Schmitz v. Colo. State Patrol
| Decision Date | 18 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-1045,20-1045 |
| Parties | DONALD WILLIAM SCHMITZ, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. COLORADO STATE PATROL; STATE TROOPER BEN EVANS, individually and in his official capacities with Colorado State Patrol; UNKNOWN SUPERVISOR, Colorado State Patrol, Defendants - Appellants, and PARK COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE; SGT. JENNIFER PLUTT, in her individual and official capacities with Park County Sheriff's Office; SGT. COOPER, in his/her individual and official capacities with Park County Jail; DEPUTY LEDVINA, in his/her individual and official capacities with Park County Jail; UNKNOWN DEPUTIES OF THE PARK COUNTY JAIL; PARAMEDIC DAVE SANDERS, in his individual and official capacities with South Park Ambulance Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
(D. Colo.)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
Colorado State Trooper Ben Evans came across Appellee Donald Schmitz late one night after Schmitz had hit a guardrail with his car. Trooper Evans quickly recognized that Schmitz was out of sorts: he didn't know where he was, he struggled to answer simple questions, and he said his head hurt. So Trooper Evans conducted several sobriety tests, each of which Schmitz failed. But Trooper Evans didn't smell even a hint of alcohol. After talking it over with his sergeant, Trooper Evans nonetheless arrested Schmitz for driving under the influence of drugs. At no point did Trooper Evans call for medical professionals to assess Schmitz despite his concerning condition. As it turned out, Schmitz's symptoms weren't the result of drugs or alcohol. A blood test revealed no traces of either substance. But the test did detect in Schmitz's blood elevated levels of ammonia, caused by the sudden onset of a liver problem and necessitating a three-day hospital stay immediately after Schmitz was released from jail. Schmitz's liver condition likely caused his confusion and the ensuing car crash.
Among other things, Schmitz asserted a state tort claim against Trooper Evans for failing to ensure he received adequate medical attention. Trooper Evans moved to dismiss the claim on state immunity grounds: Colorado law shields public employees from suit unless they engage in "willful and wanton" conduct. Although TrooperEvans argued that Schmitz's allegations amounted to no more than negligence, the district court disagreed and denied Trooper Evans's motion. Trooper Evans now asks that we reverse that denial. But because we conclude that Schmitz sufficiently alleged that Trooper Evans acted willfully and wantonly, we affirm.
While driving home from work late at night in May 2018, Schmitz became disoriented and crashed his car into a guardrail near Fairplay, Colorado. Just after midnight, Trooper Evans arrived at the scene and found Schmitz in his car. Trooper Evans quickly realized that Schmitz "was very confused"; he didn't know where he was going or coming from. App. at 68. Although Schmitz repeatedly said that he was heading "just up the road," Trooper Evans later learned that Schmitz had already driven past his house. Id. (quoting App. at 14). In directing Schmitz to get out of the car, Trooper Evans had to repeatedly tell Schmitz to unbuckle his seatbelt. When exiting the car, Schmitz closed the door on his arm and had to use his car for support. Moving slowly, Schmitz stated that he was "waiting for his head to get out." Id. (quoting App. at 15).
Apparently suspecting that Schmitz was drunk, Trooper Evans conducted three field-sobriety tests. Schmitz failed all three. Trooper Evans recorded his observations of several "indicia of impairment, including slow hand movements, confusion, inappropriate answers to simple question[s] and using the vehicle to exit." Id. (quoting App. at 15). Yet he didn't smell alcohol. Trooper Evans discussed the matterwith his sergeant and, at the sergeant's direction, arrested Schmitz for driving under the influence of drugs.
Trooper Evans took Schmitz to Park County Jail. When Schmitz arrived "he was visibly flushed, had an elevated pulse, could not support his own weight, and did not understand questions." Id. at 69. He stayed at the jail overnight and continued to exhibit the same symptoms. At some point during the night, he lost control of his bowels, defecating in his clothing.
