

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  • Hutchins by Owens v. District of Columbia
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