Schmoll v. Housing Authority of St. Louis County

• Decision Date: 09 February 1959
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 46875,46875,2
• Parties: Warren SCHMOLL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY et al., Defendants-Respondents
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 494

321 S.W.2d 494

Warren SCHMOLL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY et al., Defendants-Respondents.

No. 46875.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

Feb. 9, 1959.

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court en Banc Denied

March 9, 1959.

J. A. Gochenour and Frank Bild, St. Louis, for appellants.

John J. McAtee, Clayton, Elmer Price, Irvin Dagen, St. Louis, for respondents Housing Authority and others.

William B. Kline, Clayton, C. W. Detjen, St. Louis, for Respondents Luman F. Matthews and St. Louis County.

BARRETT, Commissioner.

In this action resident taxpayers have sought a declaratory judgment with respect to the legality of a cooperation agreement between St. Louis County and the Housing Authority of St. Louis County. Because of the asserted invalidity of the agreement the plaintiffs initially asked for a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants from carrying out the agreement. The only parties defendant are St. Louis County and its supervisor and the Housing Authority of St. Louis County, its commissioners and executive director-secretary. Upon defendants' separate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the trial court, in effect, made no declaration other than the single conclusion that 'St. Louis County had authority to contract with St. Louis County Housing Authority, a municipal corporation, by resolution or order.' Upon that single conclusion, apparently, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' petition. The plaintiffs have appealed and urge that the cooperation agreement is void for several reasons, that the trial court did not declare, determine and adjudicate the rights of the parties, and it is insisted that this court declare the contract void and accordingly adjudicate the respective rights of the parties and reverse the trial court's judgment dismissing the petition.

The Housing Authorities Law (V.A.M.S. Secs. 99.010 to 99.230) and cooperative agreements between the City of St. Louis and Kansas City and their respective housing authorities have been before this court on three occasions; St. Louis Housing Authority v. St. Louis, 361 Mo. 1170, 239 S.W.2d 289; Bader Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Housing Authority, 358 Mo. 747, 217 S.W.2d 489; Laret Investment Co. v. Dickmann, 345 Mo. 449, 134 S.W.2d 65. In those cases the housing act was declared constitutional and the cooperation agreements between the municipalities and the housing authorities authorized and valid. See also Annotations 130 A.L.R. 1069; 172 A.L.R. 966. The essential provisions of the housing law and of the cooperation agreements were set forth in the opinions in those cases and there is no reason to again detail the provisions of the act or to set forth the terms of the agreemtnt. The General Assembly by enacting the Housing Authorities Law and the courts in construing the law and upholding the law and the cooperation agreements have declared the state's public purpose and policy and the essential merits and philosophy of the law are no longer open questions in this court. In this connection, the plaintiffs do not attack the essential validity of the law, nor do they attack the basic findings and facts upon which the cooperation agreements are based; they do not claim that the areas and projects, Jefferson Barracks and Webster Heights, are not appropriate subjects for application of the law and the consequent execution of the agreement. Since the state's public purpose and policy have thus been established and similar cooperation agreements have been held to be authorized and valid, it is appropriate to rather summarily dispose of some of the plaintiffs' claims that this cooperation agreement is void.

For example, it is said that the agreement is void in that it binds the county to waive taxes for the school districts in which the housing developments are located and requires the school districts to furnish facilities to the housing projects when in fact the county or the county council have no jurisdiction over school districts, their taxes and facilites. It is said that the agreement is void in that it binds the county to furnish the housing authority with sewers when sewers are under the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District. It is said that St. Louis County 'has no authority to contract to pass future legislation' and therefore the agreement is ultra vires in so far as the county agrees in the future to vacate streets or alleys or modify the county zoning law. Some of the statements contained in the argument are mere assumptions on the part of the plaintiffs and the assumptions do not correspond with the actual terms of the agreement. To illustrate, as to zoning the agreement provides, 'In so far as the Municipality may lawfully do so' the county will 'make such changes in any zoning of the site and surrounding territory of such Project as are reasonable and necessary for the development and protection of such Project and the surrounding territory.' The county agrees to furnish 'public services and facilities of the same character and to the same extent as are furnished from time to time without cost or charge to other dwellings and inhabitants in the Municipality' and it agrees that it will accept, upon request, the dedication of streets and sewers constructed and paid for by the authority, but we do not find any provision requiring the county, without regard to the powers and functions of the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, to furnish sewers.

These examples are sufficient to illustrate the point that the agreement does not purport to bargain away the powers and duties of either the county zoning board or the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District or of any other political subdivision, and, of course, the county could not barter away any of these functions. State on Information of Dalton v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 365 Mo. 1, 275 S.W.2d 225. The county only agrees to do in these particular respects what it 'may lawfully do,' and if it has no power or authority as to these matters, as the appellants assert, it would seem to make but little difference in the essential validity of the agreement. Whether they would have it so or not and regardless of what the agreement may say, the parties, both the housing authority and the county, have contracted in the knowledge that some of these subjects, schools, sewers and zoning, are governed by other constitutional and statutory provisions and in so far as they are pertinent are likewise a part of and may modify this contract.

It has been expressly held on two occasions, and all the reasons were fully considered, that housing authority property is exempt from ad valorem taxes. Laret Investment Co. v. Dickmann, supra; Bader Realty & Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Housing Authority, supra. See also: Annotations 133 A.L.R. 365; 152 A.L.R. 239. One of the reasons housing authority property is exempt from taxation is that it too is a municipal corporation and by virtue of the constitution and express legislation such property 'may be exempted from taxation by general law.' V.A.M.S.Const.Mo. art. 10, Sec. 6; V.A.M.S., Sec. 137.100. If for any reason the housing authority is subject to school taxes the county council could not, of course, bargain away or waive the schools' taxes. The agreement recites that 'Under the constitution and statutes of the State of Missouri, all Projects are exempt from all real and personal property taxes levied or imposed by any Taxing Body' and so long as the contract remains in force 'the Municipality agrees that it will not levy or impose any real or personal property taxes upon such Project or upon the Local Authority with respect thereto.' Nevertheless, as one alternative, the county agrees to accept and the housing authority agrees to make an annual payment 'in lieu of taxes may be the amount by which the real property taxes which would have been paid to all taxing bodies for such fiscal year, if such property were not exempt from taxation.' And the county agrees to distribute the annual payments among the taxing bodies 'in the proportion which the real property taxes which would have been paid.' Inferentially if not directly the provision with respect to annual payments in lieu of taxes was declared to be valid, in a suit for a declaratory judgment, St. Louis Housing Authority v. St. Louis, supra. Furthermore, the school districts, the county zoning board and the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District are not parties to this litigation or to this agreement, and except in so far as tangentially indicated it is neither desirable nor possible in this proceeding to adjudicate the rights, duties or obligations of these political subdivisions with respect to the housing authority or the county, even at the behest of resident taxpayers.

Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the agreement refer to contracts and loans between 'Local Authority' (Housing Authority of St. Louis County) and 'PHA' (Public Housing Administration) and therefore it is said that the contract 'does not set out the whole agreement between the parties' as required by the cooperation agreement statute, V.A.M.S. Sec. 70.230. It is said that no time is fixed and no consideration to the county expressed or provided and therefore the agreement is void. As indicated, the two latter contentions were before the court in St. Louis Housing Authority v. St....