Schlote v. Dawson

Decision Date22 January 2004
Docket NumberNo. 02-1143.,02-1143.
Citation676 N.W.2d 187
PartiesJames Dennis SCHLOTE and Nancy Schlote, Appellees, v. Douglas E. DAWSON, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Chad M. VonKampen and James E. Shipman of Simmons, Perrine, Albright & Ellwood, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Martin A. Diaz, Iowa City, for appellees.

LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

In this medical malpractice case, the district court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The defendant contended Iowa Code section 614.1(9) (2001)—Iowa's medical malpractice statute of limitations—barred the plaintiffs' claims. The district court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed on this issue. Because we disagree, we reverse and remand with directions.

I. Scope of review.

We review a summary judgment ruling for correction of errors at law.

Summary judgment is appropriate under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981 only when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. We examine the record before the district court to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether that court correctly applied the law. Summary judgment is the appropriate remedy where questions of statutory interpretation are involved.

Hegeman v. Kelch, 666 N.W.2d 531, 533 (Iowa 2003) (citations omitted).

II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

A family doctor referred James Dennis Schlote to Dr. Douglas E. Dawson for a sore throat. Schlote's first contact with Dr. Dawson was May 2, 1996. On that date Dr. Dawson told Schlote he had cancer of the throat, and the cancer was lying on top of his voice box. Dr. Dawson also told Schlote that he needed an operation to remove his voice box and without the operation he would die. Dr. Dawson did not tell Schlote that radiation treatment rather than surgery might be an option. Nor did he tell Schlote about a more conservative surgery that might avoid a complete removal of his voice box. Schlote agreed to the surgery to remove his voice box.

On May 21 Dr. Dawson surgically removed Schlote's voice box. Because of the surgery, Schlote lost his voice. Before the surgery, Dr. Dawson told Schlote this would happen.

In August 1998, Schlote's daughter visited him from California. She suggested that Schlote get his medical records, which he did. Schlote took the records to Dr. Guy McFarland, one of Dr. Dawson's former partners. In August 1997 the partners had removed Dr. Dawson as a partner after they learned that Dr. Dawson had become addicted to a narcotic. Dr. McFarland told Schlote to submit the records to the Iowa Board of Medical Examiners, which Schlote did.

In December 1999, the Iowa Board of Medical Examiners suspended Dr. Dawson's medical license for, among other things, excessive surgery. Two months later on February 17, 2000, Schlote and his wife sued Dr. Dawson. The Schlotes claimed Dr. Dawson was negligent because the surgery he performed was unnecessary and excessive. Schlote's wife claimed Dr. Dawson's negligence caused her a loss of consortium.

Later, Dr. Dawson moved for summary judgment, contending that Iowa Code section 614.1(9) barred the medical malpractice claims of both plaintiffs. Section 614.1(9) provides that medical malpractice claims must be brought "within two years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known ... [of] the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action...." Iowa Code § 614.1(9) (emphasis added).

Dr. Dawson contended that the "injury" for purposes of section 614.1(9) was Schlote's loss of his natural voice. This injury, Dr. Dawson argued, was known to Schlote more than two years before he filed suit and for that reason the suit was time-barred.

In contrast, the Schlotes maintained that the "injury" for purposes of section 614.1(9) was the excessive surgery resulting in the unnecessary removal of Schlote's voice box. The earliest that Schlote became aware of a potential problem was in August 1998 when Dr. McFarland told him to submit his medical records to the Iowa Board of Medical Examiners. This was less than two years before February 17, 2000, the date the Schlotes filed suit. Therefore, according to the Schlotes, section 614.1(9) did not bar the lawsuit.

The Schlotes had a fallback position. They contended the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applied to prevent the statute of limitations from running until Schlote discovered the medical malpractice claim. The Schlotes argued the doctrine applied because Dr. Dawson did not tell Schlote that removal of his voice box was unnecessary and that he—Dr. Dawson—had a drug problem.

The district court denied Dr. Dawson's motion for summary judgment. The court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed about whether Schlote was aware of the injury and about whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine applied.

Dr. Dawson filed an application for interlocutory appeal, which we granted.

