Schmidt v. State
| Decision Date | 29 December 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 967S87,967S87 |
| Citation | 265 N.E.2d 219,24 Ind.Dec. 164,255 Ind. 443 |
| Parties | Edith Louise SCHMIDT, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Patrick N. Ryan, Jack B. Welchons, Marion, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Richard V. Bennett, Deputy Atty. Gen., William F. Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, together with one Glenn Everett Stewart, was charged by indictment with the crime of first degree murder of the appellant's husband, Larry Lee Schmidt. The indictment alleged that Larry Lee Schmidt died on the 7th day of May, 1966.
The record before us discloses the following facts:
For approximately one year prior to the death of the decedent the appellant, Edith Louise Schmidt, and Glenn Everett Stewart, had been having an affair. The decedent was aware of this situation and had attempted to break it up. During this period of time the appellant was committed to a mental institution for a short period (less than twenty days). After her release, both she and her husband attempted to persuade Stewart to stay away from their home.
On Friday evening, May 6, the evening before the alleged killing, Stewart came to appellant's home and attempted to persuade her to leave with him. This she refused to do. He told her if she would not leave with him he would kill her husband. Appellant claims that she did not believe he would actually kill her husband. However, the conversation between Stewart and the appellant continued concerning the killing of appellant's husband. Stewart then drove the appellant to a shopping center where he purchased a hatchet and a hacksaw. His stated intention was that they were to be used to dismember the body of appellant's husband after he had killed him.
That evening the appellant returned home where she spent the evening with her husband.
The following day the decedent went to work at 4:00 P.M. Stewart came to the Schmidt home at about 7:30 P.M. bringing the hatchet and hacksaw with him. He stayed a few minutes then left, but returned again before the decedent came home from work at approximately 11:55 P.M. When the decedent arrived, the appellant let him in. Almost immediately an argument ensued between the decedent and Stewart. The decedent proceeded to his bedroom, followed by Stewart. In an ensuing fight, the decedent was stabbed in the heart by Stewart. The appellant claims Stewart then forced her to clean the blood stains from the floor and help him to move the decedent's body to the basement.
After taking the body to the basement, Stewart and Mrs. Schmidt returned to the main floor of the house.
On three different occasions during the next day (Sunday) the appellant's brother came to the house. On these occasions Stewart hid 'upstairs between the closets in the bathroom, it wasn't finished, you can go up in the attic.'
After dark Sunday evening Stewart returned to the basement and spent the evening dismembering decedent's body.
On Monday Stewart took the appellant and her children to Arkansas, where appellant claims she and her children were held by Stewart as prisoners. She recites a sordid story of abuse at the hands of Stewart, of exposure in the swamps and forests of Arkansas and how she helped Stewart totally dismantle the automobile which they had driven from Indiana. She finally obtained money from Stewart, which she used to transport herself and her children via bus to the home of her parents in Sparta, Tennessee. At the trial Stewart's mother testified that at the time appellant obtained money from Stewart they embraced each other and kissed before the appellant left for Tennessee.
Up to this time authorities in Marion, Indiana, were unaware of the death of the decedent.
The first knowledge any law enforcement officer had concerning the crime of which appellant now stands convicted was a call from the appellant herself to the Sheriff of White County, Tennessee, in his office at Sparta on Sunday, May 22, 1966. At that time she registered a complaint with the Sheriff that she and her two children had been kidnapped by a man named Stewart, after he had first killed her husband in Marion, Indiana. That following the killing of her husband, Stewart had forced the appellant and her children to accompany him to Arkansas, where after a period of captivity she managed to effect her escape. Upon receiving this call, the Sheriff went to the home of appellant's mother and stepfather and obtained information in more detail of her alleged kidnapping and the death of her husband. The information thus obtained was transmitted to police officers in Marion, Indiana. Acting upon this information they went to the home of appellant in Marion where they discovered the dismembered body of her deceased husband.
Upon being informed that the appellant would willingly return to Indiana as a material witness against Stewart, police officers from Marion traveled to Sparta, Tennessee, where the defendant was again interviewed and a tape recording made of the interview.
It is true there was no warning given as described in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, prior to the making of this tape recording. Up to this time the appellant had not been arrested or confined. Her appearance at the Sparta police station was entirely voluntary. She voiced her willingness to return to Indiana and in fact signed a witness' release stating that she was willing to return to Indiana with the Marion police officers. One of the officers testified that this release was necessary in view of the fact that she was a woman and that she would be traveling with two male officers; that no female officer was in attendance and they wanted to make sure she was going freely and voluntarily.
The tape which was made in Sparta, Tennesee, was introduced in evidence as State's Exhibit 4. Standing alone it is entirely exculpatory and is merely a statement made by the appellant in which she describes the killing of her husband and the kidnapping of herself and the children at gunpoint by Stewart.
The Marion police officers transported appellant to Marion, Indiana, arriving around 10:00 o'clock in the evening. The testimony by the officers was that this was strictly because she was a material witness, and at the time she was transported she was not considered as a suspect. Upon arriving in Marion, she was immediately taken to the home of her brother. There was no restraint or incarceration of any kind. Before leaving her at her brother's home the police officers did ask her to come to the police station the next day in order that they might obtain further information.
The next day at approximately 11:00 A.M. the appellant voluntarily appeared at the Marion police station. In the meantime the officers had replayed the tape made in Sparta and had made other investigations concerning the case. When the appellant appeared at the police staion she was immediately informed by the officers she was now a possible suspect in the case, and the constitutional warnings required by the Miranda case were immediately given. Officer Harrigan gave three of the four warnings required by the Miranda case and Officer Hickman immediately added a fourth warning, that is appellant's right to remain silent.
It is true that the appellant testifying in her own behalf at the trial stated that the warnings either were not given or she did not recall the warnings being given by the police officers. Appellant argues that the statement of police authorities that they gave the proper warnings is not believable because the entire proceedings were recorded on tape recording machines with the exception of the warnings, which the officers claim to have given. Although it might have been better had the warnings been recorded at the police station, the fact that they were not recorded does not mean that they were not given, and certainly does not entitle us to wholly ignore the express statements of the police officers that the warnings were given. This, of course, presents a conflict of evidence in the trial court which was within the province of the jury to weigh and not within the province of this Court to determine. Smith v. State (1969), Ind., 18 Ind.Dec. 189, 249 N.E.2d 493.
This Court has previously recognized that 'custodial interrogation' as defined in Miranda does not apply to every statement made to police by a person concerning a crime. Smith v. State, supra. See also Maxey v. State (1969), Ind., 16 Ind.Dec. 526, 244 N.E.2d 650.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda had this to say concerning situations such as those in the case at bar. They stated at 384 U.S. page 477, 86 S.Ct. page 1629:
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