Schmidt v. Wilkinson
| Decision Date | 23 November 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 69569,69569 |
| Citation | 340 N.W.2d 282 |
| Parties | Randall SCHMIDT, Cheryl Schmidt, Kim Walter and Jean Walter, Appellants, v. James D. WILKINSON and Frances Wilkinson, Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Lyle A. Rodenburg, Council Bluffs, for appellants.
Scott H. Peters of The Peters Law Firm, P.C., Council Bluffs, for appellees.
Considered by McGIVERIN, P.J., and LARSON, SCHULTZ, CARTER and WOLLE, JJ.
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion to dismiss for plaintiffs' alleged failure to properly plead an abuse of process claim. We conclude that plaintiffs' petition sufficiently stated an abuse of process claim in compliance with the "notice pleading" requirements of Iowa R.Civ.P. 69(a). Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
The record for purposes of this appeal is very brief. Plaintiffs filed a petition on August 6, 1982. The petition consisted of two divisions. Division I was drafted to assert a claim for abuse of process. Plaintiffs alleged that plaintiffs Randall Schmidt and Kim Walter are police officers of the City of Council Bluffs. The other plaintiffs are their wives. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants filed a lawsuit against them in 1978, and that by doing so they "improperly used the civil process against plaintiffs primarily to accomplish purposes for which the civil process was not designed." Additionally, plaintiffs asserted that the prior suit by defendants was an attempt to avoid a lawful criminal prosecution. Division II asserted a claim for loss of consortium by the wives based on the abuse of process alleged in division I.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that plaintiffs failed to state a claim on which any relief can be granted.
In ruling on defendants' motion, the court entered an order dismissing plaintiffs' petition with prejudice based on its finding that "plaintiffs have failed to plead facts showing abuse of civil process." (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs then appealed from that order.
I. Consideration of a motion to dismiss in view of notice pleading. We have previously stated that for purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim on which any relief can be granted," Iowa R.Civ.P. 104(b), our "notice pleading," provided for in Iowa R.Civ.P. 69(a), requires only a "short and plain statement of the claim" and does not require the pleading of facts. Lakota Consolidated Independent School v. Buffalo Center/Rake Community Schools, 334 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Iowa 1983); Van Meter v. Van Meter, 328 N.W.2d 497, 497 (Iowa 1983). We have stated, however, that "notice pleading" requires, at a minimum, "fair notice" of the claim asserted so the other party can make an adequate response. Gosha v. Woller, 288 N.W.2d 329, 331 (Iowa 1980). We interpret our cases to mean that "notice pleading" does not require the pleading of ultimate facts that support the elements of the cause of action; however, facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the incident must be included in the petition in order to provide "fair notice" of the claim asserted. This view is consistent with Soike v. Evan Matthews & Co., 302 N.W.2d 841, 842 (Iowa 1981), where we found that a petition provides "fair notice" if it apprises a defendant of the incident giving rise to the claim, states the prima facie elements of the claim and sets forth the general nature of the action, and Gosha, 288 N.W.2d at 331, where we said that "fair notice" is not premised upon a showing that the rigid requirements of a cause of action have been pleaded.
In order to uphold the sustention of a motion to dismiss under rule 104(b), we must conclude that no state of facts is conceivable under which plaintiff might show a right of recovery. Lakota, 334 N.W.2d at 708.
II. Adequate pleading of an abuse of process claim. At the outset we note that the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion to dismiss, based on plaintiffs' failure "to plead facts showing abuse of civil process," because a plaintiff is not required to plead ultimate facts. Van Meter, 328 N.W.2d at 497.
In addition, we conclude that plaintiffs' petition sufficiently stated a claim of abuse of process in compliance with the "notice pleading" requirements of Iowa R.Civ.P. 69(a). Paragraph five of plaintiffs' petition is a concise statement of the claim of abuse of process. It alleges:
5. That defendants improperly used the civil process against plaintiffs primarily to accomplish purposes for which the civil process was not designed.
(Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs' pleading is substantially identical to the language of section 682 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) which provides the general principle for an abuse of process claim. It states:
One who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed, is subject to liability to the other for harm caused by the abuse of process.
(Emphasis added.)
We have previously adopted section 682, and comment a of that section, of the first edition of the Restatement of Torts. Mills County State Bank v. Roure, 291 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 1980); Sarvold v. Dodson, 237 N.W.2d 447, 448-49 (Iowa 1976). We today adopt section 682, and comments a and b, of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 682 is identical to the Restatement of Torts section 682 in all respects except for the addition of the word "primarily" in the second edition. This revision narrows the claim of abuse of process as explained in new comment b:
b. "Primarily." The significance of this word is that there is no action for abuse of process when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant....
For abuse of process to occur there must be use of the process for an immediate purpose other than that for which it was designed and intended. The usual case of abuse of process is one of some form of extortion, using the process to put pressure upon...
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