Schmidt v. Mayfield

Decision Date16 July 1987
Docket NumberNo. CA,CA
Citation39 Ohio App.3d 157,530 N.E.2d 1331
PartiesSCHMIDT, Appellee, v. MAYFIELD, Admr.; City of Dayton, Appellant. 10174.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

In an action to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund based on the claimant's heart attack, a jury's verdict in favor of participation may be based upon evidence that work-related physical exertion and stress greater than that customary in the claimant's usual work routine, plus the pressure attending his usual job-related duties, precipitated a myocardial infarction substantially sooner than it would have occurred under ordinary circumstances. (Ryan v. Connor [1986], 28 Ohio St.3d 406, 28 OBR 462, 503 N.E.2d 1379, followed.)

E.S. Gallon & Assoc. and Joseph R. Ebenger, for appellee.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and G. Jack Davis, Jr., for James L. Mayfield, Adm'r, Bureau of Workers' Compensation.

Edward B. Neuman, Asst. City Atty., for appellant City of Dayton.

KERNS, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal by the city of Dayton from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County entered upon a jury verdict finding that the appellee, Clifford C. Schmidt, is eligible to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund. Schmidt was a lieutenant with the Dayton Fire Department, and since 1980, he had been assigned as a supervisor at the department communications center. In this capacity, he and his crew of three dispatchers normally worked a twenty-four-hour shift beginning at 7:00 a.m., during which time the dispatch board was manned in rotation by two men while the other two would rest or attend to other duties.

On October 28, 1983, Schmidt's scheduled time off the board was spent working on a special redistricting project, which was necessitated by the impending opening of a new engine house. Since the redistricting map was a prerequisite to the job of revising the communication center's response file, Lieutenant Schmidt pushed himself to complete the map and have it approved by his chief before the weekend. This involved a number of trips up and down the stairs to the chief's office on another floor of the building. Moreover, the task required greater physical exertion than was customary in Schmidt's usual routine. After the appellee obtained approval for his redistricting proposal, which was at about 4:30 p.m., he resumed his dispatch duties until about 6:00 p.m., and thereafter, from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., he worked on a final version of the redistricting map. Then, at 8:00 p.m., Schmidt took his turn on the dispatch board, but about an hour later, he suffered a heart attack. During his subsequent examination, a coronary catherization revealed severe occlusion of the coronary arteries, suggesting advanced arteriosclerotic heart disease which required extensive bypass surgery.

Thereafter, Schmidt filed an application for benefits with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, but his claim was denied by the district hearing officer and by the Dayton Regional Board of Review. Subsequently, the Industrial Commission refused a further appeal of the matter, whereupon Schmidt commenced this action in the common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 4123.519. At the trial, the plaintiff relied upon his own testimony and the depositions of his cardiologist, Dr. C. David Joffe. The city presented Dr. Sudhakar Maraboyina as its expert witness. In reaching its verdict, the jury apparently concluded that the disability was proximately caused by a work-related injury which substantially accelerated a pre-existing condition, and the judgment entered upon the verdict is before this court for review.

The city of Dayton has submitted five assignments of error, the first two of which have been stated as follows:

"1. The court erred to the prejudice of the defendant-appellant in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict and/or for a judgment N.O.V. since plaintiff-appellee failed to offer any evidence or to establish that a physical injury within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act, directly and proximately aggravated plaintiff's pre-existing coronary artery disease.

"2. The judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee is contrary to law since plaintiff offered no evidence that his pre-existing coronary artery disease was directly and proximately aggravated by a compensable physical injury."

The appellant apparently does not seriously dispute the finding that the working conditions experienced by the appellee on October 28, 1983, might constitute an "injury" under R.C. 4123.01(C), and such finding is consistent with the case law which provides that a sudden mishap or physical damage through external means is not necessarily required to sustain a claim for injuries. Czarnecki v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 413, 12 O.O.3d 353, 390 N.E.2d 1195; Hunyadi v. San Enterprises, Inc. (1975), 48 Ohio App.2d 251, 2 O.O.3d 201, 356 N.E.2d 747. However, the appellant does argue that there was a lack of evidence to show that Schmidt's work-related activities aggravated his heart disease and precipitated the heart attack. Specifically, the city contends that the appellee failed to show that his disability was accelerated by a substantial period of time as a direct result of the occurrence. Swanton v. Stringer (1975) 42 Ohio St.2d 356, 71 O.O.2d 325, 328 N.E.2d 794; Senvisky v. Truscon Steel Division (1959), 168 Ohio St. 523, 7 O.O.2d 390, 156 N.E.2d 724.

However, the testimony of Dr. Joffe on this disputed point was unequivocal. In fact, the physical exertion and stress associated with the redistricting deadline, when coupled with the pressure attending Schmidt's usual dispatch duties, presented what his expert witness regarded as a classic case for the precipitation of a myocardial infarction. In response to a hypothetical question containing all of the pertinent facts of this case, Joffe stated that it was his opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical probability, that the appellee's work-related activities caused a rupture of arterial placque resulting in a thrombosis which caused complete blockage of his partially occluded coronary artery. Joffe also opined that the resulting heart attack occurred substantially sooner than it would have occurred under ordinary circumstances.

The appellant argues that the mere use of words of causation is not enough to establish the requisite relationship between the work activity and the aggravation of the pre-existing condition (McKee v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. [1958], 168 Ohio St. 77, 5 O.O.2d 345, 151 N.E.2d 540), but Joffe's opinion, as well as the opinion of the appellant's expert witness, appears to be attuned to well-established medical findings which link stress and unusual exertion to the acceleration of heart disease. And while the specific cause of a cardiac episode is not susceptible to determination with the same degree of medical certainty as most other disabilities, such condition is nonetheless compensable under the law. Dillon v. Connor (Oct. 24, 1984), Clark App. No. 1954, unreported. Here, the...

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    ...that the stress precipitated the heart attack sooner than it would have occurred under ordinary circumstances. Schmidt v. Mayfield (1987), 39 Ohio App.3d 157, 530 N.E.2d 1331, Upon a review of the evidence in this case, we find that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whethe......
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