Schmidt v. Mt. Angel Abbey

• Decision Date: 24 December 2009
• Docket Number: CC020403531.,SC S056261.,CA A124850.
• Citation: 223 P.3d 399,347 Or. 389
• Parties: David SCHMIDT, Petitioner on Review, and N. M., Plaintiff, v. MT. ANGEL ABBEY, an Oregon not for profit corporation, Respondent on Review, and Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, an Oregon corporation; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, dba Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, and successors, a corporation sole; and Louis Charvet, deceased, Defendants-Respondents, and Swiss-American Congregation of the Ordo Sancti Benedicti, Defendant.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

223 P.3d 399

347 Or. 389

David SCHMIDT, Petitioner on Review, and N. M., Plaintiff, v. MT. ANGEL ABBEY, an Oregon not for profit corporation, Respondent on Review, and Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, an Oregon corporation; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, dba Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, and successors, a corporation sole; and Louis Charvet, deceased, Defendants-Respondents, and Swiss-American Congregation of the Ordo Sancti Benedicti, Defendant.

CC020403531.

CA A124850.

SC S056261.

Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc.

Argued and Submitted March 3, 2009.

Decided December 24, 2009.

On review from the Court of Appeals.^*

Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, argued the cause for petitioner on review. Erin K. Olson, Law Office of Erin Olson PC, Portland, filed the brief for petitioner on review.

Lisa E. Lear, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. With her on the brief were Richard J. Whittemore and Beth Cupani.

Walter J. Ledesma, Woodburn, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

BALMER, J.

This tort action requires us to consider the proper interpretation of the terms "sexual exploitation" and "cruelty" as used in ORS 12.117, which extends the statute of limitations for certain tort actions. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that, while plaintiff was a student at Mt. Angel Seminary, a priest questioned plaintiff about sexuality and reproduction and began masturbating under his cassock while plaintiff was present. Plaintiff averred that the priest's actions constituted a tort and caused him physical and emotional harm, and, for present purposes, defendant does not dispute those allegations. Defendant, however, moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's claim was time-barred and that ORS 12.117 did not extend the statute of limitations because the priest's alleged conduct was neither "sexual exploitation" nor "cruelty" within the meaning of that statute. The trial court agreed and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, 218 Or.App. 661, 180 P.3d 160 (2008). For the reasons set out below, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.

Because this case comes to us on summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—here, plaintiff. See Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 336 Or. 329, 332, 83 P.3d 322 (2004) (stating standard). In 1958, when plaintiff was a high school freshman at Mt. Angel Seminary, Father Charvet—plaintiff's freshman advisor—asked plaintiff to meet Charvet in his office at a specific time. When plaintiff arrived, Charvet was sitting behind his desk and told plaintiff to stand in front of the desk. Charvet then began questioning plaintiff as to what he knew about sexuality and reproduction. Among other things, Charvet asked plaintiff whether he had ever masturbated and explained to plaintiff "what that was about." At that point, Charvet became "less technical" and began using "street or gutter talk as opposed to clinical [terms]." During Charvet's questioning, plaintiff "could see that there was a lot of motion going on under his cassock," and, according to plaintiff, it was "pretty obvious" that Charvet was masturbating. Although Charvet never instructed plaintiff to remain in the room, plaintiff stated that his training as a student in the seminary prevented him from leaving and that he "felt in a locked situation." The incident lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes.

In 2002, plaintiff filed this action against Charvet and Mt. Angel Abbey, Charvet's employer, seeking damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and for breach of a fiduciary duty.¹ As noted, defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's action was barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant argued that ORS 12.117(1),² which extends the statute of limitations for tort actions based on conduct that constitutes "child abuse," did not apply because Charvet's alleged conduct was not "child abuse" within the meaning of that statute.³ Plaintiff responded that Charvet's conduct fell within two examples of child abuse enumerated in ORS 12.117(2).⁴ Plaintiff argued that the conduct was covered by ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B), which defines as child abuse any "[i]ntentional conduct by an adult that results in * * * [a]ny mental injury to a child which results in observable and substantial impairment of the child's mental or psychological ability to function caused by cruelty to the child, with due regard to the culture of the child." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff also argued that Charvet's conduct came within ORS 12.117(2)(d), which provides that child abuse includes

"[s]exual exploitation of a child, including but not limited to:

"(A) Conduct constituting [a] violation of ORS 163.435 and any other conduct which allows, employs, authorizes, permits, induces or encourages a child to engage in the performing for people to observe or the photographing, filming, tape recording or other exhibition which, in whole or in part, depicts sexual conduct or contact; and

"(B) Allowing, permitting, encouraging or hiring a child to engage in prostitution, as defined in ORS chapter 167."

