Schlessinger v. Chi. Hous. Auth.

• Decision Date: 16 September 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 12 C 3733
• Parties: David Schlessinger, Plaintiff, v. The Chicago Housing Authority, Jessica Porter (in Her Individual Capacity), and Ken Love (in His Individual Capacity), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

130 F.Supp.3d 1226

David Schlessinger, Plaintiff,

v.The Chicago Housing Authority, Jessica Porter (in Her Individual Capacity), and Ken Love (in His Individual Capacity), Defendants.

Case No. 12 C 3733

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed September 16, 2015

Michael S. Pileggi, Law Office of Michael Pileggi, Philadelphia, PA, Howard B. Brookins, Jr., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Michael L. Hahn, Litchfield Cavo LLP, Matthew J. Gardner, Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas, Lifton & Taylor, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL, United States District Judge

Plaintiff David Schlessinger ("Plaintiff" or "Schlessinger") alleges that defendants Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA") and CHA's former Senior Vice President of the Housing Choice Voucher Program, Jessica Porter, violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by retaliating against him for opposing their improper conduct.¹ Now before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted.

I. NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS LOCAL RULE 56.1

Before addressing the merits of the defendants' motion, the court turns to the defendants' objection to Schlessinger's Statement of Additional Facts ("SAF"). Under Local Rule 56.1(a)(3), a party moving for summary judgment must submit "a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law." Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc. , 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir.2009)(citing L.R. 56.1(a)(3). Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)then requires the nonmoving party to submit a "concise response" to each statement of fact, "including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B). The nonmoving party may also present a separate statement of additional facts "consisting of short numbered paragraphs," with citations to the record, that require the denial of summary judgment. See L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C); see alsoCiomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc. , 527 F.3d 635, 643–44 (7th Cir.2008).

If the nonmoving party offers a separate statement of additional facts, the statement is limited to forty paragraphs, unless the nonmoving party obtains prior leave from the court. Here, the defendants object to Schlessinger's Statement of Additional Facts because it contains 109 separate paragraphs, and Schlessinger did not seek leave from the court to file the excess paragraphs. L.R. 56.1imposes the 40–paragraph cap to force parties to introduce only material facts. As the Committee Comment to L.R. 56.1explains, "[t]he judges of this Court have observed that parties frequently include in their L.R. 56.1statements facts that are unnecessary to the motion and/or are disputed," and "that in the vast majority of cases, a limit of ... 40 assertions of additional statements of fact will be more than sufficient to determine whether the case is appropriate for summary judgment." The Committee Comment adds that a nonmoving party may obtain a "relaxation" of the 40–statement limit by showing that the "complexity of the case" necessitates additional paragraphs. In this case, Schlessinger made no such showing. As a consequence, the court strikes paragraphs numbered 41 through 109 and considers the information presented in them only for context.

Additionally, Schlessinger violated Local Rule 56.1and the law of this district in other respects. First, Schlessinger's response to the defendants' statement of material facts improperly denies many of the defendants' numbered paragraphs. Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)requires the party opposing a motion for summary judgment to submit "a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement...." L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(A)-(B). Although Schlessinger submitted a statement with numbered paragraphs corresponding to the defendants' paragraphs, none of Schlessinger's paragraphs contain "responses" that clarify the facts in dispute. Instead, where Schlessinger disputes a statement, he merely writes, "Disputed," and cites to paragraphs from his Statement of Additional Facts, not the record itself.

While this approach may have saved Schlessinger's counsel time, it merely shifted that expenditure of time onto the court. Schlessinger disputes twelve of the defendants' eighty statements of fact. For each paragraph in dispute, the court had to review the paragraphs Schlessinger cited from his Statement of Additional Facts, analyze the cross-referenced record citations, and ascertain whether those record citations were not only responsive to the numbered paragraph in the defendants' Statement of Fact, but raised a genuine dispute.

