Schloss v. Ashby, 11-CV-3337
| Decision Date | 11 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | 11-CV-3337 |
| Parties | JEREMY L. SCHLOSS et al., Plaintiffs, v. FOREST ASHBY et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Forty plaintiffs detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center ("Rushville") challenge alleged systemic failings in Rushville's administration. Plaintiffs seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim, without prejudice to filing an amended complaint in accordance with this opinion.
Plaintiffs are not "prisoners" within the meaning of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act because they have no current criminal charges filed against them and are not serving criminal sentences. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h); see also Kalinowski v. Bond, 358 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2004)(declining to consider whether a person held as sexually violent is a prisoner, but noting that "[a]pplying the PLRA's definition to such detainees may be difficult."); Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000)(person detained as sexually violent under California law was not a "prisoner" under PLRA); West v. Macht, 986 F.Supp. 1141 (W.D. Wis. 1997)(person detained as sexually violent under Wisconsin law was not a "prisoner" under PLRA). Accordingly, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A requiring a screening of the complaint do not apply.
However, the "privilege to proceed without posting security for costs and fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who, within the District Court's sound discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them." Brewster v. NorthAm. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972). Additionally, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma pauperis "at any time if the court determines that the action fails to state a claim." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Accordingly, this Court grants leave to proceed in forma pauperis only if the complaint states a federal claim. A hearing was scheduled to assist in this review, but the hearing has been cancelled as unnecessary.
To state a claim, the allegations must set forth a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Factual allegations must give enough detail to give "'fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" EEOC v. Concentra Health Serv., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)(add'l citation omitted). The factual "allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a 'speculative level.'" Id., quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555-56. However, pro se pleadings are liberally construed when applying this standard. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiffs are detained in Rushville pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Act. Their complaint is lengthy but can be distilled into a few recurrent themes.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are required to adhere to the entire Title 59 of the Illinois Administrative Code governing mental health, not just part 299 of Chapter 1, which specifically applies to sexually violent persons. 59 Ill.Admin.Code §§ 299.100-350. Defendants are allegedly violating Title 59 in many ways, including the failure to give adequate notice of rules, the adoption of prison-likepolicies, the failure to adequately monitor residents, the failure to provide rehabilitative treatment, the segregation of residents who consent to treatment from those who do not, the failure to provide a meaningful grievance process, and the implementation of restrictions on resident movement and interactions.
For example, the allegations include the banning of gaming consoles for irrational reasons and a ban on access to the outside patios. Additionally, the waiting list to obtain sex-offender treatment is allegedly six months to one year long, and residents are allegedly not allowed to participate in other groups such as the health care fitness group unless they are in treatment. Further, the rehabilitative treatment that is provided is allegedly based on "outdated and incorrect diagnostic tools."
Plaintiffs appear to assert that these conditions violate not only Title 59 but also their equal protection right to be treated just like any other mentally ill patient who is confined in a state mental health facility. They also challenge these conditions on due process grounds.
Additionally, Plaintiffs allege routine retaliation for attempting touse the grievance process. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Durant reads their legal pleadings and then denies them copies of those pleadings, depriving Plaintiffs of their right of access to the court and retaliating against them for their attempts to pursue legal actions.
A violation of state law is not, by itself, a violation of federal law. Guarjardo-Palma v. Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 806 (7th Cir. 2010)("[A] violation of state law is not a ground for a federal civil rights suit."). A federal court is not an enforcer of state laws and regulations. Accordingly, Plaintiffs state no federal claim to the extent they allege that Defendants are violating the spirit or text of Title 59 of the Illinois Administrative Code.
As to the equal protection claim, Plaintiffs are not similarly situated to persons confined for treatment in other state mental health facilities. Plaintiffs are in Rushville because they have been "convicted of a sexually violent offense, . . .[and are] dangerous because [they] . . . suffer[] from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that .. . [they] will engage in acts of sexual violence." 725 ILCS 207/5(f). Persons confined in other state mental health facilities may also be dangerous to themselves or others, but they do not fit the statutory definition for sexually violent persons. If they did, they would be in Rushville. See Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 2002)("facilities dealing with those who have been involuntarily committed for sexual disorders are 'volatile' environments whose day-to-day operations cannot be managed from on high."). In short, there is no equal protection claim because Plaintiffs are not similarly situated to mentally ill persons held in other mental facilities. Additionally, Plaintiffs' alleged differential treatment is rationally related to the fact that they are confined as sexually violent persons.1 See Thielman, 282 F.3d at 485 ().
For the same reasons, there is no equal protection violation in segregating residents who consent to treatment from those who do not. They are not similarly situated, and, even if they are, separation is rationally related to a legitimate interest in enabling residents undergoing treatment to support each other in their treatment goals while avoiding possible negative influences from those who refuse treatment. Judge Baker recently discussed this separation in Lane v. Phillips, 07-3332 (C.D. Ill., 9/19/11 order, d/e 116), finding no constitutional violation. In that order, Judge Baker affirmed his earlier ruling that such separation is "rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives of security and rehabilitation." Id. at p. 6. He further found that the separation did not implicate a resident's rehabilitation or treatment. Id. at pp. 9-10. A copy of Judge Baker's order is attached. This Court agrees with his conclusions.
Plaintiffs' allegations regarding denial of access to the court also do not state a claim. An access to the courts claim arises only when a plaintiff suffers an "actual injury" from the inability to pursue a nonfrivolous claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996); May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 883 (7th Cir. 2000). Denial of copies of unidentified legal pleadings does not, by itself, state an access claim. Further, Plaintiffs identify no legal action in which they suffered any prejudice by their inability to make copies. And, unless there is a systemic denial of access to the court, the joinder of 40 unrelated access claims would not be proper in one lawsuit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 ().
Similarly, Plaintiffs' allegations about retaliation for using the grievance procedure or litigating cases is too vague. No Plaintiff identifies specifically what protected First Amendment right he exercised and when, or the specific retaliation he suffered. And, as with the access to court claim, joinder of 40 different retaliation claims based onunrelated incidents would not be properly joined in one lawsuit.
The same conclusion is reached with the allegations that Defendants fail to give notice of their rules. "Due process requires that inmates receive fair notice of a rule before they can be sanctioned for its violation." Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 314 (7th Cir. 1992). However, no plausible inference arises that any Plaintiff was sanctioned for violating an undisclosed rule. There is no federal law...
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