Schmitt v. Meritcare Health Sys.

• Decision Date: 22 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 20130013.,20130013.
• Citation: 2013 ND 136,834 N.W.2d 627
• Parties: John SCHMITT, M.D., Plaintiff and Appellant v. MERITCARE HEALTH SYSTEM, Dakota Clinic, Ltd., and Innovis Health LLC, Defendants MeritCare Health System, Appellee.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

834 N.W.2d 627

2013 ND 136

John SCHMITT, M.D., Plaintiff and Appellant

v. MERITCARE HEALTH SYSTEM, Dakota Clinic, Ltd., and Innovis Health LLC, DefendantsMeritCare Health System, Appellee.

No. 20130013.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

July 22, 2013.

Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, the Honorable Steven L. Marquart, Judge.

Bruce A. Schoenwald, Moorhead, MN, for plaintiff and appellant.

Ronald H. McLean (argued) and Peter W. Zuger (on brief), Fargo, N.D., for defendant and appellee.

SANDSTROM, Justice.

[¶ 1] John Schmitt, M.D., appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his claims against MeritCare Health System for defamation, tortious interference with a prospective business advantage, and violation of state antitrust law. We conclude Dr. Schmitt's conclusory allegations about MeritCare's conduct and responses to a credentialing questionnaire by a Dickinson hospital do not raise factual issues on his claims, and we affirm the summary judgment.

I

[¶ 2] Dr. Schmitt was employed as a physician and surgeon by Dakota Clinic from August 2002 until his contract was not renewed in December 2004, and he was employed by MeritCare from June 2005 until he terminated his employment effective July 2007. Dr. Schmitt claimed he thereafter contracted with a physician placement agency, Weatherby Locums, Inc., to provide locums tenens—temporary—physician services, which, subject to credentialing requirements, resulted in a job offer at St. Joseph's Hospital in Dickinson. Dr. Schmitt's application for employment with St. Joseph's included a release from liability for “any and all individuals, entities, or organizations who provide [St. Joseph's] in good faith and without malice, information concerning [Schmitt's] professional competence, ethics, character, health status, other qualifications and ability to work cooperatively with others.”

[¶ 3] According to Dr. Schmitt, Dakota Clinic responded “[d]o not recommend” to a credentialing questionnaire from St. Joseph's, and MeritCare would not respond to the credentialing questionnaire until Dr. Schmitt signed a separate authorization granting MeritCare immunity from liability for release of information. Dr. Schmitt claimed he initially refused to sign MeritCare's release, but he signed the authorization under duress after he learned St. Joseph's had rescinded a locums tenens offer to him. The release authorized MeritCare to provide St. Joseph's:

with any and all information and documentation requested regarding my professional qualifications, employment with MeritCare Health System and/or fitness for the position sought. This authorization specifically includes, but is not limited to, any and all information and documentation relating to my clinical competence, my professional conduct, and any other information that bears upon my ability to perform in my professional capacity, including information that may be otherwise considered to be peer review activities, during my tenure on the Medical Staff at MeritCare Hospital or in the employment of MeritCare Medical Group.

I hereby extend absolute immunity to, release from any and all liability, and agree not to sue or bring any other claim against, MeritCare Hospital, MeritCare Medical Group, MeritCare Health System, their related entities, and/or their medical staff, employees, directors, officers, agents or representatives for (1) providing the above information and documentation, and/or (2) any other action that may result from the provision of that information and documentation.

[¶ 4] MeritCare thereafter responded to preprinted questions on the credentialing questionnaire, stating Dr. Schmitt's appointment at MeritCare had never been denied or voluntarily revoked, he had not voluntarily or involuntarily changed medical staff membership or surrendered clinical privileges, his practice at MeritCare had never been investigated or subject to monitoring requirements as a result of quality determinations, he had not been named in a professional liability or medical malpractice case while at MeritCare, and he had not been a defendant in a felony criminal matter. In response to a request for a recommendation, MeritCare checked a box that it “[w]ould recommend” with a handwritten note stating “with reservation.” MeritCare's response to the questionnaire also answered “yes” to a question about whether Dr. Schmitt had any disciplinary actions at MeritCare and explained:

Dr. Schmitt was presented with an action plan based on episodes of insensitive comments and irritability with others. He submitted his resignation before completing the action plan. No restriction or limitation of privileges was suggested by the action plan.