More often than not, Schlessinger cited to paragraphs from his Statement of Additional Facts that had nothing to do with the paragraph he was addressing in the defendants' Statement of Facts. Consequently, the court deems all paragraphs in the defendants' Statement of Facts admitted insofar as the record supports them and Schlessinger's denials are unresponsive. SeeRaymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir.2006)("district courts are entitled to expect strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1"); Flores v. Giuliano, No. 12–cv–162, 2014 WL 3360504, at *2 (N.D.Ill. July 9, 2014).

Furthermore, Schlessinger's legal memorandum lacked sufficient citations to the parties' Local Rule 56.1statements. "Courts in this district [ ] repeatedly have held that, in memoranda of law filed in support of, or in opposition to, motions for summary judgment, parties should cite to the specific Local Rule 56.1statements of fact in support of their arguments, not to the record directly." Abdel–Ghaffar v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc. , No. 12–cv–5812, 2015 WL 5025461, *6, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111940, at *16–17 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 24, 2015)(citing cases). Here, however, Schlessinger cited to neither the parties' L.R. 56.1statements nor the record in his recitation of the facts.

As a result, Schlessinger's recitation of the facts was relatively useless. Although it apprised the court of what Schlessinger believes is the relevant timeline, it placed the onus of constructing that timeline on the court. SeeDelapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir.2011)(L.R. 56.1"is designed, in part, to aid the district court, 'which does not have the advantage of the parties' familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information,' in determining whether a trial is necessary.") (citation omitted).

II. FACTS

A. Schlessinger

Schlessinger is a landlord who participated in the Housing Choice Voucher ("HCV") program, the federal government's Section 8 program that provides assistance to renters in the private market. Under the HCV program, once a program participant has located an approved rental unit, a local public housing agency, such as CHA, pays the landlord a rent subsidy. Schlessinger entered the HCV program in 2005, when CHA signed a Housing Assistance Payment ("HAP") Contract with him, so that he could lease one of his units to a program participant. Pursuant to that contract, CHA paid a portion of the monthly rent on behalf of the tenant directly to Schlessinger. Schlessinger has since executed several HAP Contracts with HAC on properties he owns.

B. The CHA Housing Inspection Process

One of the requirements a landlord must satisfy to participate in the HCV program is the successful completion of a housing inspection on the proposed rental unit. HUD mandates that all properties pass an inspection before the HAP Contract is signed and at least once annually during the term of the contract. See Defs.' Ex. 7. The standards for an inspection are HUD's "Housing Quality Standards" ("HQS"), which refer to the "combination of both HUD and [CHA's] established requirements." Id. at 8–1. CHA inspectors, comprised of employees and independent contractors, are trained to inspect properties to determine whether they meet the HQS.

If a property fails an HQS inspection, CHA notifies the tenant and the owner of the violation and advises whether the deficiency is the responsibility of the tenant or owner. The responsible party has twenty-four hours to repair emergency or life-threatening violations and thirty days to repair other violations. The property is then re-inspected. If the repairs are not made within the respective time allotted, CHA provides the responsible party with a notice of intent to terminate his or her Housing Assistance Program benefits. If an owner's benefits are terminated, the owner's rent subsidies are discontinued and abated effective the last day of the month that the violation was first identified.

C. Schlessinger's 2009 Complaints

Schlessinger began complaining to CHA about its inspections conducted at his properties in 2009. His complaints are reflected in the handouts he distributed during a CHA Board of Commissioners meeting in May 2009. See Defs.' Ex. 10. Included in those handouts were emails that Schlessinger sent regarding re-inspections that two of his properties had to undergo after failing prior inspections. He also included a copy of an email that he sent on May 14, 2009, to a representative of CHA and one of its inspection contractors, McCright & Associates ("McCright"). The email was titled, "Department of Housing and Urban Developement [sic] Complaint," and it described at length Schlessinger's views that CHA inspectors:

1) were incompetent; 2) were negligent; 3) were improperly trained; 4) did not follow the proper inspection guidelines; 5) cited him for deficiencies that were the responsibility of the tenant; 6) cited him for violations that did not exist; 7) did not appear for inspection at the scheduled time; 8) improperly abated his properties; and 9) failed him for items that [he] had previously been told passed.

Defs.' SOF ¶ 15 (undisputed). At the end of the...