Schnable v. Providence Pub. Mkt.

• Decision Date: 29 October 1902
• Citation: 24 R.I. 477,53 A. 634
• Parties: SCHNABLE v. PROVIDENCE PUBLIC MARKET.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

53 A. 634

24 R.I. 477

SCHNABLE

v. PROVIDENCE PUBLIC MARKET.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Oct. 29, 1902.

Action by Samuel Schnable against the Providence Public Market. There was judgment for plaintiff. Petition for new trial denied.

Argued before STINESS, C. J., and TILLINGHAST and ROGERS, JJ.

C. M. Salisbury, for plaintiff.

David S. Baker, for defendant.

TILLINGHAST, J. The first ground upon which the plaintiff bases his petition for a new trial is that the damages awarded by the jury are inadequate to compensate him for the loss sustained by the death of his child. The child was a boy of five years of age, and was killed by the falling upon him of a heavy box through the negligent handling thereof by the defendant's servants; and the jury assessed the plaintiff's damages in the sum of $750.

1. The measure of damages in a case of this sort is the pecuniary loss which the parent sustains by reason of being deprived of the child's services during his minority. Nothing can be given by way of solace for wounded feelings or for the bereavement suffered (City of Chicago v. Hesing, 83 Ill. 207, 25 Am. Rep. 378; Agricultural & Mechanical Ass'n v. State, 71 Md. 86, 18 Atl. 37, 17 Am. St. Rep. 507; Caldwell v. Brown, 53 Pa. 459; 2 Sedg. Meas. Dam. 536-539, and cases in note), and nothing for loss of society of the child (McGarr v. Worsted Mills, 24 R. I. 447, 53 Atl. 320). The only question, therefore, for the jury to determine in such a case, is what, in their judgment, would have been the pecuniary value of the child's services from the time of the accident which resulted in its death to the time when it would have reached the age of majority, had the injury not been sustained, less the child's proper support and maintenance. That this is a very difficult question to answer, and that it is absolutely incapable of exact determination, no one will deny. The child might or might not have lived till it was 21. It might have lived to that age without being able to render any services of pecuniary value. It might have refused to live with its parents, or to render them any services if it had remained with them, or, on the other hand, it might have been a dutiful and useful child, and rendered much valuable service to them. These contingencies, and numerous others which might be mentioned, and which are within the realm of practical experience, show that, at the best, the question aforesaid is very largely a problematical, if not, indeed, a speculative, one, and hence is peculiarly within the province of a jury to determine, after hearing all of the evidence bearing upon the situation and standing in life of the parent, the physical and mental condition of the child, his surroundings and prospects, and all the other circumstances of the case. They see and hear the witnesses, they are generally heads of families and have children of their own, and therefore have peculiar knowledge as to the pecuniary value of children's services, as well as of the expense attending their support and education, and hence are in a position to approximate more nearly to the correct solution of such a difficult question than any other tribunal can be. It follows, therefore, that unless it be made to appear in a given case that the jury were influenced by passion, prejudice, or some improper motive, or that they failed to be governed by the law and the evidence in the case, their finding upon the question of damages will not be disturbed. An examination of the record presented in this case fails to satisfy us that the jury were thus improperly influenced, or that they in any respect disregarded their duty in the premises, or that the damages awarded by them are Inadequate to fully compensate the plaintiff for the net pecuniary loss sustained by the death of his child. It is true, the verdict is for a smaller amount than that awarded in the cases cited by the plaintiff, but it is also true that it is larger than the amount awarded in a number of cases cited by the defendant. Such lack of uniformity must always be expected in tort actions, and especially in those of this class. Different juries almost invariably render different verdicts as to damages, even when trying the same case. And it is certainly not within the bounds of reason to expect them to conform to any rule approaching exactness in this matter, when the cases themselves are different. For a collection of cases showing the different amounts awarded by juries, and either sustained or held excessive by the courts, see Tiff. Death Wrong. Act, pp. 199-212. The following cases are pertinent as bearing upon the question of damages, under statutes similar to ours, in cases of this sort, and fully sustain the view which we have taken, viz.: Caldwell v. Brown, 53 Pa. 453, at page 459; Terhune v. Contracting Co. (Sup.) 76 N. Y. Supp. 255; Cumberland & P. R. Co. v. State, 44 Md. 283; Reger v. Railroad Co. (Sup.) 37 N. Y. Supp. 520; Hurst v. Railway Co., 84 Mich. 539, 48 N. W. 44, at page 545, 84 Mich., and at page 44, 48 N. W.; Telfer v. Railroad Co., 30 N. J. Law, 188; Pennsylvania Co. v. Lilly, 73 Ind. 252; Benton v. Railroad Co., 55 Iowa, 496, 8 N. W. 330; Rains v. Railway Co., 71 Mo. 164, 36 Am. Rep. 459; Agricultural & Mechanical Ass'n v. State, 71 Md. 86, 18 Atl. 37, 17 Am....