SCHNEIDER NAT. CARRIERS, INC. v. Tinney
Decision Date | 26 May 2000 |
Citation | 776 So.2d 753 |
Parties | SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC. v. Kenneth A. TINNEY. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
John W. Clark, Jr., and Joseph E. Stott of Clark & Scott, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
R. Ben Hogan III and J. Lee Roberts, Jr., of Hogan, Smith & Alspaugh, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.
This case involves the failure of a safety device known as a "rear-impact guard" that was attached to a cargo trailer owned by Schneider National Carriers, Inc. ("Schneider"). On April 17, 1995, Kenneth Tinney was driving an automobile on Interstate Highway 20 when he rear-ended the cargo trailer owned by Schneider. The rear-impact guard failed, and Tinney was injured.
Tinney sued Schneider. The gravamen of his complaint was that the rear-impact guard had not been reasonably maintained. Schneider moved for a summary judgment. The trial court delayed ruling on the motion until discovery was completed, which was almost seven months after the court had heard oral argument on the motion. After discovery had been completed, Tinney did not oppose the summary-judgment motion; the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Schneider on November 9, 1998. That summary judgment read:
Tinney continued his action against Alfa and Wabash. On May 21, 1999, Tinney moved to reinstate Schneider as a defendant. The factual basis of the motion was newly discovered evidence. The legal basis of the motion was that the trial court's November 9, 1998, order had not been made a final order because the judge had not used the words "no just reason for delay" in the concluding sentence of the summary judgment, quoted above. Tinney contended that Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., required that the judge use those exact words to make an order final under Rule 54(b). On September 1, 1999, almost 10 months after it had entered the summary judgment, the trial court granted the motion to reinstate Schneider, explaining its action in an amended order:
Schneider appeals the trial court's September 1, 1999, order reinstating it as a defendant. Schneider argues that the November 9, 1998, order was a final judgment.
The pertinent portion of Rule 54(b) provides:
"[W]hen multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the ... parties only upon an express1 determination2 that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."
(Emphasis added.)
In Sho-Me Motor Lodges, Inc. v. Jehle-Slauson Construction Co., 466 So.2d 83 (Ala.1985), this Court held that the following language, which concluded two summary-judgment orders, made the two orders final pursuant to Rule 54(b) even though the language did not mention Rule 54(b) and even though it stated no "express direction" for the entry of final judgments: "The Court further finds there is no just reason for delay in the entry of said final judgment." 466 So.2d at 87. We held in Sho-Me that if it is clear and obvious from the language used by the trial court in its order that the court intended to enter a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b), then we will treat the order as a final judgment:
In this present case, the trial court specifically cited Rule 54(b) as its ground for "expressly" making the summary judgment final. By citing Rule 54(b), the trial court implicitly incorporated the language of Rule 54(b) into its order. It would take a tortured and biased reading of the trial court's summary-judgment order to find anything but an express intent to make the order final under Rule 54(b). We are not generally approving the omission of language stating that the court has made "an express determination that there is no just reason for delay," because Rule 54(b) explicitly calls for such a determination. However, to say the determination is absent in this case would exalt form over substance, given the quoted portion of the trial court's order. Nonetheless, the better practice is for the trial court's order to speak to the point directly. Nothing in Rule 54(b) requires findings to buttress the conclusion "that there is no just reason for delay." All that is required is an "express determination."3 Therefore, the trial court's November 9, 1998, summary-judgment order was a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b).
Pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., Tinney had four months to seek relief from the November 9, 1998, final judgment, on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. Tinney did not seek such relief until more than six months after the final judgment had been entered. Therefore, the trial court was jurisdictionally barred from reinstating Schneider as a defendant.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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