III. Issues.

Dr. Dawson raises the following issues: (1) whether the district court erred in finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether Schlote was aware of the injury more than two years before the Schlotes filed suit, and (2) whether the district court erred in finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine applied in this case.

IV. Discovery of Injury.

A. Background. Before beginning our analysis, we think it would be helpful to review the case law about statute of limitations for private-party medical malpractice actions before and after the legislature passed Iowa Code section 614.1(9). In Schnebly v. Baker, this court noted that the general rule in tort cases is that the period of limitations commences when the tort is committed. 217 N.W.2d 708, 721 (Iowa 1974). The court also noted that courts had developed two exceptions, "both founded on the unawareness of the plaintiff of his injury or of its cause." Id. The one exception was the discovery rule and the other was the fraudulent concealment doctrine. Id. at 721-22. Finally, the court explained that both exceptions were part of the Iowa law. Id.

Several years before Schnebly, this court adopted the discovery rule for negligence actions generally in Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 463, 150 N.W.2d 94, 100 (1967) (plaintiff unaware of defective design until water dripped through ceiling). In Chrischilles, the court noted the general rule is that a cause of action accrues when the aggrieved party has a right to initiate and maintain a suit. 260 Iowa at 461, 150 N.W.2d at 99. A cause of action for negligence does not accrue until there is an injury resulting from the negligence. Id. The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the cause of action accrues. Id. at 461, 150 N.W.2d at 100.

In Chrischilles, the court, in adopting the discovery rule as an exception to the statute of limitations, expressed the discovery rule this way: "[A] cause of action based on negligence does not accrue until plaintiff has in fact discovered that he has suffered injury or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it...." Id. at 463, 150 N.W.2d at 100. By "injury," the court meant "injury to [the plaintiff's] interest." Id. at 463, 150 N.W.2d at 101; see also 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitations of Actions § 148, at 546 (2000) ("The test to determine when a cause of action arises or accrues is when the plaintiff has suffered a legal injury, that is, when he or she has the right to maintain an action....")

In applying Iowa Code section 614.1(2)—the general statute of limitations in tort cases for injuries to the person — this court in Baines v. Blenderman adopted the discovery rule in a medical malpractice case. 223 N.W.2d 199, 201-02 (Iowa 1974). In Baines, during the course of surgery to repair the plaintiff's herniated disc, the plaintiff lost the vision of his right eye apparently because the blood supply to the eye was cut off for two or more minutes during the operation. The plaintiff discovered four months after the operation that the defendant had negligently caused the injury, and the plaintiff did not file suit until two years and two months after the surgery. Id. at 200, 203.

In Baines, the court noted that in Chrischilles, the court had approved the following statement from Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785, 791 (1963), a medical malpractice case: "The limitation statute or statutes in malpractice cases do not start to run until the date of discovery, or the date when, by the exercise of reasonable care, plaintiff should have discovered the wrongful act." 223 N.W.2d at 201.

Significantly, in Baines, the court rejected the defendant's contention that perception of physical harm equates with imputed knowledge of its origin in malpractice. In response, the court stated: "Knowledge of an injury may or may not be sufficient to alert a reasonably diligent person to the basis of his claim, depending on the circumstances of the case." Id.

Baines interpreted the discovery rule to mean that the statute of limitations "does not begin to run until the injured person knows or can be charged with knowledge of the existence of his cause of action." Id. The court continued:

[I]t is not necessary to prove the plaintiff knew the specific negligence of the defendant nor that he knew the details of the evidence by which to prove the cause of action. It is enough that he knew or may be reasonably charged with knowledge of sufficient facts to be aware he had a cause of action more than two years before it was brought.

Id.

Finally, the court noted that it would be unjust to require a plaintiff to seek a remedy before he knows of his rights. Id. at 202-03. Such a requirement would force a patient to...

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  • Nixon v. State
    • United States
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    ...Chrischilles, what followed was not a sweeping, overwhelming movement to apply the discovery rule in all cases. See Schlote v. Dawson, 676 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Iowa 2004) (noting Chrischilles adopted the discovery rule as an exception to the general rule). More than a generation passed followin......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice
    • United States
    • Iowa Law Review No. 97-4, May 2012
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