(Emphasis added.) The trial court agreed with defendant that Charvet's actions did not come within either of those provisions and therefore did not constitute "child abuse" as defined in ORS 12.117. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that plaintiff's action was barred by the statute of limitations and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations extension did not apply and that plaintiff's claims therefore were time-barred. The majority agreed with the trial court that Charvet's actions did not constitute "cruelty" or "sexual exploitation" as those terms are used in ORS 12.117(2). Judge Edmonds dissented in part,⁵ concluding that Charvet's conduct constituted "cruelty" under ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B). We begin with a discussion of whether a reasonable factfinder could find that Charvet's conduct falls within the "cruelty" provision of ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B). We then consider whether a reasonable factfinder could find that Charvet's conduct constitutes "sexual exploitation" under ORS 12.117(2)(d).

As noted, under ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B), an action is subject to the extended statute of limitations if it is based on conduct that (1) is intentional, (2) results in a mental injury to the child that results in "observable and substantial impairment of the child's mental or psychological ability to function," and (3) constitutes "cruelty to the child." Defendant does not argue that Charvet's conduct was not intentional or that plaintiff did not suffer the requisite mental injury; instead, defendant argues only that Charvet's conduct was not "cruelty to the child." We therefore limit our analysis of ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B) to that issue, turning first to the analysis of the Court of Appeals.

The majority initially looked to dictionary definitions of "cruelty" and "cruel" and determined, based on those definitions, that the phrase "cruelty to the child" has several possible meanings. The majority began with the question whether the term "cruelty" refers to the mental state of the person engaging in the conduct or to a particular type of conduct. Because ORS 12.117 applies to "action[s] based on conduct that constitutes child abuse" and generally defines child abuse in terms of conduct, the majority determined that the phrase "cruelty to the child" refers to a type of conduct rather than to a particular mental state. The majority then turned to an analysis of the nature of that conduct.

The majority determined, after analyzing the plain meaning of "cruel," that the term refers to relatively extreme or severe conduct; however, because the precise nature of the conduct was still unclear, the majority examined legislative history.⁶ That history demonstrated, in the majority's view, that the legislature intended "cruelty" to encompass a "narrow" range of severe or extreme conduct and that, generally speaking, the legislature was concerned with verbal conduct—such as shouting at a child—that occurs repeatedly. Finally, because the meaning of the phrase "cruelty" was still unclear, the majority looked to the general purpose of the statute. Although the primary purpose of the statute was the protection of children, the majority determined that the legislature had "made a significant effort to enact specific, detailed criteria giving rise to * * * the entitlement to an extended limitations period," again demonstrating that it intended the word "cruelty" to refer to "a narrow range of extreme or severe conduct." Schmidt, 218 Or.App. at 681-82, 180 P.3d 160. Ultimately, the majority concluded that, given the nature of Charvet's conduct, including the fact that the masturbation itself lasted only 10 minutes and occurred on only one occasion, a reasonable jury could not have found that that conduct constituted "cruelty to [a] child." Id. at 682-83, 180 P.3d 160.

Judge Edmonds dissented from the majority's holding that Charvet's conduct did not constitute "cruelty to [a] child" under the statute. He concluded that, in 1989, when the legislature enacted ORS 12.117(2)(a)(B), "cruelty" had a well-defined legal meaning. Looking to case law that existed when ORS 12.117 was enacted and the definition of "cruelty" contained in Black's Law Dictionary at that time, the dissent concluded that the legislature intended to include two categories of conduct with the phrase "cruelty to [a] child": (1) conduct that was "specifically...