Schmidt v. State

• Decision Date: 29 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 13795,13795
• Citation: 103 Idaho 340,647 P.2d 796
• Parties: Ardell K. SCHMIDT, Applicant-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 796

647 P.2d 796

103 Idaho 340

Ardell K. SCHMIDT, Applicant-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.

No. 13795.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

June 29, 1982.

Charles F. Bean, Coeur d'Alene, for applicant-appellant.

David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Timothy Walton, Deputy Atty. Gen., on brief, and Myrna A. I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., on oral argument, Boise, for respondent.

WALTERS, Chief Judge.

I. Facts and Procedure.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court granting summary disposition of an application for post-conviction relief. The applicant, Ardell K. Schmidt, was charged with the unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. He was found to be an indigent person, an attorney was appointed to represent him, and he entered a plea of not guilty. The day before his trial Schmidt changed his plea to guilty. Thereafter the trial court sentenced him to the custody of the Board of Correction for an indeterminate period not to exceed fifteen years. The trial court retained jurisdiction for the first one hundred-twenty days pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601.

While in the custody of the Board, Schmidt was sent to the North Idaho Correctional Institution located at Cottonwood, Idaho. Near the expiration of the period of retained jurisdiction, Schmidt appeared before the Board's central classification committee. Following the classification hearing, the committee recommended that the trial court relinquish jurisdiction over Schmidt. The trial court reviewed the committee's recommendations and terminated jurisdiction, ordering that the remainder of the sentence be served.

Schmidt then filed an application for post-conviction relief before the district court. Schmidt alleged that he had been denied due process of law in the proceeding before the classification committee at Cottonwood. The district court gave notice of intent to dismiss the application, ruling that the procedure followed by the committee conformed with the requirements of State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 582 P.2d 728 (1978). Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b), Schmidt was given twenty days within which to respond to the court's proposed dismissal of the application. Schmidt then timely filed a motion for leave of court to supplement his application for post-conviction relief. Thereafter, and following a series of motions and orders relating to the appointment of counsel, discovery, and similar matters, Schmidt filed an amended application for post-conviction relief.

Both Schmidt and the state then filed motions for summary disposition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c). These motions represented that no genuine issues of material fact existed in respect to the amended application, and that each moving party was entitled to judgment on the application as a matter of law. Following argument and receipt of briefs, the district court entered an order granting the state's motion and dismissed the amended application. Schmidt appeals. We affirm the order of the district court.

II. Issues on Appeal.

On appeal, Schmidt contends that the district court erred in making seven rulings in the order granting summary disposition. These rulings are as follows: (a) that the general nature of the crime was explained to Schmidt prior to acceptance of his plea of guilty; (b) that the trial court had no duty to explain the specific elements of the crime with which Schmidt was charged, prior to accepting his plea of guilty; (c) that the trial court had no obligation to ascertain whether there was a sufficient factual basis for the charge, prior to accepting Schmidt's plea of guilty; (d) that a letter from Schmidt's brother-in-law to the prosecutor was not material to the charge of delivery of a controlled substance, and was thus not discoverable by Schmidt; (e) that Schmidt was not denied the right of appeal due to inadequate counsel; (f) that Schmidt was not entitled to the assistance of legal counsel in respect to the classification hearing held at the Cottonwood facility; and (g) that a trial court may terminate its jurisdiction over a defendant without first holding an evidentiary hearing.

III. Voluntariness and Understanding of the Plea.

The first two issues on appeal concern the acceptance of Schmidt's plea of guilty. Schmidt argues that the district court erred in ruling that the nature of the crime was explained to Schmidt prior to acceptance of his plea of guilty, and that the court also erred in ruling that the trial court had no duty to explain to him the elements of the crime charged, prior to accepting his plea of guilty. These issues relate to the voluntariness and understanding requirements of his plea.

Schmidt argues that his plea of guilty was not voluntarily entered because neither the nature of the crime nor the elements thereof were explained to him prior to acceptance of his plea. In this regard, Schmidt cites the cases of McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) and Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976).

McCarthy focused on the procedure that must be followed under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, before a United States district court may accept a guilty plea. By its own terms that decision was rendered pursuant to the supervisory power of the United States Supreme Court over the federal courts in the administration of criminal law, and because of an apparent conflict between the federal courts of appeal over the effect of the failure of federal district judges to follow the provisions of Federal Rule 11. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the court in McCarthy "expressly based its decision upon its supervisory power over the courts rather than upon constitutional grounds." State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976). It has also been noted that "Rule 11, Fed.R.Crim.P., of course, does not apply to a plea of guilty in state courts." Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1974). Because of its uniqueness as a federal procedural decision under a specific rule of practice in the federal courts, we deem McCarthy to be inapplicable to Schmidt's case. Schmidt properly cites Henderson, supra, for the proposition that when pleading guilty a defendant must be informed of the nature and elements of the crime charged; otherwise his plea of guilty may be deemed involuntary either because he did not understand the nature of the constitutional protections which he waives by pleading guilty, or because he had such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt. In Henderson, the defendant was charged with first degree murder but pled to second degree murder through a plea bargain. At the time of the plea, no discussion of the elements of second degree murder were had with the court; specifically, there was no reference to the requisite intent to cause the death of the victim, an element of second degree murder. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court noted that the charge of second degree murder was never formally made. The Court observed that had it been so made, it necessarily would have included the charge that the offense was committed with a design to effect the death of the victim. The Court held that lack of a formal charge resulted in failure to inform the defendant of the necessary elements of the crime and prevented his plea of guilty from being voluntary in the constitutional sense.

Henderson also held the guilty plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission by the defendant to the offense, unless he received real notice of the true nature of the charge against him. The Court noted further that ordinarily the record of the proceedings contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused. The Court in Henderson concluded that because the defendant did not receive adequate notice of the offense to which he pled guilty, his plea was involuntary; and therefore its acceptance was inconsistent with the defendant's rights of due process of law.

Schmidt's situation differs greatly from Henderson. When Schmidt appeared before the trial court to withdraw his plea of not guilty and to interpose a plea of guilty to the charge of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, the judge had the clerk read the information to Schmidt in open court, before proceeding further. Then, before allowing Schmidt to plead guilty to the offense, the judge advised him in a lengthy colloquy. The judge reminded him of the various pleas that could be entered, and that upon a plea of not guilty, a jury trial would be held and the state would be required to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge discussed the presumption of innocence; the right of confrontation; the right to subpoena witnesses; and the right against self-incrimination. The judge explained that a plea of guilty would waive the right to trial by jury as well as the other rights outlined to him. The judge advised that a plea of guilty would admit the truth of all of the essential elements of the charge as filed in the information, including the issue of intent, and that a plea of guilty would be an admission of all facts stated in the information. The judge specifically noted that a plea of guilty would admit guilt of the crime of delivery of a controlled substance. Finally, the judge advised Schmidt of the maximum penalty that could be imposed for the crime either under a plea of guilty or upon conviction following a plea of not guilty.

In addition to the foregoing, the judge further determined the voluntariness of Schmidt's plea by inquiring as to whether Schmidt was under the influence of any alcohol or other narcotic or non-narcotics of any kind; whether Schmidt had any thoughts that he was not mentally competent to...