Schmieding v. Pennsylvania

• Decision Date: 21 June 2018
• Docket Number: 1:11-cv-2096
• Parties: KARL JOSEPH SCHMIEDING, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, HUNTINGDON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFIC, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

KARL JOSEPH SCHMIEDING, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,HUNTINGDON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFIC, et al., Respondents.

1:11-cv-2096

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

June 21, 2018

Hon. John E. Jones III

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Karl Joseph Schmieding ("Petitioner" or "Schmieding"), a state inmate currently confined at the State Correctional Institution at Forrest (SCI-Forrest), Marienville, Pennsylvania, initially filed his petition (Docs. 1, 7) for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 5, 2011, seeking relief from his pleas of guilty to all counts in Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania, criminal case CP-31-CR-0000465-2005, and Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Pennsylvania, criminal docket number CP-31-0000074-2006. (Doc. 1, p. 1). The matter is proceeding via a second amended petition, dated August 25, 2017. (Doc. 42). The second amended petition is ripe for disposition. (Docs. 42, 43, 50, 52, 53). For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. State Court Proceedings

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in considering Schmieding's appeal of the denial of relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§9541-9546, set forth the following relevant procedural background:

On September 8, 2006 [sic]¹, Appellant pled guilty to various sexual offenses against minors. At [Huntingdon County] docket number CP-31-0000465-2005, Appellant entered a guilty plea to Photographing a Child Involved in Prohibited Sexual Acts, Possession of Child Pornography, Contact with a Minor for the Purpose of Engaging in Sexual Abuse, Unlawful Use of a Computer, Unlawful Contact with a Minor, and four counts of Indecent Assault. [18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6312(b); 6312(d); 6318(a)(5); 7611(a)(1); 6318(a)(1); and 3126, respectively.] At [Franklin County] docket number CP-31-0000074-2006, Appellant entered a plea to 13 counts of Possession of Child Pornography and one count of Unlawful Use of a Computer. [18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6312(d) and 7611(a)(1), respectively.] After reviewing a pre-sentence investigation report ("PSI"), the trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of incarceration of 89 ½ to 215 months. Appellant did not pursue a direct appeal.

On September 17, 2006, Appellant filed a counseled PCRA petition. An amended PCRA petition followed on September 28, 2012. Although a hearing was conducted on January 9, 2014, Appellant's [PCRA] counsel was subsequently disbarred, for reasons not of record, and new counsel was appointed. A new evidentiaryhearing was held on October 3, 2014. The PCRA denied Appellant's petition.

(Doc. 50-5, pp. 2-3).

In his timely appeal from the denial of PCRA relief to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Schmieding raised the following issues:

1. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in ruling that the [guilty plea] was knowingly, voluntar[ily], and intelligently made where there was evidence that neither his attorney nor the [c]ourt understood the plea/sentencing?

2. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in finding [Appellant's trial] attorney effective where said attorney failed to call defense witnesses for [Appellant] at the time of sentencing?

3. Whether [Appellant's] attorney was ineffective for his failure to file an appeal?

(Id. at 3). The Superior Court affirmed the PCRA Court on February 2, 2016. (Doc. 50-5, p. 10). On September 29, 2016, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Schmieding's Petition for Allowance of Appeal. (Doc. 50-6).

B. Federal Court Proceedings

Schmieding initiated this action with the filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 5, 2011 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. (Docs. 1, 7). On November 11, 2011, the matter was transferred to this Court. On January 31, 2012, the Court stayed the petition toallow Petitioner to fully exhaust his state court remedies. (Doc. 20). On January 4, 2017, Schmieding filed a motion seeking to lift the stay as he had exhausted his state court remedies. (Doc. 36). On May 2, 2017, the Court granted Petitioner's motion, lifted the stay, and afforded him the opportunity to file an amended petition. (Doc. 38). He filed an amended petition on June 23, 2017. (Doc. 39). He filed a second amended petition two months later. (Doc. 42). The Respondent filed a response on January 23, 2018 (Doc. 50) and on February 12, 2018, Petitioner filed a traverse. On April 10, 2018, the Court issued an order directing the parties to supplement their filings to address all seven grounds raised by Petitioner. Respondent filed a supplemental response on April 13, 2018. (Doc. 55); Petitioner filed a supplemental reply on May 4, 2018 (Doc. 56).

II. ISSUES PRESENTED IN FEDERAL PETITION

1. The sentences were grossly disportinate [sic] to the crimes which violated the petitiners [sic] constitutional right agaist [sic] cruel and unusual punishment.

2. Petioner [sic] was denied his right to direct appeal on every sentencing by Counsel Abeln.

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Abeln.

4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Rominger and Counsel Ghaner PCRA Attorneys. Ablen Trial Attorney.

5. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Ghaner.

6. Breach of Plea Agreement.

7. Failure to consolidate or/and merge offenses for plea agreement/or then separated case after petitioner accepted plea.

(Doc. 42, pp. 10-11).

III. DISCUSSION

A habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the "fact or duration" of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973). Petitioner's case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, April 24, 1996 ("AEDPA"). 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides, in pertinent part:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

...

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding....

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Section 2254 sets limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011); Glenn v. Wynder, 743 F.3d 402, 406 (3d Cir. 2014). A federal court may consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner only "on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

By limiting habeas relief to state conduct which violates "the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," § 2254 places a high threshold on the courts. Typically, habeas relief will only be granted to state prisoners in those instances where the conduct of state proceedings resulted in a "fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice" or was completely inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair procedure. See, e.g., Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994).

A. Non-Cognizable Claims

"[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federalcourt is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21, 96 S.Ct. 175, 177, 46 L.Ed.2d 162 (1975) (per curiam)." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, at 67-68 (1991). "[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law." Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984).

In grounds four and five, Petitioner contends that PCRA counsel were ineffective in failing to communicate with each other and with trial counsel to obtain critical information.² (Doc. 42, pp. 10, 11). Freestanding claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel are not cognizable on federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) ("The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254."); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752-53 (1991); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1987). Accordingly, these claims will be denied as non-cognizable.

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Habeas relief "shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see also O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). The state courts must have the first opportunity to redress any claimed violation of a habeas petitioner's federal rights. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971). The habeas statute codifies this principle by requiring that a petitioner exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), meaning a state prisoner must "fairly present" his claims in "one complete round of the state's established appellate review process," before bringing them in federal court. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845 (stating "[b]ecause the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those...