Schneider v. Almgren

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WIGGINS
• Citation: Schneider v. Almgren, 173 Wash.2d 353, 268 P.3d 215 (Wash. 2011)
• Decision Date: 22 December 2011
• Docket Number: No. 85112–3.
• Parties: Carol Marie (Almgren) SCHNEIDER, Respondent,andJeffrey Joseph Almgren, Petitioner.

173 Wash.2d 353

268 P.3d 215

Carol Marie (Almgren) SCHNEIDER, Respondent,andJeffrey Joseph Almgren, Petitioner.

No. 85112–3.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Sept. 22, 2011.Decided Dec. 22, 2011.

Charles M. Stroschein, Attorney at Law, Lewiston, ID, for Petitioner.

Scott Calvin Broyles, Attorney at Law, Clarkston, WA, for Respondent.

WIGGINS, J.

[173 Wash.2d 355] ¶ 1 The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), chapter 26.2A RCW, governs modification of child support obligations in Washington when the initial child support order was entered in a different state but one of the parties lives in Washington. The UIFSA provides that the duration of child support is governed by the laws of the original forum state. Jeffrey Almgren and Carol Schneider divorced in Nebraska and Schneider moved to Washington with the couple's two children. We hold that the superior court erred by extending the father's child support obligation past the age of majority by granting postsecondary support for the daughter to attend college. Nebraska law would not have allowed postsecondary support in this case, and the UIFSA provides that the law of the original forum state governs the duration of child support. We reverse the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Carol Schneider (the mother) and Jeffrey Almgren (the father) were divorced in Nebraska in 1997. The couple had two children, Amanda born December 24, 1990 and D.J.A. born October 31, 1993. The decree of dissolution set child support to continue during each child's minority. In Nebraska, the age of majority is 19 years. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42–371.01(1). The Nebraska court modified the decree, approving the mother's move with the children to Washington and adjusting obligations to provide health insurance for the children. Neither modification changed the duration of the father's child support obligation.

¶ 3 The mother moved with the children to Washington, and the father moved to Minnesota. In December 2005, the mother registered and moved to modify the Nebraska decree in Asotin County under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, chapter 26.27 RCW. The mother also submitted the Nebraska decree and subsequent modifications under a cover sheet for UIFSA documents. The record does not reveal whether the mother also filed a petition to modify child support under the UIFSA. But her petition to modify the parenting plan/residential schedule was based, in part, on changed economic circumstances, including the fact that child support had not been reviewed since 1997. And under “Relief Requested,” the mother asked that the court (1) modify the custody decree/parenting plan/residential schedule and (2) “[e]nter an order establishing child support in conjunction with the proposed parenting plan/residential schedule....” Clerk's Papers at 325.

¶ 4 In January 2007, the Asotin County Superior Court entered an order of child support stating that the obligation would terminate when the children reach 18 or graduate from high school, whichever occurs last, and reserving the right to request postsecondary support. The order was entered without objection by the father regarding the application of the UIFSA or challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction to modify the Nebraska child support order.

¶ 5 In January 2009, the mother petitioned for postsecondary educational support for Amanda, who was still 18 and in high school and had been accepted for admission to Eastern Washington University. The father filed a cross-motion to modify child support for the younger child downward due to the father's recent loss of his job. The trial court granted the mother's motion for postsecondary educational support for Amanda and denied the father's motion for a downward modification.

¶ 6 The father moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of the trial court's authority under the UIFSA to enter orders extending child support for Amanda beyond the age of majority in Nebraska. After hearing argument, the trial court denied reconsideration. Although recognizing the underlying policy of the UIFSA to prevent forum shopping for child support, the trial court declined to reconsider its jurisdiction, considering the time that had passed since it had entered a child support order in this case with no objection from either party. The trial court ruled that it had jurisdiction to modify its own 2007 child support order, overruled the father's objections, and entered the findings/conclusions and child support order.

