Schmiege v. The State of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 14 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-CV-418-LJV |
| Parties | BRIAN E. SCHMIEGE, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
BRIAN E. SCHMIEGE, Plaintiff,
v.
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.
No. 21-CV-418-LJV
United States District Court, W.D. New York
November 14, 2022
DECISION & ORDER
LAWRENCE J. VILARDO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On March 22, 2021, the pro se plaintiff, Brian E. Schmiege, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the “ADA”). Docket Item 1. Schmiege, who is currently an inmate at the Five Points Correctional Facility (“Five Points”), asserts claims arising from his time at the Attica Correctional Facility (“Attica”)-where he resided when he filed the complaint-against New York State and various Attica employees. Id.
In a screening order issued on July 9, 2021, this Court allowed to proceed to service Schmiege's ADA claims against defendants Sean White, David Williams, and Joey Clinton; his conditions-of-confinement claims against White, Rodney Burns, Troy Emke, Andrew Snyder, and Elisabeth Couch; and his retaliation claim against Couch. Docket Item 7 at 18. But it dismissed Schmiege's section 1983 claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities and informed Schmiege that if he did not amend his complaint within 60 days of that order, his claims against New York State and the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), as well as his inadequate-medical-care claims against White, Williams, and Clinton, would also be dismissed. Id. at 18-19.
Schmiege declined to amend his complaint,[1] Docket Item 8 at 1, and on November 10, 2021, the remaining defendants moved to dismiss the remaining claims, Docket Item 15-1. Schmiege responded on January 25, 2022, Docket Item 23, and on April 11, 2022, he moved for injunctive relief, release from custody, and summary judgment on his claims, Docket Item 25. Finally, on June 29, 2022, Schmiege moved for a default judgment. Docket Item 29.
For the following reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss Schmiege's ADA and retaliation claims will be granted unless Schmiege amends his complaint to correct the deficiencies noted below. The defendants' motion to dismiss Schmiege's conditions-of-confinement claim is denied, and the Court construes Schmiege's complaint as bringing additional Eighth Amendment claims, which may also proceed. But Schmiege's motions for injunctive relief, release from custody, summary judgment, and a default judgment are denied.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND[2]
Schmiege is at least six-feet-six-inches tall and suffers from “sev[ere] nerve damage to [his] neck, back, right arm[, and] right hand,” as documented in his medical records and confirmed by electromyography (“EMG”) testing on March 5, 2021. Docket Item 1 at 5, 35. Due to his height, Schmiege requires a “long bed [f]rame [and] [h]ospital[-]style mattress” so that his head and feet do not hang off his bed, which exacerbates his nerve damage. Id. at 5, 38. Schmiege received these accommodations at “all of [his] prior prisons,” including the Auburn Correctional Facility (“Auburn”) and the Sing Sing Correctional Facility (“Sing Sing”). Id. at 5, 37-38. In fact, a doctor at Sing Sing evaluated Schmiege and confirmed that Schmiege needed an extra-long bed to accommodate his size. Id. at 38.
When Schmiege was first transferred to Attica in 2020, he requested the same accommodations, but “Deputy Security Mr. White[,] Medical Doctor David Williams[, and] Deputy of Programs Mr. Clinton” denied his requests. Id. at 5, 25-29. Schmiege filed a grievance challenging their decision, but his grievance was denied with a report noting that “medical review [did] not support [Schmiege's] requested accommodations”
and that “there [was] no evidence to suggest a long bed and extra pillow [were] medically necessary.” Id. at 28.[3]
Even worse, on January 23, 2021, White, along with “‘Lt.' Mr. Burns[,] ‘Sgt.' Mr. Emke[,] ‘Sgt.' Mr. Snyder[, and] Mental Health Ther[a]pist Ms. Couch . . . put [Schmiege] in a SHU[4] cell . . . [that] was cover[e]d in bodily [f]luids [and] cock roaches [sic] [and] was [f]reezing cold with absolutely no heat at all.” Id. at 5-6. As a result, Schmiege “bec[a]me deathly sick [and] suffer[ed] from mental [a]nguish.” Id. at 6. Schmiege and his fellow inmates brought these conditions to the attention of the Attica staff, including Couch. Id. at 6-7. In fact, all the defendants acknowledged the “dirty, disgus[]ting, unlivable[,] [and] [i]nhumane conditions of every cell on the SHU . . . [and] the very cold air.” Id. at 7. Schmiege ultimately reported Couch to the Central New York Psychiatric Center (the “CNYPC”) for “misconduct [and] abuse of power.” Id.
At some point, Couch “wrote a fabr[i]cated Tier [III] Ticket [against Schmiege] full of lies that were proven to be lies” by audio and video surveillance footage. Id. Moreover, since he reported the prison misconduct, Schmiege has been “targeted, retaliated against, [and] [] subject[ed] to victimizing acts of dehumanizing comments” and rumors “by security staff” that Schmiege is a “‘[r] at snitch.'” Id.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
DISCUSSION
I. MOTION TO DISMISS
In its prior order, this Court determined that Schmiege's ADA claim, his conditions-of-confinement claim, and his retaliation claim could proceed to service. Docket Item 7 at 17-19. The defendants have moved to dismiss each of these claims. Docket Item 15.[5] For the reasons stated below, Schmiege's conditions-of-confinement claim may proceed, but his ADA and retaliation claims cannot proceed as currently pleaded. Additionally, this Court construes Schmiege's complaint as bringing an Eighth
Amendment claim against White, Williams, and Clinton regarding Schmiege's need for an extra-long bed. That claim may proceed as well.
A. ADA Claim
Schmiege argues that White, Williams, and Clinton have violated the ADA by refusing to provide him the reasonable accommodation of an extra-long mattress and bed frame. See Docket Item 1 at 5. The defendants assert that this claim must be dismissed for two reasons. First, they argue that Title II of the ADA does not permit “claims for money damages against [state officials] in their official capacity” because such claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Docket Item 15-1 at 7-10. And even if Title II allows damages claims against state officials, the defendants argue, Schmiege's ADA claim must be dismissed because he has not stated a plausible claim. Id. at 10-16.
In this Circuit, the circumstances under which a Title II claimant can seek money damages against state officials are unsettled, to say the least.[6] But this Court need not
weigh in on this issue because even if Schmiege could overcome sovereign immunity, he has not stated a plausible ADA claim. See Cole v. Goord, 2009 WL 2601369, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009) (declining to “delve into the[] deep constitutional waters” surrounding Title II and sovereign immunity because the plaintiff's claims “fail to make out a violation of Title II in the first place”).
“Title II of the ADA requires that ‘no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.'” Wright v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132). To state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that he is a ‘qualified individual' with a disability; (2) that he was excluded from
participation in a public entity's services, programs[,] or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by a public entity; and (3) that such exclusion or discrimination was due to his disability.” Hargrave v. Vermont, 340 F.3d 27, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132); see Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003).
A “qualified individual” is
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
42 U.S.C. §12131(2). “Disability” means “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” id. § 12102(1)(A), such as-but not limited to-“caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, . . . eating, sleeping, walking, . . . [or] working,” id. § 12102(2). An impairment is not a disability unless it substantially limits a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii); see Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2005).
“[A] person's height is not ordinarily an ‘impairment' covered as a disability” under the ADA. Gowins v. Greiner, 2002 WL 1770772, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2002); see Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999) (“[A]n employer is free to decide that physical characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to the level of an impairment-such as one's height, build, or singing...
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