Schmidt v. Simmons

• Decision Date: 22 February 1894
• Citation: 137 Ind. 93,36 N.E. 516
• Parties: SCHMIDT v. SIMMONS, Sheriff.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

137 Ind. 93

36 N.E. 516

SCHMIDT

v.SIMMONS, Sheriff.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 22, 1894.

Appeal from circuit court, Howard county; L. J. Kirkpatrick, Judge.

Augusta Schmidt, indicted for murder, made application for a writ of habeas corpus to procure admission to bail. Judgment refusing bail. Applicant appeals. Affirmed.

McCabe, J., dissenting.

Winfield & Taber, Dykeman, Wilson & Taber, and Blacklidge, Shirley & Moon, for appellant. Conrad Wolf, Bell & Purdum, and F. M. Kistler, for appellee.

HACKNEY, J.

The appellant was indicted by the grand jury of Cass county for murder in the first degree, in the killing of one James Oscar Walton, and, after procuring a change of venue to the Howard circuit court, applied for and obtained the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, upon which an issue was properly formed and submitted to the judge of the Howard circuit court, who found that the appellant should not be admitted to bail. It is conceded that one under indictment for murder is not entitled to bail when the proof is evident or the presumption is strong. Such is the rule under the constitution and the statute. Rev. St. 1881, §§ 62, 1686, and Rev. St. 1894, §§ 62, 1755. Under this rule, the burden rests upon the applicant for bail to show by the evidence that the proof is not evident, and that the presumption is not strong. Ex parte Heffren, 27 Ind. 87; Ex parte Jones, 55 Ind. 180; Ex parte Kendall, 100 Ind. 600; Ex parte Richards, 102 Ind. 261, 1 N. E. 639. The cases cited, and the cases of Ex parte Moore, 30 Ind. 197, and Ex parte Walton, 79 Ind. 600, hold that it is the duty of the supreme court to weigh the evidence, and determine its sufficiency to require that the petitioner should be admitted to bail. In compliance with this duty, we have carefully read all of the evidence, have heard the arguments, and have read the briefs of counsel. After fully considering the case, we have reached the conclusion that the appellant has not discharged the burden resting upon her under the rule above suggested. The evidence is too voluminous to set out in this opinion. It is sufficient to say of it that it establishes, without conflict, that the appellant shot and killed Walton; that there were previous threats by her to do so; that the weapon used by her was one of a dangerous and deadly character; and that, in addition to such threats, and the character of the weapon used, there were circumstances clearly manifesting the existence of...