Schmehl v. Wegelin

• Decision Date: 12 June 2007
• Citation: 927 A.2d 183
• Parties: Jean SCHMEHL and David Schmehl, Appellants, v. Ann WEGELIN and Perry Schmehl, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

927 A.2d 183

Jean SCHMEHL and David Schmehl, Appellants, v. Ann WEGELIN and Perry Schmehl, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted November 29, 2005.

Decided June 12, 2007.

Sharon Leigh Gray, Esq., for Jean and David Schmehl.

Gregory David Henry, Esq., Tract, Kauffman and Henry, Reading, for Ann Wegelin.

Perry Schmehl, for Perry Schmehl.

Gerald J. Pappert, Esq., Office of Attorney General, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Attorney General.

BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, BALDWIN AND FITZGERALD, JJ.

OPINION

Justice SAYLOR.

The question presented is whether Section 5312 of the Domestic Relations Code violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution in providing for grandparent visitation of a child when the child's parents are divorced, engaged in divorce proceedings, or separated for six months or more.

On November 12, 2002, during Mother and Father's separation, a custody order was entered between them regarding their two children. Five months later they were divorced. On April 29, 2005, after Mother refused to permit the children's paternal grandparents ("Grandparents") to pick up the children from school during her period of custody, Grandparents filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County under Section 5312 seeking partial custody.¹ Although Father supports his parents' claim, Grandparents joined him as a defendant as a necessary party. See Pa.R.C.P. No.1915.6. Mother moved to dismiss the action, asserting that Section 5312 violated her Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.²

The challenged statute enables grandparents to seek partial custody or visitation of their grandchild when the child's parents are divorced, engaged in divorce proceedings, or have been separated for six months or more. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5312. In particular, the statute provides:

In all proceedings for dissolution, subsequent to the commencement of the proceeding and continuing thereafter or when parents have been separated for six months or more, the court may, upon application of the parent or grandparent of a party, grant reasonable partial custody or visitation rights, or both, to the unmarried child if it finds that visitation rights or partial custody, or both, would be in the best interest of the child and would not interfere with the parent-child relationship. The court shall consider the amount of personal contact between the parents or grandparents of the party and the child prior to the application.

Id. In contrast, standing to obtain partial custody or visitation is not afforded to grandparents of children whose parents are married and living together.³ This disparate treatment between intact families — married parents living together — and divorced or separated parents, Mother argued, violates equal protection principles.

The trial court agreed, finding that Section 5312 violates the Equal Protection Clause because it impermissibly treats intact families differently from parents who are divorced or separated, and dismissed Grandparent's complaint without addressing the merits of their claim. The trial court noted that the "prohibition against treating people differently under the law does not preclude the Commonwealth from resorting to legislative classifications ...." Schmehl v. Wegelin, No. 05-5526, slip op. at 3 (C.P. Berks July 29, 2005) (quoting Curtis v. Kline, 542 Pa. 249, 256, 666 A.2d 265, 268 (1995)). But when that classification burdens a fundamental right, the court explained, strict scrutiny is applied, which requires the classification to be necessary for a compelling government interest. See id. Because the classification under Section 5312 burdened a parent's fundamental right to make decisions regarding the upbringing of his or her children, the trial court held that, to uphold the legislative classification created by the statute between parents who are married and living together versus those who are divorced or separated, such classification must be necessary to vindicate a compelling government interest. See id. at 6.

The trial court found that no compelling government interest existed for the classification, noting that, although the parents are no longer together, it does not logically follow that state intervention is necessary. In particular, the court observed:

Both parents remain and, during periods of their partial custody with the children, either parent can provide access to their parents. There is no compelling reason that this Court can see for the state to require that Mother give up more of her time with the children, so that Father's parents can have their own periods of visitation separate from visitations while Father has custody. . . . There is no compelling reason, in fact it would create the potential for greater harm, if a child of separated/divorced parents would be subject to, in this case, [two] more potential periods of Court ordered partial custody/visitation. A child of an intact family has freedom to live their life as a child, absent court ordered scheduling of their time. There is no reason to burden a child of separated/divorced parents with more court ordered interference in their already restricted childhood. Their parents can make sure there is contact with the grandparents.

Schmehl, No. 05-5526, slip op. at 8.

In its subsequent opinion under Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), the trial court reiterated its earlier ruling, explaining:

Although the parents no longer live together, each must continue to enjoy the fundamental right, free from court interference, to make decisions about the upbringing of their children, including the decision about with whom the children associate. It is important to note that this court's decision does not preclude [Grandparents] from ever seeing the children, which they may do during periods of the father's partial custody. It merely asserts that there is no compelling reason to justify subjecting the children of divorced or separated parents to additional periods of Court ordered ... custody and visitation, nor requiring Mother to relinquish periods of her custody so that Father's parents may have their own periods, when such court intervention would not be permissible if the parents were married or living together.

Schmehl v. Wegelin, No. 05-5526, slip op. at 3 (C.P. Berks September 19, 2005). Grandparents appealed to this Court, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction of decisions of a court of common pleas that determine a statute to be unconstitutional. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(7).

As the constitutionality of statute presents a question of law, our review is plenary. See Theodore v. Delaware Valley School Dist., 575 Pa. 321, 333-334, 836 A.2d 76, 83 (2003) (citing Purple Orchid v. Pennsylvania State Police, 572 Pa. 171, 813 A.2d 801 (2002)). A statute duly enacted by the General Assembly is presumed valid and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it "clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Constitution." Purple Orchid, 572 Pa. at 171, 178, 813 A.2d at 805. The party seeking to overcome the presumption of validity bears a heavy burden of persuasion. See Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. v. McCafferty, 563 Pa. 146, 155, 758 A.2d 1155, 1160 (2000).

Grandparents challenge the trial court's determination that Section 5312 violates non-intact families' equal protection rights. Although Grandparents concede that Mother's interest in the care, direction, and control of her children is a fundamental right, Grandparents assert that the need to protect children of non-intact families is a compelling government interest, and the standards set forth in the statute are narrowly tailored to such interest. In particular, Grandparents note that, under the statute, the grant of partial custody or visitation is not automatic; rather, it depends on several factors that they must establish.

In contrast, Mother argues that a state should not interject its own beliefs regarding parenting decisions or thwart a parent's ability to raise her children as she sees fit. She maintains that no compelling interest exists to treat married parents differently from separated parents who are still alive and still fit to make decisions regarding their children. Although she and Father are divorced, Mother contends, it does not logically follow that state intervention is necessary.

In Hiller v. Fausey, 588 Pa. 342, 904 A.2d 875 (2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1876, 167 L.Ed.2d 363 (U.S.Pa.2007), this Court recently considered the constitutionality under the Due Process Clause of another grandparent visitation statute, Section 5311 of the Domestic Relations Code, which delimits the circumstances in which a grandparent may seek partial custody or visitation of his or her grandchild when a parent has died.⁴ Observing that the right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of one's own children "is one of the oldest fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment]," id. at 358, 904 A.2d at 885 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)), this Court determined that any infringement of such right requires strict scrutiny review to determine whether the infringement is supported by a compelling state interest and if the infringement is narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest. See Hiller, 588 Pa. at 359, 904 A.2d at 885-86. In applying strict scrutiny to Section 5311 and finding it constitutional, the Court identified the compelling state interest for grandparent partial custody or visitation under Section 5311 as the state's "longstanding interest in protecting the health and emotional welfare of children," under the state's parens patriae interest. See id. at 359, 904 A.2d at 886. Section 5311 was narrowly tailored to serve that interest, the Court held, because it extends...