Schmitz v. Carroll, Civil Action No. 02-1527-GMS (D. Del. 10/7/2003), Civil Action No. 02-1527-GMS.
| Decision Date | 07 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 02-1527-GMS. |
| Parties | JOHN ERIC SCHMITZ, Petitioner, v. THOMAS L. CARROLL, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
GREGORY SLEET, District Judge.
Petitioner John Eric Schmitz pled guilty in the Delaware Superior Court to second degree murder. The Superior Court sentenced Schmitz to twenty years in prison. He is presently incarcerated in the Delaware Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware. Schmitz has filed with the court the current petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and a motion for discovery. (D.1.s 2, 3, 7.) For the reasons explained below, the court will deny his petition and dismiss the motion as moot.
The petitioner, John Eric Schmitz, and his co-defendant, Bruce R. Banther, were indicted in Delaware Superior Court for first degree murder, first degree conspiracy, possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony, second degree forgery, and theft. The co-defendants killed Dennis Ravers with an ax. Ravers' body was found mutilated, burned, and buried in North Carolina under a trash pile. The Superior Court severed the charges and ordered separate trials for Schmitz and Banther. In 1998, Banther was tried, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole. See Schmitz v. State, 748 A.2d 914, at **1 (Del. 2000)("Schmitz I").
Jury selection for Schmitz's trial began on February 22, 1999 with a special panel summoned for that purpose. On the second day of jury selection, Schmitz's counsel and the Deputy Attorney General for the State of Delaware met in chambers before Judge Ridgely and, on the record, informed him of a proffered plea agreement. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Schmitz agreed to plead guilty to second degree murder, felony theft, and forgery in the second degree. In return, the State agreed to recommend a sentence cap of thirteen years imprisonment as permitted under Superior Court Criminal Procedure Rule 11(e)(1)(C).1 The Superior Court rejected this plea agreement.
Approximately ninety minutes later the parties presented in open court a different plea agreement. Under the terms of the new agreement, Schmitz pled guilty to the lesser included offense of second degree murder.2 In return, the State agreed to drop all the remaining charges and to recommend a sentence cap of thirteen years in prison. See State v. Schmitz, 2002 WL 484642, at *1 (Del. Super. Mar. 28, 2002)("Schmitz 2").
After a plea colloquy with Schmitz under oath, the court accepted the guilty plea and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. On May 14, 1999, the Superior Court conducted a hearing and considered the information contained in the pre-sentence report along with the arguments presented by both parties. The court sentenced Schmitz to the statutory maximum 20 years in prison for second degree murder. See Schmitz 2, at *2.
On May 20, 1999, Schmitz filed a motion for reconsideration or reduction of sentence. The Superior Court denied this motion. See Schmitz 1, at **2. Schmitz appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. Id.
Schmitz then filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. In his application, Schmitz asserted that Judge Ridgely's participation in the initial plea agreement discussions violated his right to due process, his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel, and the State breached the terms of the plea agreement concerning the recommendation of sentence. See Schmitz 2, at *1. Simultaneously, Schmitz filed a motion for the recusal of Judge Ridgely. (D.1. 20, Appellant's Op. Br. App. at A-13.) On February 12, 2001, the Superior Court denied the motion for recusal and dismissed the due process claim in Schmitz's Rule 61 motion. The Superior Court ordered an evidentiary hearing and appointed counsel to represent Schmitz on the remaining claims in his Rule 61 motion. See State v. Schmitz, ID No. 9705000274 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2001)("Schmitz 3").
After conducting an evidentiary hearing and hearing arguments from counsel with respect to the two remaining Rule 61 claims, the Superior Court denied Schmitz's Rule 61 motion. Schmitz 2. This decision was affirmed on appeal. Schmitz v. State, No. 226, 2002 (Del. Aug. 27, 2002)("Schmitz 4").
A federal district court may consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner only "on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Before the court can reach the merits of such a petition, the court must first determine whether the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") are satisfied. When the petitioner is in state custody pursuant to a state court judgment, and the federal habeas claim was adjudicated in state court on the merits, then a federal court cannot grant a writ of habeas corpus unless it finds that the state court decision either: (1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law; or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The Third Circuit requires federal courts to utilize a two-step analysis when applying the § 2254(d)(1) standard. Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1999)(en banc); see also Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980 (2001). The first step requires federal courts to identify the applicable Supreme Court precedent and then determine whether the state court decision is contrary to this clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Matteo, 171 F.3d at 888. "Relief is appropriate only if the petitioner shows that the `Supreme Court precedent requires an outcome contrary to that reached by the relevant state court.'" Werts, 228 F.3d at 197(quoting O'Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1998)). The petitioner cannot merely demonstrate "that his interpretation of Supreme Court precedent is more plausible than the state court's; rather, the petitioner must demonstrate that Supreme Court precedent requires the contrary outcome." Matteo, 171 F.3d at 888. Under this standard, habeas relief cannot be granted if the federal court merely disagrees with a reasonable state court interpretation of the applicable precedent. Id.
If the federal court concludes that the state court adjudication is not contrary to the Supreme Court precedent, the court must then determine whether the state court judgment rests upon an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 880. This analysis involves determining Id. at 891. Moreover, "in certain cases it may be appropriate to consider the decisions of inferior federal courts as helpful amplifications of Supreme Court precedent." Id. at 890. However, once again, a federal court's mere disagreement with the state court's decision does not constitute evidence of an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent by a state court. Werts, 228 F.3d at 197. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is "whether the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable." Id. (citations omitted). For example, if the state court identifies the correct legal principle, "but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case," then habeas corpus relief is appropriate. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000).
The AEDPA requires a federal court to presume that a state court's determinations of fact are correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to both explicit and implicit findings of fact. Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1084 (2001). When the standard is applied to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which involves a mixed question of law and fact, the presumption of correctness still prevails for the portion of the state court's determination regarding historical facts. Lawrie v. Snyder, 9 F. Supp.2d 428, 434 (D. Del. 1998); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984). The petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Campbell, 209 F.3d at 286.
This restriction of § 2254(d) only applies to claims that have been "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001). Consequently, if the state court did not reach the merits of the claim, then this standard does not apply on federal habeas review. Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2001); Appel, 250 F.3d at 210. Rather, where a state court did not adjudicate a claim on the merits, a federal court "`must examine, without special heed to the underlying state court decision,' whether the claim has merit." Jermyn, 226 F.3d at 300 (quoting Appel, 250 F.3d at 210). However, in analyzing the merits, the federal court must still presume any factual determinations made during the state court proceeding to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner can only rebut this presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
A federal habeas petitioner in state custody pursuant to a State court judgment must also satisfy the procedural requirements contained in the AEDPA.3 The federal habeas statute states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a ...
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