Dr. Schmitt claimed that after MeritCare responded to the questionnaire, St. Joseph's did not re-offer him employment, and he was denied employment at other medical facilities in North Dakota and Minnesota.

[¶ 5] Dr. Schmitt sued MeritCare and Dakota Clinic under several theories of liability, seeking damages resulting from his inability to secure medical staff privileges because of MeritCare's allegedly defamatory statements and other wrongful conduct. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing all Dr. Schmitt's claims against MeritCare, including his claims for defamation and tortious interference with a prospective business advantage, and his state antitrust claims against MeritCare and Dakota Clinic. The district court decided Dr. Schmitt's separate authorization for MeritCare to answer the credentialing questionnaire was void under N.D.C.C. § 9–08–02 and Granger v. Deaconess Hosp., 138 N.W.2d 443 (N.D.1965). The court concluded, however, there were no issues of material fact on Dr. Schmitt's defamation claim against MeritCare, because MeritCare's responses to the questionnaire that it “[w]ould recommend with reservation” with the explanation for those reservations were based on truthful, nondefamatory facts disclosed in the questionnaire and were not fairly susceptible of a defamatory meaning in view of his admission the statements were “technically true.” The court decided there were no issues of material fact on Dr. Schmitt's claim against MeritCare for tortious interference with a prospective business advantage, because after dismissal of the defamation claim, there was no independent tortious or otherwise unlawful conduct under Trade 'N Post, L.L.C. v. World Duty Free Americas, Inc., 2001 ND 116, ¶ 42, 628 N.W.2d 707. The court also concluded there were no facts upon which a jury could conclude Dakota Clinic and MeritCare engaged in either a contract, combination, or conspiracy under Dr. Schmitt's state antitrust claim against MeritCare. Dr. Schmitt thereafter settled his remaining claims against Dakota Clinic,and a final judgment was entered dismissing his lawsuit.

[¶ 6] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27–05–06. Dr. Schmitt's appeal is timely under N.D.R.App.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. § 28–27–01.

II

[¶ 7] Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment “shall be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” This Court's standard for reviewing summary judgments is well established:

Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt resolution of a controversy on the merits without a trial if there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law. A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether summary judgment was appropriately granted, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party will be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the record. On appeal, this Court decides whether the information available to the district court precluded the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law which we review de novo on the entire record.

Wenco v. EOG Resources, Inc., 2012 ND 219, ¶ 8, 822 N.W.2d 701 (quoting Arndt v. Maki, 2012 ND 55, ¶ 10, 813 N.W.2d 564).

[¶ 8] A party resisting a summary judgment motion cannot merely rely on the pleadings, briefs, or unsupported and conclusory allegations. Mr. G's Turtle Mountain Lodge, Inc. v. Roland Twp., 2002 ND 140, ¶ 22, 651 N.W.2d 625.

The resisting party must present competent admissible evidence by affidavit or other comparable means which raises an issue of material fact and must, if appropriate, draw the court's attention to relevant evidence in the record by setting out the page and line in depositions or other comparable documents containing testimony or evidence raising an issue of material fact.

Id. (quoting Anderson v. Meyer Broad. Co., 2001 ND 125, ¶ 14, 630 N.W.2d 46). Summary judgment is appropriate when a party fails to establish the existence of a factual dispute on an essential element of that party's claim on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Mr. G's Turtle Mountain Lodge, at ¶ 23. When no pertinent evidence on an essential element is presented to the district court in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, it is presumed no such evidence exists. Id. Issues of fact become issues of law if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion from the facts. Saltsman v. Sharp, 2011 ND 172, ¶ 5, 803 N.W.2d 553;Heng v. Rotech Med. Corp., 2004 ND 204, ¶ 10, 688 N.W.2d 389.

III

[¶ 9] Dr. Schmitt...