While at the jail, Schmitz provided a urine sample and agreed to a blood test and a drug-recognition expert evaluation. His tests results came back negative for illicit drugs and showed a blood alcohol concentration of zero. His urinalysis, however, showed large quantities of blood in his urine. Despite his symptoms, no one at the jail provided any kind of medical care, assistance, or monitoring.
Schmitz's wife picked him up at 10 a.m. the next morning. One of the staff medical providers advised Mrs. Schmitz to take her husband to the emergency room immediately, which she did. Schmitz remained at the hospital for three days. He was diagnosed with acute hepatic encephalopathy1 and acute kidney injury, complications stemming from his liver cirrhosis. These conditions resulted in elevated ammonia levels in his blood, likely causing his confusion the previous night.
Schmitz sued the Colorado State Patrol ("State Patrol"), Trooper Evans, an unknown supervising officer (collectively, "Appellants"), and several other state and county officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Colorado tort law. Schmitz asserted four claims against Appellants—two federal and two state. First, he claimed Trooper Evans lacked probable cause to arrest him, violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Second, he claimed Trooper Evans displayed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, violating his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.2 Third, he asserted a claim based on "Supervisory Liability" and "Official Capacity" against the State Patrol. Id. at 20. Fourth, he claimed Trooper Evans and the State Patrol violated Colorado tort law by failing to provide him appropriate medical attention.
Appellants moved to dismiss all claims against them. In opposing the Motion to Dismiss, Schmitz supported his claims with new allegations—not included in the Complaint—based on dashcam video of the arrest. The video of the interaction captured Trooper Evans asking Schmitz whether he took any medications. Schmitz responded that "he took a lot of medication but had not taken them that day." Id. at 48. When another officer arrived, Trooper Evans asked if they should have "medical"respond or see if they could contact someone he lived with to corroborate whether he "was off his medications." Id. The officers took neither action.3
The district court granted most of Appellants' Motion to Dismiss, allowing only Schmitz's state tort claim to advance against Trooper Evans and the State Patrol.4 On the two constitutional claims, the district court ruled that Trooper Evans was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct "was not a violation of clearly established law." Id. at 74; id. at 73 (). Because the district court determined that Trooper Evans didn't violate clearly established law, it didn't consider whether his actions amounted to constitutional violations.
Addressing the state tort claim, Appellants argued that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (the "Immunity Act" or "Act") barred Schmitz's claim. Specifically, Appellants asserted that the Act (1) completely immunizes public entities and (2) immunizes public employees from suit unless they engage in willful and wanton conduct. Appellants maintained that Schmitz had failed to sufficiently allege willful and wanton conduct in his Complaint. From that, they argued that Colorado had not waived its sovereign immunity regarding Schmitz's claim againstTrooper Evans, thus depriving the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court disagreed, ruling that Schmitz had sufficiently alleged that Trooper Evans had acted willfully and wantonly. The district court also found that Schmitz's tort claim could proceed against the State Patrol under a theory of vicarious liability. This appeal followed.
Appellants appeal the portion of the district court's Order allowing Schmitz's state tort claim to advance against Trooper Evans and the State Patrol. After setting out the applicable legal framework, we consider Schmitz's jurisdictional challenges, Appellants' substantive arguments, and Schmitz's request for sanctions. Although we agree with Appellants that Schmitz's tort claim cannot proceed against the State Patrol, we affirm the district court's ruling allowing the claim to advance against Trooper Evans.
Colorado's Immunity Act provides the following limited sovereign immunity to public employees:
A public employee shall be immune from liability in any claim for injury . . . which lies in tort or could lie in tort . . . and which arises out of an act or omission of such employee occurring during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment unless the act or omission causing such injury was willful and wanton . . . .
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(2)(a) (emphasis added). Although the Act nowhere defines "willful and wanton," Colorado's courts have defined the term (discussed below).
The Act also grants sovereign immunity to public entities: "A public entity shall be immune from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort . . . except as provided otherwise in this section." Id. § 24-10-106(1). The section then lists nine exceptions, none of which applies here. Id. § 24-10-106(1)(a)-(i).
"Because [the Immunity Act] derogates the common law, courts must strictly construe provisions that grant immunity, broadly construe the provisions that waive immunity, and...
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