¶ 7 The father filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. In re Marriage of Schneider, noted at 157 Wash.App. 1045, 2010 WL 3304309. The Court of Appeals held (1) the UIFSA did not apply to the award of postsecondary educational support because the trial court modified its own 2007 order, not the Nebraska order, id. at *3; (2) even if UIFSA had applied, it would not have prevented the trial court from extending the father's child support duty because Nebraska law permitted the extension, id.; and (3) the trial court's findings of fact supported the award, id. at *5–6. We granted review on the issue of postsecondary support only. In re Marriage of Schneider, 170 Wash.2d 1025, ––– P.3d –––– (2011).

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 A superior court's statutory authority is a question of law that we review de novo. Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 Wash.2d 540, 548–49, 78 P.3d 1279 (2003); Labriola v. Pollard Grp., Inc., 152 Wash.2d 828, 100 P.3d 791 (2004).

I. A Brief History of the UIFSA

¶ 9 To understand the issues presented by this case, it is helpful to understand the origin of the UIFSA. The UIFSA was developed in response to federal legislation impacting state child support enforcement laws. Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Construction and Application of Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 90 A.L.R. 5th § 2, at 31 (2001). Prior to the development of the UIFSA, when parties in a child support action lived in different states, each state could issue its own child support orders. Id. This potential for competing child support orders, with varying terms and duration depending on the issuing jurisdiction, resulted in a proliferation of litigation. Unif. Interstate Family Support Act (2008) § 611, 9 pt. 1B U.L.A. cmt. at 139 (Supp.2011). The UIFSA addressed this “chaos” by establishing a “one-order” system for child support orders by providing that one state would have continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the order. Id. at 139–40. The UIFSA enforces the one-order system in a variety of ways, including registration of out-of-state child support orders for either enforcement, modification, or both. See Kemper, supra, § 2; see also RCW 26.21A.500–A.515 (enforcement); RCW 26.21A.550–A.570 (modification). The modification provisions of the UIFSA are mirrored in the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B.

¶ 10 The UIFSA was revised in 1996, 2001, and 2008. Id.; see 9 pt. 1B U.L.A. prefatory note at 73 (Supp.2011). Shortly after the 1996 revision, Congress required all states to adopt the UIFSA in order to remain eligible to receive federal funding for child support enforcement. 42 U.S.C. § 666(f); Kemper, supra, § 2. All 50 states have done so. Kemper, supra, § 2. Washington has adopted the 2001 revisions. Laws of 2002, ch. 198, §§ 101–906; ch. 26.21A RCW.

¶ 11 In this case, the ultimate issue presented by the parties is whether the trial court's award of postsecondary educational support was correct.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶ 12 We first address the threshold issue of the trial court's authority to enter the 2007 order, which modified support and reserved the mother's right to seek postsecondary support. Washington and some other states have sometimes treated the trial court's authority to modify the duration of an out-of-state child support order as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Erickson, 98 Wash.App. 892, 896–97, 991 P.2d 123 (2000) (holding that UIFSA granted subject matter jurisdiction to enforce an out-of-state child support order only if the order was registered under the act and specified conditions were met); In re Marriage of Doetzl, 31 Kan.App.2d 331, 337, 65 P.3d 539 (2003) (trial court “lacked jurisdiction to modify the duration of [the father's] support obligation” where the duration of the obligation was not modifiable in the initial forum state); Phillips v. Fallen, 6 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Mo.1999) (holding that “[a] Washington court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Kansas order” where the registration provisions of Washington's UIFSA were not met).

¶ 13 We reach this issue (even though neither party raised it) in order to decide whether we can properly reach the issues pertaining to the 2009 modification.¹ We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction in 2007, but lacked authority to enter the order, which was erroneous. We reject the reasoning of Erickson, which injects an unnecessary note of confusion into UIFSA.

a. The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Nebraska child support order in 2007

¶ 14 Washington superior courts have jurisdiction “in all cases ... in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested in some other court.” Const. art. IV, § 6. This broad constitutional grant of jurisdiction on the superior courts requires that exceptions to that jurisdiction be narrowly read. Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wash.2d 249, 251, 692 P.2d 793 (1984). Where a court does lack subject matter jurisdiction to issue an order, the order is void. See Marley v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 125 Wash.2d 533, 541, 886 P.2d 189 (1994). But subject matter jurisdiction refers to the court's authority to entertain a type of controversy, not simply lack of...