Schleis' Estate, Matter of
| Decision Date | 27 January 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 13465,13465 |
| Citation | 1982 NMSC 10,642 P.2d 164,97 N.M. 561 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Stephen D. SCHLEIS, Deceased. Kathleen HALEY, Claimant-Appellant, v. Daniel SCHLEIS, Personal Representative, and the Estate of Stephen D. Schleis, Deceased, Appellee. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
This appeal requires us to determine whether a divorce decree automatically severs an ex-spouse's beneficiary interest in an insurance policy. We hold that it does not.
Kathleen Haley and Stephen Schleis were married in 1975. During the marriage Stephen took out two insurance policies through his employer, naming Kathleen as beneficiary. On November 6, 1979, Stephen and Kathleen were divorced. The policies involved were term insurance and the period of coverage purchased with premium payments from the community funds had ended shortly after the divorce. Kathleen therefore retains no interest separate from her status as beneficiary. Phillips v. Wellborn, 89 N.M. 340, 552 P.2d 471 (1976).
In July, 1980, Stephen's personal representative moved for summary judgment on the proper distribution of the death benefits. The asserted grounds for the motion were first, that Stephen had designated a beneficiary for only one of the policies and second, that since the divorce decree gave Stephen all personal property in his possession Kathleen was divested of her interest in the policies. Kathleen also moved for summary judgment in her favor. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Stephen's estate, finding there were no issues of material fact. Kathleen appeals. We reverse.
Neither of the grounds asserted by Stephen's estate could support its motion for summary judgment in this case. His employer's practice was to require only one beneficiary designation no matter how many group policies were involved, unless separate beneficiaries were specifically desired. Under this procedure, Stephen's failure to make two beneficiary designations could not mean, as a matter of law, that he intended that proceeds of the second policy should go to his estate.
The estate's assertion that Kathleen was divested of her beneficiary interest in the policy because the divorce decree granted ownership of the policy to Stephen cannot be sustained. The estate relies on Romero v. Melendez, 83 N.M. 776, 498 P.2d 305 (1972). In Romero, we held that a wife's interest as beneficiary under a life insurance policy can be defeated by disposition of the policies in a divorce decree even though no change in beneficiary is made. We distinguished Harris v. Harris, 83 N.M. 441, 493 P.2d 407 (1972), which permitted a divorced wife to receive proceeds from a life insurance policy owned by her former husband, on grounds that the policy had not been disposed of in the decree. We reaffirm that the decree is dispositive, but feel it necessary to clarify what was meant in Romero and Harris.
The cases cited as authority for the Romero rule, Brewer v. Brewer, 239 Ark. 614, 390 S.W.2d 630 (1965); Dudley v. Franklin Life Insurance Company, 250 Or. 51, 440 P.2d 363 (1968), involved instances where the former wife specifically transferred and released any and all interest in the husband's policies and released him from any and all obligations which may have existed for any reason whatsoever. They were not cases in which the husband was merely given ownership of the policies. In Romero itself the decree "gave the decedent the policies as his sole and separate property and divested the appellant of any and all interest, including the expectancy as a beneficiary." Id. at 780, 498 P.2d 309. Thus, the Romero rule, which applies when policies are disposed of by a divorce decree, is limited to situations where the interest of the beneficiary spouse is specifically divested. Where the decree merely grants ownership of the policy to one spouse, without divesting the former spouse of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Fox Valley & Vicinity Const. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown
... ... (e) if no spouse, children, parents, or brothers and sisters be living, then to the estate of such deceased Participant ... In 1986, James executed a Beneficiary ... no genuine issues of material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(c). There were no disputed facts in this case and the district court ... Garcia, 639 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Mo.Ct.App.1982); Haley v. Schleis, 97 N.M. 561, 562, 642 P.2d 164, 165 (1982); Culbertson v. Continental Assurance Co., 631 P.2d ... ...
-
Bli v. Dixson Irrevocable Trust
... ... genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c); Baxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267. The moving party ... 7 Estate of Hull v. Williams, 126 Idaho 437, 440, 885 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Ct.App.1994). Property acquired ... App.3d 319, 325-26, 236 Cal.Rptr. 368 (1987); In re Estate of Schleis, 97 N.M. 561, 642 P.2d 164, 164 (1982); Wadsworth, 689 P.2d at 50; see also Guy, 98 Idaho at ... ...
-
Schultz v. Schultz
... ... Plan Guide (CCH) P 23,953 ... Beverley A. SCHULTZ, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Daniel Charles SCHULTZ, Appellants, ... Paula S. SCHULTZ, Appellee ... No. 97-1391 ... Supreme ... did not extinguish ex-wife's expectancy as a beneficiary of the policy); In re Estate of Schleis, 97 N.M. 561, 642 P.2d 164, 165 (1982) (holding "divorce decree granting the insured spouse ... ...
-
Messier v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 87-392
... ... See IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Groshong, 112 Idaho 847, 849, 736 P.2d 1301, 1303 (1987) ... The elements ... Life Ins. Co. v. Durbin, 541 F.Supp. 4, 7 (E.D.Pa.1981); In re Estate of Schleis, 97 N.M. 561, 563, 642 P.2d 164, 166 (1982) ... While this case is close, we ... ...